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POLITICAL, SOCIOLOGICAL AND MILITARY AFFAIRS

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26 April 1984

EAST EUROPE REPORT  
POLITICAL, SOCIOLOGICAL AND MILITARY AFFAIRS

## CONTENTS

## ALBANIA

- Relations With Yugoslavia, Greece Hurt by Nationalism  
(Kaija Virta; HELSINKIN SANOMAT, 26 Mar 84)..... 1

## GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC

- Proposed Honecker FRG Visit Raises Legal Questions  
(FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE, 22 Mar 84)..... 6

## HUNGARY

- Criticism of Proposed Sociopolitical Ideas Rejected  
(Istvan Hagelmayer, Laszlo Antal; TARSADALMI  
SZEMLE, No 2, 1984)..... 9

- CP Seeks Policy Line To Explain Problematic 1950 Era  
(PARTELET, No 3, Mar 84)..... 25

- Church-State Dialogue Advocated To Maintain National Unity  
(VILAGOSSAG, Jan 84; MAGYAR NEMZET, 4 Feb 84)..... 37

- Lutheran Bishop Advocates Dialogue  
Churches Offer Social Benefits

- Economic Reform Popularized in Movie House Documentary  
(HETI VILAGGAZDASAG, 3 Mar 84)..... 44

POLAND

Results of Krakow Reports-Elections Conference (Various sources, 30 Jan 84).....	48
Account of Proceedings	
Additional Information on Proceedings	
First Secretary's Speech, by Jozef Gajewicz	
Barcikowski's Speech, by Kazimierz Barcikowski	
Role of Press in Socialist State Debated (Various sources, 1, 14 Feb 84).....	73
Press Vehicle for Politicians, by Kazimierz Kozniewski	
Press as Forum for Readers, by Zbigniew Siedlecki	
Archbishop Bazyli Discusses Orthodox Church (Bazyli Interview; PRZEGLAD TYGODNIOWY, 4 Mar 84).....	80
FRG Statements on German Minority Questioned (Various sources, 10, 12 Feb 84).....	90
Intentional Political Provocation, by Jerzy Nowakowski	
Legal Definition Questioned, by Jan Barcz	
Mertes Equated With Goebbels, by Jerzy Pardus	
Olszowski Voices Concern, Stefan Olszowski Interview	
Baka Speaks for Reform, Dismisses 'NOT' Charges as 'Demagoguery' (Various sources, 8, 13, 14, 25 Mar 84).....	111
Arena of 'Political Struggle', Editorial, by Wladyslaw Baka	
Baka Press Conference, by Andrzej Leszczynski	
Erratum to Press Conference Story, by Andrzej Leszczynski	
Additional Details on Press Conference, by Tomasz Jezioranski	
Militia Official Discusses Warsaw Crime (Edward Klosowski Interview; ZYCIE WARSZAWY, 30 Mar 84).....	119
PZPR Conference Record Rated in Economic Affairs Weekly (ZYCIE GOSPODARCZE, No 13, 25 Mar 84).....	121

ROMANIA

Decree on Ministry of Education, Instruction Amended (BULETINUL OFICIAL, No 22, 19 Mar 84).....	125
Decree on Ministry of Foreign Affairs Amended (BULETINUL OFICIAL, No 22, 19 Mar 84).....	127
Briefs	
New Deputy Chairmen	129
Peoples Councils Appointments	129

YUGOSLAVIA

Schedule of Electoral Changes in Federal-Level Functions (BORBA, 14 Mar 84).....	130
Joze Smole Discusses Degree of Liberalism in Ljubljana (Joze Smole Interview; BORBA, 22 Feb 84).....	134
Slovene Unions Oppose Further Decline in Living Standard (Helena Kos; DELO, 6 Apr 84).....	139

ALBANIA

RELATIONS WITH YUGOSLAVIA, GREECE HURT BY NATIONALISM CAMPAIGN

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 26 Mar 84 p 25

[Article by Kaija Virta: "Albania Isolated by Distrust"]

[Text] The question of Kosovo, an Albanian area belonging to Yugoslavia, is given a prominent position within Albania. And it is easy to observe that in addition to official positions, the dispute also incites the feelings of average citizens.

"A dance from the area of Kosovo", announces an elegant mistress of ceremonies in the middle of a concert in Tirana's Palace of Culture. She relates that the choreographer, Besim Zekthi, the principal dancer of the State People's Dance Company, "has made the patriotism of the residents of Kosovo and their love toward the Albanian flag the central theme".

Since nationalism has been labelled as a questionable word throughout all of Eastern Europe, patriotism is frequently used as its substitute.

The stage is filled with serious and fast-moving dancers. The cheerfulness and lightness of the previous numbers are in the past. Capturing the eye are the bright red scarves which male dancers tie around their forehead in a warlike fashion. Two solo dancers bring out from backstage a large rolled up cloth, which is spread open in the middle of the stage: a red, hawk-emblazoned flag, an emblem of Kosovo, but also of the Albanian state. The audience breaks out in a frenzied applause in the middle of the performance.

The Fate of Kosovo

In Albanian speeches one can hear such unofficial pronouncements as "Albanian territories" or "Albania is not now a whole country" in reference to Kosovo.

When the discussion turns to even the subject of West Germany, the Albanians always remember to express pity for the people of Kosovo who have left Yugoslavia as refugees forcibly expelled from their land to become immigrant workers. There is, indeed, even some justification for such a statement since unemployment in the area of Kosovo is approaching 30 percent.

### Borders Drawn by the Powerful

Kosovo, in which more than a million Albanians now live, was separated from Albania as a result of the border decisions made by the superpowers in 1913. After World War II Yugoslavia's new, socialist leadership made it into an autonomous region of the Serbian Republic. Demands have been made in Kosovo for the more independent status of a separate republic, and there has been political unrest in the 1960's as well as now in the beginning of this decade. Yugoslavia has dealt harshly with these rebels and has accused Albania of encouraging separatism.

Albania has given assurances that it is not striving to weaken the Yugoslav state. The party paper ZERI I POPULLIT has, however, pointed out that during the war at a meeting of communists and partisans from Kosovo it was agreed that the final objective would be the reunification of Kosovo with Albania and that Tito had promised the same to Enver Hoxha in 1946. The newspaper also described Albania as an inseparable entity even though it is divided into two nations in the same manner as Germany or Korea.

### Progress Slow on Railroad Construction

It appears that Yugoslavia's and Albania's political relations have remained at an impasse over this past winter. One indication of this is that the completion of the railroad between Shkodra and Titograd, which is located in Montenegro on the other side of the border, has been postponed. What would be in question is Albania's first railroad link with the outside world.

It was initially said that the track will be completed in 1983, but the work is incomplete either on one side or both sides of the border or is progressing very slowly. Albanian authorities turned down a request to visit the area of construction.

### Relations With Greece Have Become Strained

Albania's relations with Greece have also become more tense since the beginning of the year.

Two men belonging to Albania's small Greek minority fled to Greece in 1982 and in February of this year began a hunger strike in front of the Albanian Embassy in Athens. They said that other members of their minority group have been either imprisoned in Albania or driven into internal exile and they demanded permission for them to leave the country.

In Greece there have always been rightwing factions which for purposes of expansionism have called the area in which the Greek minority lives in Albania's southern tip Northern Ipiros, as if it were the missing half of the Greek northwest province of Ipiros. In the confusion of the ruckus caused by the hunger strike Greece's leftwing Prime Minister Andreas Papandreu also accused Albania of violating the Greek minority's civil rights and talked about the "umbilical cord" that has been preserved between the Greek state and all the world's people of Greek descent.

### "Defamation Campaign"

Approximately 50,000 Greeks presently live in the southern part of Albania. Before World War II they numbered more than 400,000. The contention in Greece is that the large difference in numbers is explained, in part, by the forced relocation of thousands of people and by assimilation into other areas of Albania.

Even when the Pope recently complained about the fate of believers in atheistic Albania during a visit to Bari on the opposite coast of the Adriatic Sea, ZERI I POPULLIT told the Albanians that "an extensive, inimical attack and campaign of defamation" has been initiated against them and is backed by neighboring countries and "a dangerous secret plot" organized by the USA.

### Bunkers in Place

Such warnings in Albania fall on soil that is more favorable than average since the feeling of an outside threat is even otherwise always present.

Military training begins for both sexes at the age of 18 and continues after that once a year. In the last decade small, round-domed cement bunkers large enough for two people were erected all over Albania. Looking like national hero Skanderbeg's helms half buried in the ground, they stare out at you with their peepholes from roadsides, backyards of apartment buildings, and even from under the windows of hotel restaurants.

### "Superpowers Interested"

A comparison with Vietnam cannot help but come to mind when from behind a women's brigade working in a field one can see a half dozen bunker domes looming in the background.

Albania considers that it has tangible reasons to suspect the worst from not only its neighbors but also from the United States and the Soviet Union. "The superpowers are interested in every piece of land along the Mediterranean," states journalist Ymer Minxhozi, who is familiar with international questions.

He believes Albania is worth pursuing since its coast is situated in an important spot in the Balkans between the Adriatic and Ionian seas and would thus offer suitable facilities for military bases.

### Situation in the Mediterranean

The security situation itself in the Mediterranean area has grown worse from year to year according to Minxhozi, and the chief reason for this tension is the increase in the number of warships belonging to the two superpowers, now already as many as 120 on both sides.

Albania's view of the superpower's power relationship in the Mediterranean is that they have carefully maintained a balance even though the United States has a definite upper hand with its military bases on land.

Albania will not participate in the Mediterranean Conference, organized on the periphery of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, just as it has not participated in any other CSCE forums.

Each Mediterranean security meeting has failed already even before it has begun from Albania's point of view. If the participants, indeed, wanted security, they would expel the military bases of the superpowers from the area and would deny all access to their ships for maintenance in the area's ports; without them the superpowers would not be able to stay in the Mediterranean for very long, argues Minxhozi.

According to him, it is a waste of time for Albania to express views at such conferences since it has already made its opinion very clear by means of its own policies. The 1976 constitution prohibits the establishment of foreign military bases on Albanian territory and Albania does not even accept foreign naval visits.

#### Guided Vacation Trips for Small Groups

Contrary to what many believe, Albania is not a country closed to foreign tourists. Tourists have been accepted since the 1950's although in very small numbers and exclusively on guided tours.

The more established travellers are the French, Italians, Austrians, and West Germans. A Finnish travel agency has only recently concluded an agreement with the Albanians for the first time on the commencement of group tours this summer.

Ramiz Shehu, an official of the state-owned Albturist office, states that not now or in the future does Albania intend to use tourism for commercial benefit. Income from tourism is only of small significance in the national economy according to him.

#### Three Thousand a Year

The annual number of tourists in recent years is believed to be 3,000. Thus tourism falls far below the numbers visiting near-by Bulgaria, for example, where the annual number of tourists is 6 million even though its population is only three times that of Albania.

Albanian tourism is, in part, still limited by the small number of lodging facilities. First class hotels can only be found in Tirana, Durres, Shkodra, and Saranda. Generally, one of these cities is chosen as a base for foreign tour groups from which trips to other parts of the country are made by bus.

Very limited group tours from Finland as well as from other countries have been arranged to Albania over the years through local friendship societies. Such arrangements best suit the objectives of the host country since, as Ramiz Shehu explains, Albania wants "friends, people with a favorable attitude toward us" to visit the country.

Some 20 years ago, when the average Albanian was not as accustomed to foreigners and the country had just experienced "a new revolutionary movement" or a kind of cultural revolution, tourists experienced some adjustment difficulties.

Men with a full beard and long hair reminded Albanians too much of the recently banished priests, and for some time such individuals had to enter the country only through a barber's chair. Some women, on the other hand, had to unstitch the hem of their skirt on the bus in order to cover their knees and avoid the stares of local men upon stepping out onto the street. If a foreigner attempted to talk to an Albanian, the reaction could be a hateful flood of words or a mute who runs away.

Attitudes have softened since those times, but a tourist should still keep in mind that Albania is a very regulated country in which the people are sincerely proud of their country and will not tolerate any insults to it and no attempts should be made to purchase servility with money.

#### Beaches and Ruins

In addition to the unusual, Albania has other tourist attractions. In Durres there are exceptionally beautiful sandy beaches, and ancient ruins, medieval castles, and picturesque villages are to be found in various parts of the country.

People seeking the sun and beaches are not the type of tourists being attracted from Finland this summer, but the intent is to find small groups interested in some specialty area for which a tour program will be arranged accordingly. A week-long trip to Tirana, Lake Ohrid, and Korca for the purpose of agricultural studies is already being arranged.

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GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC

PROPOSED HONECKER FRG VISIT RAISES LEGAL QUESTIONS

Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 22 Mar 84 p 6

Article signed Fr., datelined Frankfurt 21 Mar 84: "When Honecker Comes--Guest of the Federal Government"--Bridging a Gap in Extraterritoriality"]

Text Legal provisions are being made for a possible visit by Honecker, chairman of the GDR Council of State, this summer or fall, and they are being made in good time and in such a way as to preserve the greatest possible degree of inconspicuousness. What is at stake is to protect the visitor (who will not be a "state visitor" and whose destination will not be the federal capital) from being prosecuted by the authorities. The penal code applies to all Germans. Inhabitants of the GDR, including the chairman of the Council of State, are Germans; and when a German from the GDR comes to the Federal Republic, he is subject to prosecution here in accordance with the rule of law, to which there only few exceptions--also for criminal offenses committed "on the other side." The prerequisite is whether there are sufficient reasons to suspect that such an offense has been committed.

Honecker could, for instance, face criminal charges in connection with the order to shoot at the Berlin wall and the zone boundary. While obviously a visit serving inter-German relations should be "exempted" from these peculiarities of the inter-German relationship, it is also clear that to make special provisions to prevent prosecution would not be a sound contribution to the legal standard of the Federal Republic, for an essential part of this standard is the rule of law--prosecution without regard to who the person is by the authorities charged with this task.

The law governing the jurisdiction of courts contains certain provisions covering the fact that representatives of foreign countries cannot as matter of principle be free of the suspicion of having committed a crime, including such crimes as, regardless of where they have been committed, have to be prosecuted anywhere in the world. In accordance with this law, members of diplomatic missions and consular representations are "extraterritorial." That means that in no case, whether it is a question of a criminal charge or of disputes (such as questions of rent) under the jurisdiction of civil courts, can they be tried in the Federal Republic. Another provision extends this extraterritoriality to "other...persons insofar as, in accordance with

general rules of international law," these are exempt from prosecution. This concerns primarily heads of state, who, although they are not diplomats, in accordance with general rules of international law are to be treated like diplomats. In Honecker's case, however, this provision does not provide any relief, because, though a head of state, Honecker certainly is no "foreign" head of state. According to the concept, raised to the level of a constitutional obligation for Federal governments, in the Federal Constitutional Law judgment concerning the Basic Treaty handed down 31 July 1973, the GDR is not foreign territory as far as the Federal Republic is concerned, and there are no relations with the GDR under international law.

Thus a special provision has to be made for a visit by Honecker. The intention is for article 20 of the jurisdiction law, concerning persons put on the same level as diplomats, to be preceded by a paragraph stating something like the following: "Any persons staying on territory of the Federal Republic of Germany at the invitation of the Federal Government are exempt from German jurisdiction." The same is to apply to persons accompanying such guests of the Federal Government. The Federal Government reportedly has coordinated the draft with the SPD opposition. All the Laender, too, are said to be in agreement, with certain wishes reportedly having been expressed to accommodate Germany-policy ambitions in some Land capitals where it is desired to extend this special extraterritoriality to guests of Land governments. The amendment of the article concerned is to be appended as a special paragraph to a new version of the Federal Central Register Law the discussion of which has been completed by the Legal Committee. In this form the new provision is to be passed by the Bundestag. All the Laender having been consulted, there will be no difficulties in the Bundesrat.

This would be a more elegant solution than was put in legislative form before the planned "exchange of speakers" between the Federal Republic and the GDR in early 1966. At that time (the talks about it were conducted not between government organs but at the "party level") an "exchange of speakers" was to take place between the SPD and SED, with a prominent SPD politician slated to speak in Chemnitz (Karl-Marx-Stadt) and an SED politician in Hannover or Essen. It was considered possible at that time that the then chairman of the Council of State, Ulbricht, would make an appearance in the Federal Republic. The exchange of speakers did not come off, but a law was passed about "limited exemption from German jurisdiction" which was to allow the Federal Government in an individual case to prevent prosecution of leading SED officials--at that time already in connection with the orders to shoot at the Wall. This law, which still played a certain role when GDR Prime Minister Stoph paid a visit to Kassel in 1970 (returning a visit by the then Federal chancellor, Brandt, to Kassel), allows the Federal Government to exempt for a limited time from German jurisdiction any persons who normally reside outside the area where the Basic Law applies "if it considers it appropriate in weighing all circumstances and for the promotion of important interests."

This law was passed under a government of the CDU/CSU and FDP, with part of the CDU/CSU not assenting to it but a large majority of SPD deputies voting for it. The law was violently attacked by the GDR, which described it as a "handcuff law" and an act of "legal aggression." Valid to this day, the law follows a path of expanding the principle of opportunity in prosecution.

Now the Federal Government intends to use a method which is kinder to the GDR in that exemption from prosecution of diplomats in a general way is extended to guests of the Federal Government, regardless of whether these guests come from the GDR or elsewhere. Thus the law gains a universal validity, which is to the liking of the GDR, without deviating from the fact that inhabitants of the GDR are Germans as far as the Basic Law is concerned.

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HUNGARY

CRITICISM OF PROPOSED SOCIOPOLITICAL IDEAS REJECTED

Budapest TARSADALMI SZEMLE in Hungarian No 2, 1984 pp 54-63

[Article by Istvan Hagelmayer and Laszlo Antal: "Sociopolitical Ideas and Economic Realities. Comments on an article by Zsuzsa Ferge"]

[Text] Today there are two reasons why it has become necessary once again to review our sociopolitical principles and practice. The planned changes in our economic mechanism, primarily those aimed at increasing the role of business ventures (which we hope soon will also extend to our medium and large-scale enterprises) and at allowing stratum and group interests to assert themselves in a more open and competitive manner are expected to bring about profound changes in our income distribution relationships, and to define in a more unequivocal and clear manner the tasks and responsibilities of the organizations and groups that are involved in the making of economic decisions, and the relationship between our state agencies of guidance and our enterprises.

Although little mention has been made of this in the various proposals aimed at improving our economic mechanism, these changes, a few of which have already been implemented, but most of which are still in their planning stage, also cannot leave our socio-political system unaffected. Hence it is not by accident, for example, that the necessity of separating state and enterprise tasks has also been put on the agenda of our employment policy, giving the responsibility of ensuring full employment to the state and the task of maintaining efficient employment to the enterprises. Once again we must ask ourselves: what, on the one hand, are the services that we can justifiably continue to allocate according to need--that is to say, completely or virtually free--, where do we need to provide significant preferences while partially allowing market principles to assert themselves, and where can we leave the allocation of services up to the market place. On the other hand, we need to decide what role our central budget, the various central monetary funds separate from it, our independent local agencies and enterprises, and--something which so far has not been too significant--the independent activities organized and fi-

nancially supported by our state and independent local agencies should play in our social policy.

In addition to these "big" questions, however, we are also faced with a "smaller," although more timely problem. Today's increasingly more serious economic problems--as we can clearly see now--will cause a long interruption in the golden age of rapidly and markedly growing consumption, not only in our country but also in the great majority of socialist and capitalist countries. Hopefully, our situation will stabilize within the next few years, however, our revenue-utilization possibilities will remain unchanged, or at best will only slightly improve.

The restrictive measures that have become unavoidable under these circumstances today can no longer be limited to stockpiling, the proportion of which in the past few years has declined with unprecedented speed from 30 percent to 12 percent. It has become unavoidable for us to also begin to feel the effects of these unfavorable economic trends in the development of our standard of living. The only say we have is in deciding which areas of our population's living conditions these burdens should be allowed to affect (i.e. work incomes, infrastructural developments, social benefits), that is to say, in determining the "distribution" channels " through which they are allowed to assert themselves (i.e. by way of increasing consumer price levels, limiting the outflow of revenues, or perhaps by narrowing the selection of products and services, and by having to endure temporary shortages).

The fact is that we will have to retreat even from our already unchanging consumption levels, and not only in terms of the desired achievements projected on the basis of development levels which we have become accustomed to in the past, but also compared with our already attained income levels, in other words, to the facts. A break in the level of real wages will cause the population to reduce, and perhaps even live up a part of its savings. If we stop increasing the level of social benefits while, for example, today's retirees are going into retirement on the basis of a higher wage level than their predecessors (and perhaps in even greater numbers and proportions) then this may cause an automatic increase in social benefits.<sup>1</sup> These are well-known relationships. We would hesitate to conclude, however, that the very stagnation of our standard of living already makes such retreats unavoidable.

In practice, renewal which takes a longer time and which, although characterized by conflicts, is inseparably connected with having to involuntarily adapt to today's more difficult conditions. Hence Zsuzsa Ferge is justly concerned about the effects of rationalization and "belt-tightening" proposals and ideas which in view of our growing economic problems are being increasingly loudly recommended, on the achievements of our social policy, especially since --with some exaggeration--they stem not from the inner logic of our

social policy, but from the difficult position of our economy. It is justified concern which can be sensed from Zsuzsa Ferge's review of the various proposals and possibilities that have recently been heard in the economic sphere.<sup>2</sup> She calls attention to the dangers and inconsistencies that are inherent in these proposals. She cautions against their implementation, suggesting that "until the new principles and organizational perimeters are more clearly defined we should refrain from implementing any of the usually regressive proposals that may be aimed at correcting our already established practices." In her view, the ideas that are being proposed today are in conflict with our post-1945 development trend "which has been built on systems aimed at promoting citizens' rights, and which has stressed the importance of a collective undertaking of tasks." the reason these proposals have been able to gain ground is because our sociopolitical ideas still have not been refined: "the vacuum that has thus evolved provides fertile ground for some frequently backward views that have been left to us from the 19th century and earlier regarding 'worthiness' and 'unworthiness,' and the advantages of privately undertaken and market-oriented businesses, etc." By saying this she has condemned these new--or newly defined--ideas as the Eastern European versions of the renaissance of conservatism.

With this we have come to the point where we can ask: what parts of Zsuzsa Ferge's views do we accept, what do we think they lack, and what is it that we disagree with?

1. We agree with Zsuzsa Ferge when she points out: in the area of social policy, economic rationalization cannot be defined without subjecting it to our social priorities.
2. Naturally, she is also right in saying that today's unavoidable restrictive measures will not take us any closer to having an ideal sociopolitical system. Certainly not in the sense of creating a system of effectively equalized opportunities in which the extent of the demands to be collectively met is considerably greater than today. She is also right in reminding us that the stagnation of consumption (including a considerably slower growth in collective consumption) will not take us any closer to solving our economic problems--it will not make our economy more efficient. This is merely an acknowledgement of our changed conditions, for finding the necessary protection and remedies, and effectively implementing them takes a longer time. These concerns are justified, for it always hurts to retreat, even if we succeed in using our diminished resources at a--from the social point of view--higher level of efficiency. However, there is not much we can do with this truth. Affirming the unpleasant nature of the truth does not help much.
3. What we feel Zsuzsa Ferge's article is lacking is a discussion of our social policy's "own" problems, an examination of the questions which sooner or later would compel us to think about changing

directions. even if our economic circumstances had not called for putting such a move on the agenda. Without such a discussion it would appear as if our sociopolitical system were basically and in principle harmonious, and as if this harmony could only be upset by necessity or by the sometimes narrow-mindedly imposed restrictions on the resources used to alleviate it.

It is impossible, for example, not to see the connection between the many socially damaging and economically irrational conditions that have evolved in the area of public health and in the "mechanism" of health care (gratuituousness, restrictions that allow only a minimal choice of doctors).<sup>3</sup> The result of this--beyond the sometimes astoundingly high cost of "free" benefits--is likely to be a type of service allocation system that will only aggrevate our social inequalities. There are certain sociopolitical preferences that are clearly the products of an era of extremely low living standards and of strictly equalized income levels for which it had been partly responsible (such, for example, are most of our consumer price subsidies). The gradual decline in these preferences today has been not the result of austerity-related pressures but has also been justified from the social standpoint (even if those affected find losing their earned rights prejudicial which, incidentally, is a phenomenon experienced not only in our country but everywhere else in the world).

4. The thing, however, which in the following discussion we intend to challenge is the author's view regarding progressive personal (family) income taxes. Naturally, our disagreement pertains not to the method of taxation, but to the proposed principles of distribution. We are on the opinion that having a progressive personal income tax would provide us with an adequate tool for implementing a principle of distribution that would be significantly different from the one which is in effect today.

Let us also begin where Zsuzsa Ferge did. What kind of social consequences will the economic processes of the near future bring? We anticipate that our desire to return to the principles of the 1968 reform will become a practical reality, that starting a business venture--in accordance with our plans--will not only be the "privilage" of small businesses, family and private operations, but will also be extended to our medium and large-scale enterprises, and that as a natural consequence of all this the risk of going bankrupt will also cease to be the privilage of small businesses. We do not want to, and indeed could not come up with a perfect answer, we would merely like to call attention to a few recent, and to some extent already perceivable developments.

The next 3 to 5 years are expected to be characterized by stagnating or barely growing real wages and by rising consumer price levels. There will be a significant increase in the proportion of

families--affecting perhaps as many as one-third of our households --where real incomes will decline for several years.

It is probable that certain unprofitable plants will have to be closed down. There will (we hope) be an even greater pressure on certain production units to reduce their workforce, and the decision to do so will come not from above, but in the form of an agreement between the representatives of the working collective and the management of the enterprise.<sup>4</sup> It would indeed be nice, as Zsuzsa Ferge points out, to be able to change our production structure "in such a way, so that the reduction in force or termination could be tied in with our efforts to overcome manpower shortages which today are still of significant and distressing dimensions in many areas." In practice, however, if the process of structural reorganization is indeed accelerated, then for a few months employees in retraining who are looking for a new job may find themselves in a position where they have already left their old jobs, but are still in the process of finding a new one. The difference between the structures of manpower demand and supply, and the unique conditions of the regional (local) manpower market will cause temporary--"frictional"--problems, even if otherwise there is an excess nationwide demand for the manpower that is being released. In addition, some professions are being phased out, and there are some skilled workers among the older generation for whom making a change--of professions, jobs, surroundings--is hardly possible anymore. Hence, even given the established institutional system of our manpower market, the coordination of supply and demand still requires a certain length of time, and--although we must do everything to avoid this--there will be some for whom this process will cause conflicts.<sup>5</sup>

The only thing social policy can do, and this it must, is to ease this process, and to avoid adding more financial difficulties on top of this already critical period of restarting and readjustment. This social conflict cannot be avoided, only alleviated by gradually eliminating unprofitable production, and by developing an institutional system which is prepared to coordinate manpower supply and demand, and is able to organize retraining. If we fail to see this in advance, then instead of getting closer to finding a solution we will only increase the size of our non-available, hidden army of reserve manpower within our gates, which is a slowly killing poison, and which--we believe--is more demoralizing when there are tensions that must be openly faced. The attainment of perfect harmony in our manpower market may be a wishful dream, and even a long-term objective, but--unfortunately--it cannot be the reality of the near future.

We can expect further increases in the number of business ventures. There will be at least no decline in the importance of split-shift employment, working at home, employment based on occasional assignments and secondary jobs. The number of people who earn their income from more than one source (i.e. from more than one workplace)

will increase. We also hope that this enterprising spirit will be allowed to go past the closely watched reception desks of our large enterprises. Wage controls characterized by inflexible performance indicators and discouraging progressive taxes will end, and their place will be taken by collective wage agreements which will subsequently lead to an expansion of intra-enterprise businesses and contractual relationships.

We cannot tell whether these changes will further increase the differentiation among wages--it is more likely that they will--, but the extreme poles of differentiation are certain to be spread further apart (for these are not restricted by inflexible regulations). It is also certain that a freer wage management will help to reevaluate and rearrange the established proportions. Due to the increased cost sensitivity of our enterprises, several of them will not be able to take advantage of their possibilities to increase wages. If there is no, or only a slow improvement in our manpower mobility, this will lead to a greater differentiation of earnings; if, on the other hand, we have a strong increase in mobility, this will only result in the extreme points being spread further apart and in reorganization, but it will not necessarily lead to greater differentiation.

It is difficult to draw accurate conclusions regarding the outcome of intended changes that are still far from being fully implemented. The only thing that seems clear is that if business ventures spread from the small operations to the sector of the larger enterprises, legal small businesses will become more widespread, and finally: if we eliminate the inflexible central regulations which govern wages and earnings, state control over the outflow of personal incomes will become looser and more indiresct than it is today. On the one hand, there will be a greater number of wage earners who obtain their income from several (legal and regulated) sources, and on the other, income regulations will be more strongly affected by local interest and power relations, the manpower market and even by a business-oriented mentality. Accordingly, there will be less room for central regulations. The thesis, therefore, according to which we will have a more direct say in regulating the outflow of earnings is gradually losing its validity.

Our experiences so far, however, also confirm that whatever form they may take wage regulations are all characterized by internal contradictions. For we can hardly argue with the fact that wages constitute an enterprise category which--by weighing the goals and possibilities--serves the purpose of providing an incentive for better work. However, the primary motive behind all central wage regulations is an intent to regulate our purchasing power, in other words by reviewing the situation of the national economy to find some way to restrict it. So far we have not--because we could not have--resolved the inevitable conflict between the two categories, and in so trying it has been mostly the need to provide incentives

for better work that has had to suffer. What was--and is still--missing from our unquestionably profuse system of resources is a tax system which is aimed also at ensuring control over our purchasing power.

The foundations of the present income distribution system had already been laid down in the early 1950's. In those days the determining role from the point of view of the goal to eliminate all existing social differences was played by consumer price deflections and social benefits in kind. The function of distribution--in view of the consumption levels of those times, our universal shortages and economic policy objectives--was generally to provide the necessary conditions for ensuring a minimum of existence, to restrict the already very broadly interpreted concept of luxury consumption, in general, to adjust our consumption structure to central preferences, to place popular demands in a uniform mold, and also to redistribute incomes to the advantage of the city population and (mostly by way of non-monetary means) to radically suppress private activities. Income equalization was also a conscious activity in our wage system (while at the same time efforts were being made to maximize work intensity). Another important goal, given our extremely low standard of living, was to conceal our existing social inequalities.

In the wake of the development which began in the 1960's these tasks have gradually begun to lose their relevance. The best way to sum up the essence of this change is that the restrictions on consumption, the resulting equalization and standardization and the practice of putting off infrastructural development have ceased to be the main driving force behind our economic growth. Some of the consequences of rapid quantitative growth have included qualitative changes in consumption, the easing of shortage situations and an increase in the proportion of services.

At the end of the 1970's the strategy of our economic policy began to change. Even disregarding our momentary economic difficulties, this change has meant a permanent decline in the growth rate of our consumption. Perhaps the best incentive we have been able to provide under these kinds of circumstances has been to expand the alternative selection possibilities available to our consumers, to satisfy their diverse needs and to strengthen the effects of consumer decisions on production. This has necessarily led, and still continues to lead to a reassessment of our consumer price policy. Today, once again, the main function of consumer prices is to connect supply with demand, and to influence the structure of consumption while at the same time they are becoming increasingly unsuited for systematically influencing our per-stratum consumption ratios, and income distribution on the basis of prices is turning out to be an increasingly irrational and social-sacrifice demanding, mistaken function.

As we continue to meet alternative needs, however, the various forms of the "second economy", i.e. our small businesses will increase in importance, for it is only within this organizational framework that a considerable, and today increasingly greater part of these demands can be satisfied.

Together with our living standard policy efforts, our changing circumstances and social needs, since the 1950's there have also been significant changes in our income distribution mechanisms.<sup>6</sup> Still, our system of personal income distribution has retained much of its original character. Hence--contrary to their original purpose--instead of fostering the development of equal social opportunities, many of the benefit systems that are presently in effect may end up promoting even greater differentiation among our various strata, income levels and settlement forms. One of the ways this may happen is if, as Zsuzsa Ferge points out, we allow the redistribution of secondary incomes--tips, parasolvency --to prioritize our needs. Another way this could happen is if we allow the development of different supply systems which provide high quality services for those who occupy important positions within the social division of labor, or have the proper personal connections. The point is that in the case of partially satisfiable demands there must be inevitable differences among people with respect to their position within the social hierarchy and to their financial situation. In the case of social benefits (some of which are called free merely out of habit) our practical experiences do not seem to support the assumption that the various social benefits (in kind) we grant for specific purposes--which, in principle, are accessible to everyone on the basis of need, or according to socially regulated norms that provide equal opportunities for all--are genuinely income-equalizing in nature. Effective equalization can only be ensured by income policy means.

It appears, therefore, that as a rule it is mostly the people with higher state-controlled earnings who are more likely to take advantage of the benefits in kind available to them (for naturally these are the only types of income that our statistics can take into account). (See Table below.)

Today we have several indications that our submechanisms are not suited even in principle to be used as well-coordinated means, subordinate to the objective of eliminating social inequality. Every submechanism has its own function and operating logic. The primary importance of consumer prices lies in their price function, hence they have become increasingly less suited for reducing income differences, or ensuring some kind of a minimal consumption level, even though this is the purpose for which we would have liked to use them for a long time. As for social contributions to the education of children, these will depend on the load-bearing capacity of our economy at any given time. (We have no reason to assume that in the future we will be able to increase such expenditures

at a considerably faster rate than we can increase wages.) In practice, waging may be able, to some extent, to fulfill certain sociopolitical tasks, but this--especially since the "second economy," and later the various forms of legalized and regulated small businesses have become widespread--would lead to increasingly more serious difficulties. In addition, it must also be understood that we cannot have frequent and significant income redistributions which also restrict the coordinated operation of our complex personal income (and property) regulations.

So far, the possibility of ensuring coordination among the changes implemented under the pressure of economic problems and tensions of a political nature that have come up in practice within certain income distribution subsystems has automatically been ruled out.

Hence the only rational thing to do has been to take important issues of a pressing nature, and to solve them by expediently changing a given element in the regulations while at the same time leaving all of the other distribution forms intact, and by taking into account the limitations posed by these forms. It likely that the restrictions imposed on the changes initiated in some of our submechanisms are so serious that even a strategy of change which is based on a comprehensive living standard policy would not be adequate to ensure harmony.

#### The Annual Amount Per Capita of Social Benefits in Kind According to the Activity of the Head of Household

	1972	1977		
	Ft per capita	% of the average	Ft per capita	% of the average
Total employed:	3,146	106.6	4,463	109.8
Among them: white collar	4,067	137.8	5,657	139.2
including: managers	4,680	158.6	6,179	152.1
Skilled workers	2,927	99.2	4,141	101.9
Semi-skilled workers	2,733	92.6	4,001	98.5
Unskilled worker help	2,712	91.9	3,672	90.4
Agricultural physical	2,501	84.8	3,733	91.9
Producer coop members total	2,350	79.6	3,491	85.9
Independents	2,321	78.7	3,544	87.2
Pensioners and dependents	2,750	93.2	3,235	79.6
Total:	2,951	100.0	4,063	100.0

We must abandon some illusions.

1. It is becoming increasingly less expedient to regulate incomes directly. There is a growing number of people who receive their income from several sources. This raises questions regarding the possibility of directly regulating outflowing purchasing power. At the same time, in the state sector the direct regulation of wages has had an increasingly performance-hindering effect. This raises the question whether it makes any sense. If we were pursuing

this aggressively we would be forced to introduce regulating mechanisms which would considerably hinder the development of individual potentials.

2. Instead of helping to reduce inequalities, social benefits in kind made available to everyone increase absolute differences while basically keeping the existing ratios intact. (If we could also take into account the quality of the services which is not reflected in the figures, the situation would probably be even worse.)

3. Consumer price adjustments do not, and indeed could not have a real income equalizing effect, basically for two reasons. On the one hand, people earning higher incomes are able to buy more subsidized goods and services (such as children's clothing, culture). On the other hand, in addition to the basic products price supports are also extended to services and cultural goods which make up a relatively high proportion of the expended earnings of high income earners.

Given these experiences the question must be asked: is it worthwhile to contemplate the idea of introducing a comprehensive income-redistributing measure, i.e. a progressive personal income tax that would apply to a significant segment of our society?

Asking the question may itself be a clear indication already that the taxing of household (family) incomes is not discussed here as a kind of tax adjustment mechanism. What we are trying to determine is whether it would be justified or timely to integrate the factors which determine our standard of living, and which today are regulated through several separate channels. The present method of regulation treats each of these factors separately, as a result of which, in the final analysis, the burdens and benefits of our households are shared not according to the family's standard of living, but according to how favorable or unfavorable the household's, more precisely its wage earners' and real estate owners' situation is from the point of view of a given income or property-related factor (earnings, secondary employment, household farms, income, house, vacation home and property resulting from independent mental activity).

Although the criteria of fairness and justice cannot be determined precisely, these categories nevertheless exist, and fairness is simply a question of social consensus. Regardless of how we define (describe) the concept of just income distribution, regulations divided by subareas cannot satisfy the criteria of social justice. This would be a conceptual change also from the point of view that the introduction of such a tax system would, whether so intended or not, strengthen ongoing efforts to increase social control over personal income distribution.<sup>7</sup> In order to ensure this it is essential to have overall control over all generated income which

is integrated through a variety of channels, i.e. we need a system of secondary income distribution. In order to avoid unfair situations it is also necessary that the various factors which affect the situation of our families (not only their income, but also their housing conditions and any lasting illness which a dependent living with the family may be suffering from) be weighed collectively, in other words, a "tax return" should be mentally prepared even in the absence of a progressive income tax.

It is difficult to determine how the arguments for and against a progressive income tax are divided. It is undoubtedly an extremely complicated, cumbersome and expensive system. It is certain, however, that some of the often heard counterarguments--a few of which can also be found in Zsuzsa Ferge's article--are not based on realistic foundations. As we have already proven, the claim, for example, that we could effectively (without hindering the development of performances, and by keeping income differentiation within bounds) regulate the outflow of incomes. There is also no truth to the contention that the introduction of a universal progressive income tax--in other words one which also applies to the "first economy"--would increase the advantages and incentives enjoyed by impossible or difficult-to-control incomes. Obviously, the introduction of a progressive income tax into the "first economy" would be accompanied by an increase in nominal wages in order to offset the increased tax burdens. Those working in this sphere, therefore, would not suffer any losses. As far as incomes resulting from the "second" economy are concerned, however, while it is possible that there may be resident head physicians, cab drivers or gas station attendants, for example, would report only 10,000 or 15,000 forints on their tax return forms, we consider it virtually impossible to believe that they would only report their basic pay. (If for no other reason, because it is precisely these kinds of cases which our tax authorities would be most thoroughly looking at, showing great interest in finding out how such a modest, controlled income could support a consumption of luxury.) Hence we could debate whether the introduction of a universal progressive income tax would only negligibly or already genuinely reduce the income differences between the two sectors, but under no circumstances can anyone claim that the tax system always favors the latter--i.e."second" economy-type incomes.

On the other hand, one of the undeniable advantages of having a tax system--and a system of benefits built on it--which, with more or less success, views every source of income and every household's living standard collectively, over having a "divided" system (which weighs income sources and property on the one hand separately from the question of eligibility to receive benefits) is that it adjusts the distribution processes to a more or less unified system of standards. this is what could be considered the minimum criterion for social justice. Our benefit systems could be responsively adjusted (or could adjust), depending on when and which

elements become significant from among the countless factors which affects our families' standard of living, and it still would not upset the normative character of the system as a whole.

In addition, such a tax system would--in many respects--be open. on the one hand, because everyone (including the press) would have access to anyone's tax return which in itself is a kind of social control. While it does not put an end to it, it does--together with the help of strict tax laws and especially severe punishment for tax-apparatus related corruption--curtail tax fraud.<sup>8</sup> On the other hand, all income distribution systems agree in that, for example, childless families must help to subsidize those with children, people who choose not to continue their studies must help to assist those who have chosen to go on, people who are healthy must help to support those who are frequently ill, etc. These common characteristics, however, may be concealed by keeping wages low, and by having the state support those in need (whose number is automatically greater, precisely because of their lower income from work) from its "own," net revenues, and they can also be brought into the open by allowing these processes to manifest themselves, with the help of the tax system, in the form of redistribution. The former solution leads to the development and perpetuation of a charity-oriented view, while the latter helps to turn the question of income distribution into matters of public concern.

One of the real disadvantages of such systems is that they are extremely complicated and cumbersome (putting aside for the moment regular earnings resulting from employment which can be extremely simply taxed in the form of payroll deductions by the employer, administered similarly to today's wage subsidies). Understanding the various regulations is a virtual art, requiring the services of a multitude of tax experts, even in addition to the tax apparatus. Operating such a system is extremely costly; in the FRG, for example, there is a highly qualified apparatus of 30,000 people involved in tax assessment and control. Another disadvantage is that once the household income tax system has been established, subsequently great emphasis is placed on the rights that have been attained, and it becomes more difficult to introduce rational changes; the varying objectives of subsequent periods--and the compromises resulting from political struggles--tend to accumulate, thus weakening the basic effects of the tax system itself. There are several other disadvantages that are frequently mentioned in connection with the family income tax system, however, these have not been convincingly proven.<sup>9</sup>

Finally, we feel that partly as a result of changing tendencies in the development of our economy, and partly due to the contradictions that are inherent in our present sociopolitical system, this area is also ready for a change of directions. One of the

basic factors of such a change is undoubtedly what Zsuzsa Ferge has stressed: our sociopolitical interests must be more independently represented and more openly visualized.

Another related factor--which we would have liked to support in greater detail--is that neither our consumer price policies nor the direct regulation of outflowing incomes are effective means for regulating income differentiation among our various strata, groups and individuals. If businesses become more widespread also in the "first" economy then this will become even less feasible. Hence it has become unavoidable to introduce a tax system that can help to correct our income-outflow related problems, and the reasons behind the need for such a change are just as much socio-political as, in the narrower sense, they are economic.

We also have doubts whether the basic characteristic of our future development will indeed be the further spreading and unequivocal dominance of universal benefits to which all citizens will be equally entitled. It is not difficult to imagine systems in which provisions based on citizen's rights--whether they by monetary or in kind--only provide a minimum level of benefits beyond which need is determined more on an individual basis (as in the case of pension insurance and health care), by using an allowance system based on need (which on the basis of normative rules could be incorporated into the family income tax), and a greater role is given to evaluations made by local governments and to local social policies (that may be based, in part, on local taxes which although adjustable within certain limits, must be accepted by the members of the affected community).

Even if our sociopolitical priorities truly reflected the opinion of the majority, it would still appear to be more humane to have a distribution system which gives equal consideration to local communities, minorities and individuals, and which thereby overshadows all universal provision systems. This way we would be marching in the same direction without doing so in strict unison, in a military-like manner; the assertion of the common will does not have to entail a curbing of part interests under all circumstances.

#### FOOTNOTES

1. Of course, there is also an opposite mechanism in effect: for example, an increase in the price level reduces the amount of social contribution given to child education. This, however, requires periodic adjustment. The combined effect of all this--logically--is that social benefits may automatically increase even without separate measures aimed at raising our standards.

2. In the case of some of our social benefits increased selectivity, in other words, the distribution of certain benefits on the basis of need as opposed to benefits provided on the basis of citizen's rights; in our employment policy a marked separation of state and enterprise functions, a stronger differentiation among personal among personal earnings and the introduction of progressive family incomes; certain economy measures which also affect the area of social policy.

We do not intend to address here the unfortunately frequently heard proposal, according to which social benefits should be allocated as "incentives." Obviously, work which demands more effective and greater skills, efforts and sacrifices need to be recognized in terms of income--to the extent possible. It would be completely confusing the functions of benefits and incomes to try to allocate benefits according to "merit." We cannot accept this to be the course of our development. It should be understood, however, that certain highly valuable benefits (such as employer-provided housing subsidies and the preferential credits connected with them) provide advantages which far exceed the surplus incomes that may take perhaps several decades of work and effort to earn. If merit is not recognized in the allocation of such benefits then this will have a depraving effect on every imaginable system of incentives.

3. In his work entitled "The Shortage" (KJK, 1981), Janos Kornai has clearly shown: shortages are never simply the results of insufficient resources being allocated for a given purpose; rather they are caused by the allocation mechanism of benefit distribution. There are an increasing number of people who feel, taking the specific case of health care as an example, that the cause of our problems is to be sought in the allocation mechanism. (For evidence of this first of all see Gyorgy Gosztonyi's work entitled "On the Health Care Mechanism" (Manuscript, December 1980)

4. For the leaders and employees of the enterprise will have to take a joint stand on whether they are willing to accept cuts in their real earnings, or in the case of unprofitable enterprises they will face the possibility of gradual layoffs. What is sensitive about this situation is precisely the fact that the question is not decided from above, but is left to be worked out between the collective and the enterprise management which, of course, also implies a transfer of responsibilities. It is somewhere here that a sense of proprietorship first begins to show, and the general feeling that "we are not responsible because the decision has been forced on us" ends.

5. It should be noted: the explanation here is not that countries with low unemployment rates have succeeded in clearing the hurdle of structural transformation. Just the opposite is the case: it is the countries which have shown successful development that have been able to avoid unemployment.

6. the role of monetary benefits has significantly increased, the differences among our various allocation systems pertaining to workers-employees and our peasantry and to some extent even to our independent earners have decreased, the scope of popular taxation has broadened somewhat, property taxes have significantly increased--although the majority of our society has been only marginally affected by them--, and finally, our system of duties and fees has been increasingly less of a hinderence in the way of real estate mobility. Our present aim is to put an end to the unjustifiably differentiating effect of levying taxes according to the type of activity (it should not be left up to the tax system to decide whether it is the self-employed person, the photographer or the pop singer whose activities are the most useful for our society).

7. The often talked about poor tax morale would force us to follow the example of the developed capitalist countries which tax household incomes, and make all tax-return related documents open to public inspection. This would ensure a certain degree of control, even if we had reson to believe that some of the earnings and various benefits received can be temporarily concealed, or if because of certain legal rights at first the person is granted partial exemption from having to meet his tax obligations.

8. In general, the tax morale of the Anglo-Saxon countries is good. In the United States the problem is caused not by actual tax frauds, but by the various loopholes and maneuvering possibilities that can be found in the maze of tax-related measures. It is mostly the people in the higher income groups who are able to take better advantage of these possibilities. In the Southern European countries (Spain, Italy, Greece, France) the tax morale is markedly poor. Here things have gotten to the point where the collection of income taxes is done by taxing objects (i.e. by levying taxes on property, life style, etc.)

9. One such argument, for example, is that the tax system compels women to cut back their social activities. This claim, however, is not even supported by the available factual data. In examining their share of total wage earners we find, for example, that in the early 1970's the proportion of women workers was 28 percent in Canada, 45 percent in Finland, 42 percent in Hungary, 17 percent in Spain and 36 percent in Sweden. (UN Working committee: "An International Comparison of Relative Income Differences")

The data show--beyond the fact that employment among women in the capitalist countries is low to begin with--that the extent of employment among women is determined primarily by the traditions which characterize the country in question. More specifically, their ratio is greater in those countries which have an advanced sociopolitical system (and which heavily tax personal incomes).

If nothing more, this indicates that there is no direct relationship between a possible decline in women's willingness to take up employment and taxation. A possible decline in women's willingness to take up employment would probably have a lot more to do with the Swedish standard of living than with the Swedish tax system.

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HUNGARY

CP SEEKS POLICY LINE TO EXPLAIN PROBLEMATIC 1950 ERA

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[Unsigned: "A Round-Table Discussion About the 1950's"]

[Text] The history of the so-called 1950's, more precisely the first half of the decade, has come to the foreground of interest recently. Studies and memoirs, novels, films, plays and programs of the mass media deal with this period relatively frequently. Not infrequently the picture drawn of this period is contradictory and sometimes appears quite subjective, and all this raises a good number of questions in party public opinion also. This justified having the editors organize a round-table discussion about the problems of evaluating the period in question. Participating in the discussion were Peter Bacso, film director, Sandor Balogh, historian and professor at the ELTE [Lorand Eotvos Science University], Erno Csizmadia, economist and rector of the Karl Marx Economic Sciences University, Tibor Hajdu, historian and adviser to the Historical Sciences Institute of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Istvan Kiraly, literary historian and professor at the ELTE, and Karoly Urban, historian and a department chief at the Party History Institute. The discussion was led by Sandor Lakos, responsible editor of PARTELET.

Sandor Lakos: Many sorts of experiences show us that a broad circle of people, especially the younger generations, would like to get a precise and well founded picture of the history of the first half of the 1950's. They are demanding a detailed and trustworthy portrayal of the events and the interdependencies. The debates of public life, scientific works and literary and artistic creations are reacting to these demands. The stands and resolutions of the party in connection with this--which can be considered known--can give guidance in this. The December 1956 resolution of the Temporary Central Committee of the MSZMP established that from the end of 1948 the Rakosi-Gero clique used harmful methods in party and state life. It conducted a voluntarist economic policy which ignored the economic conditions of the country. All this led to serious errors, even crimes. As a result of the serious errors the profoundly embittered communists and the democratic masses outside the party fought for a correction of these errors, but they remained faithful to the ideals of communism and to the socialist social order. Despite

party positions based on a clear and properly shaded analysis the picture is not clear enough; this period of our history is not sufficiently in place in public awareness. This situation must inspire us to further profound work. I think that in the present exchange we cannot undertake an examination at the scientific level of every important element of this very complex sphere of questions. Thus I would like it if we did not propose to analyze the international interdependencies or the practical problems and mistakes of economic policy. Where it appears necessary, of course, we may turn to one or another side of these problems, but as a whole it would be most to the point if in the roundtable discussion we were to try to contribute to forming a balanced total picture of this period. It is necessary to clear up where and at what points the picture is undeveloped, or where and in what it is distorted, what are the most debated points of the period in question in public opinion, in literature and in artistic portrayals. In the interest of making the total picture richer and more precise, naturally, we must touch on certain questions of detail, but we certainly cannot undertake to provide here and now a basic scientific analysis extending to everything.

Erno Csizmadia: There really is a great need for clarification. The opinions and views at present are most diverse. We can meet with the view that the 1950's were a great historical turning point, with one or two smaller errors, but the opposite view is frequently found also--for example in some articles and a few programs on television--according to which the entire period was one big mistake, a false track, and deserves only criticism. Let us add, opinions which classify the 1950's as a whole as negative have strengthened recently.

Tibor Hajdu: It is true that certain phenomena are causing confusion, especially among young people. To mention just one matter of no little significance, the young people learn in secondary school and university that, on the one hand, a dictatorship of the proletariat began in Hungary with 1948 and, on the other hand, that--in essence--the so-called 1950's, the period of the personality cult, began at the same time. We say that the dictatorship of the proletariat is good and that the personality cult is bad. And the logic of the young people goes into action--since we do not explain adequately the difference between the two they identify the dictatorship of the proletariat with the personality cult, and thus the concept of the dictatorship of the proletariat is questioned.

Karoly Urban: The present debates dealing with the 1950's are still more the debates of the older generation, those of the same age, usually influenced too much--in one way or another--by personal interest. Of course this has an effect on young people too, but it is my experience that due to the strong subjectivity of these debates scruples arise in many young people in regard to the objectivity of the positions. As long as personal interest is so direct and so great it is difficult to expect a fully clarified, cool historical picture. But this does not relieve us of trying to clarify the debated questions. For example, there must be a clarification of the extent to which we can regard the period between 1948 and 1956 as a uniform one. Usually we mean by the

"1950's" the characteristics of the 1948-1953 period and we talk less about the years between 1953 and 1956. We have not yet measured adequately the effect of the turn in June 1953. The period between 1953 and 1956 was very rich in new ideas and forward looking initiatives. It is true that as a result of the power struggle raging in the party leadership little of this could be realized and a good part of it was deformed. But it would be a mistake to remain silent about this or to reject these things globally as things which "necessarily led to counter-revolution."

Istvan Kiraly: The present debates about the 1950's have their own historical antecedents. We know that between 1953 and 1956 a sort of incorrect polarization of politics took place, and the participants of political life because differentiated accordingly. So if that period comes up in our generation it necessarily recalls the old debates. And we must be responsible with regard to this. We must conduct the debates in such a way as not to harm the unity of the party or the mutual trust between party and people. But the debates which have developed around our present tasks also have an effect on the judgment of our recent past. There are those who believe that the progress being made today would be endangered if we talk about the positive things of the epoch--as demanded by a properly shaded evaluation of the 1950's. Others, on the other hand, suspect an intention to over-emphasize certain reform ideas in the emphasis on the negative aspects of that time. But infrequently this suspicion is fed by a reform utopianism which actually exists, one which sometimes even questions the fundamental values of socialism and which can portray the 1950's only with the darkest colors. Obviously such extreme judgments are unacceptable.

Sandor Lakos: Naturally it cannot be our goal to "expose" or "defend" the 1950's, but only to evaluate the period in question in a balanced way in accordance with reality. But this includes our mentioning what is erroneous or one-sided in the portrayal of the age. For example, in more than one article or program of the mass media, press, radio and television a view has been expressed which calls the 1950's the darkest period of the Hungarian people, and in contrast to this treats the Horthy epoch with great understanding. In connection with such one-sidedness one has to ask what are the crucial criteria of the judgment, what weight they give, for example, to the role of the leaders, more precisely a narrow circle of the leaders, and to the role of the masses. This seems to be a crucial aspect. According to a number of opinions the errors and crimes of the leaders determine the entire epoch. But is it really so simple? It is worth remembering that in these years hundreds of thousands, millions, lived and worked honorably along side an erroneous policy, in the midst of the well known difficult and contradictory conditions. Another question: If there were both errors and positive things, on the basis of what can we judge the epoch correctly? What is it that is objectively determinant in judging the epoch? A further question: To what extent can we regard the ideological-cultural and political legacy remaining for us from the 1950's "utilized"--if

one may use this expression? Is it something closed, which we had to go beyond? Is it something changed, which we had to change? Have we taken to heart all the lessons and answered all the questions which the 1950's raised?

Erno Csizmadia: What can the starting point for a realistic judgment be? A study of the period and my personal experiences agree in suggesting that this period of our recent past was a period of changes of historic importance, with great errors which also offer historic lessons. If we look at the area closest to me, at agriculture, we see that some goals were fundamentally correct, others were mistaken or excessive. But it happened even in the case of noble and good goals that erroneous methods were used; indeed, these came increasingly to predominate, and finally even the correct goals were distorted. This applies equally to the agrarian policy, peasant policy and cooperative policy, to the development of agriculture as a whole at that time.

Peter Bacso: I think that the 1950's can be judged correctly only with a knowledge of the circumstances of their birth. What happened then is inseparable from the Second World War and its consequences. The policy of the Hungarian Communist Party after 1945, and the unprecedented success of this policy, can be made interdependent with the lost war which left behind it a broken state power, a broken economy and a compromised ruling class. The stabilization, the reconstruction, the "All out for the railways," and the coal struggle were successes of the entire people and expressed aspirations of a very broad national unity. The policy of the MKP [Hungarian Communist Party] was built on this; the alliance policy of the time--not worked out very well ideologically but well applied in practice--was based on this. The basic break in 1949 took place just in this alliance policy; the basic change was here. The masses which stood beside the communist party were not trained Marxists, they came from various strata. The ideals which they made their own were not only progressive but successful ideals; it was good to adopt them, it was good to join a successful team. This also is an important motiv when judging the changes. Naturally one should not ignore the change in the objective conditions, the cold war, the so-called Yugoslav case, the situation which had sharpened in an unprecedented way economically and militarily, the frosty international atmosphere. All these things favored the development of the personality cult, a clique policy, the creation of a sort of personal dictatorship. But it is my feeling that subjective factors also played a very important role. A broad generation believed in the ideals of the age; and when it became clear what was really happening they bemoaned not only that they had been misled but also that the country had lost a great opportunity. In connection with the distortions of the 1950's we must be sensitive also to the great pain of a generation, the sigh for what might have been from this dynamic beginning!

Tibor Hajdu: I feel that in judging the 1950's one of the most basic questions is continuity and discontinuity. As was mentioned earlier, when we talk about the 1950's are we talking about the beginning years of a

system which still exists, full of stumbles, or are we talking about another system from which, thank God, we were freed in 1956? I believe that in general it is the opinion of those present that by and large we are talking about the same system. But then we must separate from one another that which was entirely different, where we can talk about discontinuity--for example, the state of legality, agrarian policy or economic policy in general, or the policy applied in regard to the arts--and that which--be it good or bad--has not changed or which has hardly changed, where continuity is the stronger. For example, there has been change only to a certain degree in industrial policy, within economic policy, or in the system of making policy decisions, which is the same or almost the same as it was structurally, naturally with changed content. We should add that it is not clearly worked out or stated what we regard as a continuation and where we stick to an emphasis on discontinuity, and naturally this leads to certain confusion in theory, in education and in publicism alike.

Istvan Kiraly: I believe that there is no debate among communists that the 1950's are a component part of socialism. This is just as natural among communists--to mention a more distant analogy--as is the continuity between Christian culture and the Middle Ages. The idea of continuity does not rule out the need for reforms; in my opinion discontinuity applies only to errors, crimes and distortions. Thus the debate about continuity-discontinuity is essentially a question of the ratio of them. Looked at in this way there is a theoretical-political judgment of the epoch which emphasizes the continuity within the dialectic contradiction and sees the 1950's primarily as an epoch in the building of socialism. But there is also an emotional judgment which puts the emphasis on discontinuity, and sees this period primarily as years of crimes and illegalities. In the emotional judgment--primarily among the young--it is obscured how complex and of many shades were the relationships of the age, how many different colors there were within the apparent unity--not only in the party but even in the leadership of the party. The matter is complicated further by the different course, in many respects, of the social movement and political movement of the time. The social movement proceeded toward socialism and was the internal movement of the socialist system; but the political movement was deformed in many respects and led to a distorted version of the dictatorship of the proletariat burdened with a personality cult. What justifies our regarding the social movement as basically positive in its own character despite a political movement which was wrong in so many things? One could make a long list here of the economic, cultural, social, etc. achievements which are still valid today. For my own part, in accordance with my profession, I would like to refer only to the changes which took place in awareness, changes of historic significance. And there also I mention only two. On the one hand, the country learned to think in terms of the "world" in the best sense of the word, became capable of measuring its own place in the world. On the other hand, the true values of progress and humanity began to be realized in public awareness as a result of the social movements.

Karoly Urban: In addition to admitting the continuity which exists in regard to social movement we have an obligation, indeed, in the present tense international situation I might say we have an elemental interest, to see clearly and make others see the external and internal causes which produced the tragic differentiation of the social and the political movement. We must also develop a realistic picture of the degree to which the distortions of politics prevented the realization of socialist goals in the society, economy and culture. Finally, in 1956, not only did a political practice go bankrupt but even the cause of socialism was mortally endangered in Hungary. On the other hand, the swift consolidation after 1956 permits the conclusion that despite the loss of illusions which strengthened from 1953 and despite all the shocks which followed the demand for a better socialism did not end in the masses.

Sandor Lakos: On the basis of what has been said thus far it is my opinion that we can affirm that there were objectively positive aspects to the 1950's in production relationships, in the direction of development, in economic building work, in culture, in the relationships of people and in many other things. Hundreds of thousands became a public life factor at a single blow. All these positive aspects must be shown together with the errors, distortions and crimes, which we cannot excuse or minimize, nor do we want to, because these are blemishes on socialism. Condemning these errors in their entirety and with determination, we emphasize that the chief processes, the objective processes, in the 1950's were socialist, and the basic direction, even in regard to subjective factors, was socialist. But as for the errors and crimes, we should do everything to see that they can never be repeated.

Erno Csizmadia: It is also a very important and instructive question how those distortions could have occurred. It is not easy to answer this. Certainly a role was played in this by international and social circumstances, and there were aspects of the political system which led in this direction. The breakup of the unity of the party leadership, the development of cliques, and many other circumstances which caused ever increasing disillusionment in the party members caused great harm. So finally the question might arise whether the country is on the socialist path or some other path.

Istvan Kiraly: I feel that the essential cause of the distortions--a tragic mistake--was that the leadership did not have faith in the people. A distorted view ruled in a narrow circle of the leadership according to which they had to build socialism with 9 million fascists. This was the crucial mistake on the part of the leadership and it followed from this that the chief thing to be done was to establish order among them.

Sandor Balogh: In my opinion we must seek one of the essential causes of the errors in the lack of theoretical preparedness of the party. It is not by chance that Lenin emphasized so strongly: Every people will come to socialism, but every people must "agonize" out for itself the correct solutions corresponding to the given relationships. In contrast

to this, what do we see in the 1950's? Frequently the party leaders and ideologists did not know where to begin with the most fundamental political concepts of the age, such things as people, people's democracy and alliance policy.

Erno Csizmadia: A clear theoretical vision certainly has a gigantic role in how much the political leadership can prosper. Of course, we should not take this to mean that one must read out of some sort of bible what is to be done. The basic task of the leadership is to draw the conclusions from reality, compare these with theory, with ideology, and insofar as necessary from the latter also. So it would not be fortunate if we were to shift a disclosure of the contradictions of the 1950's one-sidedly to the ideological line; rather, we must study primarily the mutual effect of reality and theory. So I would put it this way: One of the chief problems of the 1950's was that the party lost the ability to compare practice and theory, the capacity for a realistic analysis of the given situation, and thus it "drifted" into various one-sidednesses in the most fundamental areas of life.

Sandor Balogh: Another factor must be taken into account also if we examine what caused that certain break at the end of the 1940's. We can say of the achievements born between 1945 and 1948--not minimizing the outstanding role of the communist party--that they were joint creations. We did practically everything together with the partners. A good example of this was the financial stabilization, for which every one of our partners had some sort of proposal. This meant some sort of control together with the institutions of direct democracy. This control weakened and then ended in later years. Where and in what does one feel the lack of control in the 1950's? For example in the fact that the propertied peasants had no sort of interest defending organization. It is a question whether an interest defending organization would have meant anything, for example in connection with having a say. In my opinion there is no doubt that an interest defending organization, not the individual peasant, would have opposed the excesses. It also suggests the lack of control that prior to the introduction of the council system there were municipal elections nowhere in the country--with the exception of Budapest. Thus this fundamental element of a political system--the council--developed and operated almost entirely guided from above. The experiences with the functioning of the popular organs created after 1945 say a lot about how great a role could have been played by direct democratic control, by the voluntary activity of the masses. It is well known that those living from wages and salaries lived under difficult circumstances at this time. So where did the enthusiasm come from? According to experience it came in no small part from the fact that in the factory committees, the land claim committees and similar bodies the workers and peasants had a direct say in things, could feel directly and form their own real life possibilities. This withered away after 1949, and the effect of this can be felt even today in certain respects.

Erno Csizmadia: It was also an unprecedented positive aspect of development between 1945 and 1948 that the leadership was able to raise the most essential questions of Hungarian reality, was capable of mobilizing for the most burning practical tasks. Let us think only of the land reform, overcoming inflation, the stabilization, the elimination of unemployment and the beginning of industrialization. If we were to begin 1945 today we would not do it essentially differently; we also would initiate those changes. Thus I consider it a very bad thing if we mix these questions into the criticism of the errors of the 1950's and begin to excuse ourselves for things which can be listed among our most positive traditions.

Sandor Lakos: It is true that the 1950's did not drop down from the sky. If we look to see--a television program did this--if the signs of the errors of the 1950's can be found in 1945 or 1946 we might certainly find them. But this cannot provide a basis for the opinion that we were following an erroneous policy even then. This would be a bad conclusion. The 1950's, the period following the liberation, the international situation which developed after the war and naturally the Second World War itself are closely interdependent with one another. But the erroneous policy of the 1950's did not follow from any one of them, was not determined by any one of them. It would not be correct to question the great positive aspects of the years following the liberation. I might mention only that the experiences of the coalition period in Hungary are being analysed with great interest in the international communist movement, including the communist parties in western Europe also.

Istvan Kiraly: An interesting problem hides in the question which Sandor Balogh has posed, that institutionalized social control disappeared in the 1950's. This is true, but another, non-institutionalized control did not disappear--the control by human quality. Even if there was no institutionalized control the commitment to the people of honest party workers, movement leaders and simple party members corrected many things. And if we do not take this human correction into consideration, if we equate the entire leadership of that time, the functionaries, indeed the entire party membership with the political adventurer Mihaly Farkas then we are making nothing of those human values which then represented the strengths of socialism, we are making nothing of the integrity of the veteran communists, of the messianistic integrity of the freshly arrived communists and of the integrity of the communists welded to the people.

Tibor Hajdu: We will not understand the age if we do not take into account what an important role human factors played in the processes. It is not enough to look at the political line alone; it is not immaterial who carried it out. On the one hand honest old revolutionaries, until a good number of them were locked up; on the other hand spirited youth, until they became disillusioned; and on the third hand old experts, who feared that they would be neglected. So there was a bad political line, but many of the errors were whittled down in execution, at the lower levels, at the professional levels. This explains why

important achievements were born also despite the erroneous policy. In recent years, however, we sometimes experience the opposite--the realization of a correct policy is sometimes deformed in the course of practical activity, because too many bureaucratic transmitting elements intervene between the levels of leadership and execution.

Peter Bacso: That is why we should not ignore the fact that in the 1950's moral relationships were distorted also. I consider this a side of the epoch difficult to atone for--the reports, the anonymous letters, this poisoning of human relationships. It is true that millions and millions did with a truly unprecedented sincere faith even the things which were really wrong. Then came the schizophrenia--I do not believe even my own friend, but I act as if I believed, because I dare do nothing else. Morally this duality was the most destructive and--in my opinion--art must struggle most against this, against the consequences of it, against the schizophrenia which can be felt even today in connection with the epoch. The struggle here is not against the real production or social relationships of the epoch but rather against the moral projections and consequences which--in my opinion--are fundamental. In films also we depict the "positive hero" in whom there is some unprecedented gravitation toward human decency. This is the Archimedes point starting from which the criticism can be nothing other than a criticism of a dis-honorable political system. We cannot start from anything else but only from values of the highest order, from human dignity--which was violated and abased.

Istvan Kiraly: Socialism can be and should be apprehended only in values of the highest order; with this I agree. But if this is so, why does not a film portray, for example, the communist who struggled for the greatest values of humanity and the nation and whom nevertheless was proclaimed an enemy of the people in 1956?

Peter Bacso: I tried to do this in my film titled "Day Before Yesterday," where I tried to depict this dilemma.

Istvan Kiraly: I see here the special responsibility of art. I would consider it the greatest tragedy if our generation were to permit the young generation to regard as nonexistent all that for which we faithfully struggled, which remained as a true value even in the 1950's. We do not stand far from him. If a young person is asked what sort of man was communist in the 1950's, he answers rather unambiguously: Either a coward, or a scoundrel. The young people of today do not know that in the 1950's the great majority of communists were splendid people, ready for sacrifices, guided by great ideals, who lived and worked according to these ideals, did sincerely what they did, and were not advocates of the illegalities but selfless workers in the building of socialism. We ourselves have fouled the past of our generation in their eyes. For the most part we mention only the negative aspects in films and literature speaking about the past. Do not misunderstand me--we cannot be silent about these things. Because it is completely

true that there was the cynicism of power also, the cynicism of the Rakosi group. And there were those who were cowards or careerists too. But often the young people of today see in the mirror of the films and other artistic creations only the cowards, careerists and cynics. The others--the majority--often fall out of their field of view.

Sandor Lakos: I feel that here we have arrived at a very fundamental question. Namely the extent to which we must judge basic questions in the same way, working in different areas. I recognize that the role of art, theater and literature is one thing and that of theory and science another, but in a question so fundamental as the one we have been talking about perhaps we should work in greater agreement--keeping in mind the peculiarities of the medium. A bad division of labor has developed now. The schools and political education try to give a comprehensive picture--with far from satisfactory results--while at the same time art, for the most part, shows only one side. In my opinion this--in the final analysis--endangers the credibility of art also. It would be worth while for us to think about the possibilities of a more balanced approach. I believe that there are no essential differences in the judgment. It appears that the differences are in the approach, in the interpretation of the task. The positions taken by the party reflect that it has taken up the epoch as a whole, while most definitely setting itself off from the erroneous, criminal deeds of the political leadership of that time. But can we give a uniform evaluation of the epoch without this? In my opinion we cannot. As long as the ideological front is uncertain, as long as art passionately presents only one side, we cannot count on a uniform picture, at most we can count on rather mixed emotions. I agree with the other speakers that there is need for a scientific judgment which will provide a foundation for special depiction, emphasizing the details.

Karoly Urban: Today the arts are influencing crucially the thinking about the 1950's. There can be no doubt that the reader does not expect from literature the same thing he expects from scientific works. But he might be interested in what answer science can give to the questions raised by the arts. We must remove those obstacles which hinder historiography in the realization of its consciousness forming role. If we expect the development of a position in the debated questions authenticated by historical research within the foreseeable future then we must certainly relax the constraints existing in the area of research, especially in regard to the archives. Together with this we must increase the number of accessible publications dealing with the epoch--thus not only those appearing in the professional journals. Historiography also has great need for the reminiscences of contemporaries. We need not fewer but rather more memoirs pertaining to the 1950's. But still, the mature achievements of science must constitute the foundation for consciousness formation. There are already a number of studies--profoundly analyzing important questions--but they do not reach a wider circle.

Peter Bacso: I confess that art, at least the film arts, do discuss these events one-sidedly; I do too. But the task of art is not objective analysis, rather--if I might use this expression--it is to provide an emotional

experience. In my opinion the films dealing with the epoch can be interpreted in several ways, from Karoly Makk's "Love" to Andras Kovacs' "Horse Farmer," from my "Vera Angi" to my "Witness." In my opinion we must speak about the distortions of the epoch very passionately because only this makes it credible that we are opposing the distortions, and not opposing socialism.

Erno Csizmadia: I understand and I accept that some questions are presented differently than we might like. But what literature, art and education are doing and what should be done belong to politics too. The orienting and coordinating role of politics is indispensable here. I sincerely trust that this is generally recognized by now. And also that taking a comprehensive and clear position in the question being discussed is unavoidable. Without this it would not be possible to orient ourselves, not possible to act.

Istvan Kiraly: Let us say frankly that if someone studies the textbook and then goes to see Peter Bacso's film, then he must decide--who is telling the truth, the school or the film? Since the film is composed more beautifully and has suggestive power, naturally he believes the film and gives himself over completely to the emotional judgment, to the discontinuity. But if someone gives himself over to this mood and emotion, then he easily gives himself over also to that political judgment which flows from the western world. And finally this may lead to the point where he not only does not respect the 1950's, he does not respect socialism either. And this is the problem, why I consider the responsibility of art to be extraordinarily important, although it must be added that here art is only reflecting something which we have not clarified adequately theoretically.

Sandor Lakos: Independent of where we work, in the area of science, education or art, our chief messages should stand close to one another. Of course--and in this I agree with Karoly Urban--this poses tasks for science also, and to perform these tasks the conditions for research really should be improved. I do not believe, however, that the texts in the archives will be sufficient in themselves for a complete reconstruction of the epoch. And here let us return to an earlier thought of Karoly Urban. I do not dispute the effect of personal sensitivity in making an objection evaluation difficult, but neither do I believe that we would get a more objective picture if there were the documents only and we, who figured in the epoch, were not. I think it will be more difficult without us. The archive materials will not be able to give back reality in themselves, reflect precisely what really happened--the life of those times. I think it is the obligation of our generation to do everything in the interest of clarifying the past.

Tibor Hajdu: I would count it among these obligations that we repeatedly render an account of what should be preserved from the structures which developed then and what it is that time has gone beyond. I do not want to go into details, but I would refer to, for example, our public education system or the organizational structure of the youth movement, where it appears we may be preserving much too much from the methods and frameworks which developed 30-35 years ago.

Sandor Lakos: I agree with Tibor Hajdu. When we polemicize about the 1950's we are also debating, expressly or tacitly, how much we have learned from the 1950's. From this viewpoint this epoch is far from "worked out." Many cases show, for example, that an efficient control is not yet realized adequately, one which would protect the leadership from incorrect or insufficiently founded decisions, make it impossible for individual leaders to abuse power. Or we have here the functioning of the political system. One of the big lessons of the 1950's was that the party cannot take everything on itself, the party cannot be omnipotent. I believe that even today the party organs and the party apparatus take on more than they should, more than is necessary. They deal operationally in concrete matters--which takes up much energy and does not lead in the correct direction. The party has acted against this in principle, it is dealing with this phenomenon responsibly, but we cannot yet be satisfied with the present situation.

Erno Csizmadia: I would list among the lessons how great a role political movement has in historical processes. Let us think only of the historical situations at that time. By 1954-1955 the economy and standard of living had definitely moved ahead somewhat; by the summer of 1956 we were in a definitely better situation. Despite this the crisis of confidence began to come to a head at just that time. This is a great lesson. I do not want to bring this up to date in a stereotyped way, but even today we cannot be satisfied with the fact that the economy is slowly getting on its feet, the balance swinging back, production developing. We must concern ourselves with awareness, with morality, with the political sphere as well, because only in this way can the trust be preserved.

Sandor Lakos: It appears from what has been said, if I may formulate it in this way, that we must deal with the 1950's on two fronts. We have the task of opposing to the extremes a properly shaded, differentiated, trustworthy picture, taking into consideration also the new achievements of theory and research. I think that we can and must constantly make our views more precise, making our positions more finely shaded. In the 1956-1957 documents of the party it is said that we accept the 1950's as a whole, because despite the errors the positive features dominated. The 1962 resolution, which closed the problem of the personality cult, spoke with greater shading about certain personalities and formulated things a little differently. In the meantime new facts have come to light, and these had to be taken into consideration. So if we today can judge certain phenomena of that time more precisely on the basis of new facts or on the basis of the lessons of the development which has taken place then it is our right and obligation to make our evaluation more finely shaded, more convincing and more acceptable. Answering the essential questions is our obligation to ourselves, but it is also our obligation in regard to the entire international labor movement. When our ideological enemies again and again take out and cast the distortions of the 1950's in our teeth, we cannot remain silent. What is needed is that we argue bravely and responsibly, because what is involved is questions and lessons of great significance affecting socialism as a whole.

HUNGARY

CHURCH-STATE DIALOGUE ADVOCATED TO MAINTAIN NATIONAL UNITY

Lutheran Bishop Advocates Dialogue

Budapest VILAGOSSAG in Hungarian Jan . 84 pp 7-8

[Text] The Value and Prospects of Dialogue\*

One of the very important phenomena of the 80's in our socialist society and in the life of the churches of the country is the high-level dialogue that has developed in various forms and continues in so lively a manner between Marxists and believers in our country. For a long time now the stage of this dialogue has been the large public of the press and the Hungarian Radio. More recent important developments of it have been the 1981 Television dialogue, "Dialogue About Dialogue," the Debrecen Marxist-Protestant dialogue about the aims of dialogue and about some fundamental questions, and now the scholarly conference on the occasion of the 500th anniversary of Luther's birth.

The Value of Dialogue

Why is this dialogue valuable and important for us? As I see it, there are three dimensions. In the first place, it leads to a fuller and truer knowledge of each other, it discloses the ultimate bases of the ethical motives of our convictions, and in this way it strengthens respect in us for each other's conviction. In the second place, because it leads--over and above the frank disclosure of substantial differences, of differences in basic principles--to a fuller recognition of joint human tasks in personal human relations, in our society, and in the problems of today's world. Finally, it makes possible everywhere better coexistence and a deeper, more truly ethical cooperation in our joint personal human, social, and ideological tasks.

"Hic et nunc"--"here and now," this is the most important determinant of both our joint thinking and our dialogue, and of our joint ethical action. We are not carrying on this dialogue in abstract generalities, but in the concrete inter-connections of the past and present, of the present-day life of our people, our society, and our churches, without in the meantime

\*Closing address delivered at the Sopron conference

forgetting even for a moment the deeper context, the context of the world of peoples, of the great interdependencies of society and the world oikomenia, of the present-day life and tasks of the churches.

#### New Evaluation of Luther and the Lutheran Reformation

Let me try to summarize what it meant for us, ecclesiastical participants, where the view of our Marxist dialogue-partners in the evaluation of the Reformation showed something new in the connection of Luther and the Reformation in Hungary. What present-day lessons does the conference have?

1. First of all, I emphasize the significance of the social aspect in the appraisal of the theology of Luther and of the Reformation. Many of us Protestants are inclined--we were primarily in the last century and at the beginning of our century--to look at the Lutheran Reformation one-sidedly, from the viewpoint only of the individual and of individualism, to understand Luther as the hero of individual psychological freedom, who speaks only about the significance of the individual human being and of his relation to God.

This, however--it is obvious even from this session--is a one-sided interpretation. Luther undoubtedly sees the faith-relation, the interior relation, of God and the individual human being as the source, the foundation, of the Christian life. But he does not stop here (Augustine: Deus et anima). Faith must emerge from itself and must turn in love toward the neighbor, the other human being because God created man for community, for life in human community. "In these two things (not one!) stands the whole Christian life: Believe in God and help your fellow-man! The entire Gospel teaches this!"

2. It follows from this that alongside the dimension of personal, interior faith, of decisive importance according to Luther is love, the ethical dimension of the other human being and the community, the economic, social and political dimension. Luther's entire preaching of the Gospel and his writings are proofs that the life of neither the believing man nor of the church is imaginable without social relations, without the ethical/socio-ethical fruit of faith!

More specifically, Luther saw the tasks of a faith active in love in three main areas: the area of the family, of the earthly calling, or work, and the area of coexistence in the relation of higher authorities and subjects in the state. For us, for Christians, the Marxist evaluation of Luther and the Reformation has illuminated the ethical and socio-ethical message of the Reformation from a new angle.

3. This conference has also shed light on the fact that the teaching of the Reformation, of Luther, is a powerful inducement today to our laboring responsibly together for the solution of the great issues of the world and of humanity. According to the teaching of the Reformation, in our relation to God, in the relation of iustificatio (justification), only faith, unconditional trust (sola fides) placed in God, is decisive. In relation to human beings and to the world, however, only love, actively helping love aiming at the good of the whole man and society, counts. Love does not ask

whether the other is a believer or not, it offers a helping hand, and does so together with others! In the concrete situation one thing counts, according to Jesus (Matt. 25) and according to Luther, as well: Whether we extend our hand toward a fellow-man or human community in trouble, to active assistance, not asking about the faith or ideology of the other, whether it is a matter of a fellow helper or of someone who has gotten into trouble. Luther's great reform act, in our view, was that he put things in their place: faith in the relation of God and man, love and good deeds, however--as the fruits of faith--in our relations to fellow human beings and to the human community.

4. This conference of ours has also drawn attention to the fact that it was an act of revolutionary great significance of the Reformation and of its originator, Luther, to restore the honor of the world, the earthly world, in the field of Christianity. Augustine and many after him--largely under the influence of the Greek idealist philosopher Plato and Plotinus, the medieval Neo-Platonist mystic--looked at the world as the "civitas diaboli," the realm of the devil and of evil. Therefore, they saw the true, perfect, Christian life in man breaking with the world, withdrawing into the solitude of the wilderness or into the silence of cloister cells, in order there to be able to consecrate his life truly to God. "Vita contemplativa potior est quam activa"--this was the conviction of the Middle Ages.

In this area it was Luther's revolutionary great act to restore, and doubly, the honor of the earthly world. Although crime, selfishness, lovelessness have marred it, God still governs in the world (weltliches Regiment Gottes), and therefore the world is God's world, a place of his presence. On the other hand, this world is also the stage for the living of the faith, for in it we must practice love! Not to break with the world, with society, but to live in it and to serve the good of our fellow man, in love! Thereby Luther restored the honor of family life, respect for worldly callings (the worship of the poor serving girl) instead of cloisters, respect for earthly life! We Christians of today can scarcely measure the significance of this.

5. Finally, this symposium has pointed out to us from a new angle, as was our hope, that the hope of the Kingdom of God, far from paralysing our earthly responsibility and activity, gives it new, powerful motives--primarily the ethical motive of gratitude. Often the Christian has rightly been accused of turning the love of the Christian to another, eternal, world and thereby making him ashamed of his earthly responsibility and activity. Luther's preachings of the Gospel, his books, and his whole life are a resounding refutation of this. My faith has obtained everything from God; I must show my gratitude here on earth, in love and service to my fellow man. I only mention this oft-repeated quotation: "If I knew that tomorrow the world would be destroyed, today I would still plant the seed of a tiny apple tree!"

#### Prospects for Our Dialogue

The Sopron conference has been another significant step forward. We are still at the beginning of it, if we think of the many tasks. On the one hand we

must devote still more energy to the fundamental questions, where do we differ, where are we at one? We must become even further immersed in the analysis of concrete joint tasks in connection with our society and in world relations. I would summarize them thusly: "our mutual humanitarian, human values and our joint tasks in implementing them;" in the relations of our society, "peace and justice;" the joint human responsibility for the future of today's world.

Let me express it this way: It is my conviction that the dialogue of Marxists and believers in our country has not only up to now given a mutually valuable, new view and new inducements to joint action for man and for our world, but the real development is still ahead of us. Its significance will outgrow the borders of our country in today's divided world. At the same time it is a help to each of us that we know more truly and better how to implement our concrete tasks in the Hungarian society of today.

Gyula Nagy

#### Churches Offer Social Benefits

Budapest MAGYAR NEMZET in Hungarian 4 Feb 84 p 7

[Text] Substantive Dialogue

The reader who pays attention to public communications, so-called communiqus (and let us not preclude the existence of usch people), may have noticed that at the beginning of every year the leaders of the churches in Hungary meet with the general secretary of the People's Patriotic Front. A person might think that these are some formal, respect-paying visits--let us say--expressing good wishes for the new year. But much more is involved--substantive dialogue with a political, a public, content.

Among the church leaders several fill high elected positions in the people's front movement, on its national council and its presidency. Both as Hungarian citizens themselves, and as representatives of religious people, they take part in the formation of policy and in the tackling of common tasks facing the nation.

A good nine years ago, the first secretary of the Central Committee of the SMZMP spoke at a session of the national council of the people's front about the fact that our people, in its deeds, as well, was fittingly commemorating the 30th anniversary of the liberation of the country, in connection with which the churches, too, took a fine position, in a patriotic spirit and at the same time in harmony with their own intentions and goals. "Thereby they gave the greatest assistance not to professional politicians, but to believing people;...they removed in them that psychological problem and internal conflict over whether they should side with the political forces working for the good, the prosperity, of the people, or with the church. This means a great deal from the point of view of our work and our future."

The years that have passed since then have corroborated the truth of this statement. If religious people--with their chief pastors in the fore--had not actively taken up the highly responsible work of building the country together with their Marxist compatriots, we would have been able to overcome our problems only with much greater difficulty. And it is not just a question of joint action, but also of that public mood that is a formative force of public opinion, in which people of different denominations also have a share, and which at its best simplifies, at its worst might make more difficult, the conditions of all sorts of work of ours.

It was precisely for this reason--understandably--that at the conference that took place a few days ago one of the central issues was: what today is the state of that socialist unity that we rightly hold to be one of the greatest results of nearly four decades of our free life? The universal opinion was that internal stability has not been shaken. The fundamental pillars of collective understanding are solid, even at a time when in our day greater burdens than previously are weighing heavily on one of them--our economy. The unbroken increase of the standard of living is not the sole factor of the improvement, however; socialism has other values, as well. Not only did the general secretary of the people's front call attention to this, the church leaders also stated it. The Reform bishop of the Tiszantul, the president of the Ecumenical Council of the Churches in Hungary, referred to those moral norms that belong both to socialism and to the churches. Concerning these the Marxists declared that, although they are not convergent, they are analogous. This statement was acceptable to the churches; for precisely this reason it is only good if the churches strive to have their adherents abide by these fundamental moral principles.

The Evangelical president-bishop spoke of efforts made for the improvement of socialist democracy as a similar value. I am convinced that on the basis of these national unity has been strengthened.

Confidence--this too was a catchword of the dialogue, and in a double sense. On the basis of his observations, one of the prelates stated that confidence in the government is strong in the religious communities. Another raised a protest against "an excess of confidence." The use of quotation marks is legitimate. The point is that "this political leadership is solving the problems anyway." But without them? There are those who behave as if they did not give credence to our difficulties. If they did, they would work much, much harder. It is as if in such people the care of the state (which it cannot increase today) would have led to the undervaluing of personal action. In place of a citizen consciousness, a comfortable-seeming subject behavior has developed in many people. This is foreign to socialism; it is possible to change it with the consistent development of socialist democracy. Quite worthy of note was the train of thought with which the cardinal, the bishop of Esztergom, seized on the defense of the family as one of the most important among the tasks undertaken by the people's front. The breakdown of families also diminishes the defense of peace. Why would those who are not interested in the fate of their own families feel a greater responsibility toward the great family of humanity? The family does not come into existence unexpectedly; those who are engaged prepare for it. But they should do so with greater responsibility and thoughtfulness, preparing not

only for love and joy, but for harder days, for helping each other, as well. He who wants to receive within the family may become inclined to such behavior in social life, too. It would be good if we could make more common the recognition of the fact that we set up a family not for ourselves alone, and we bring not only ourselves into a marriage. We also bring the future of the nation with us into the family.

Others, too, followed this line of thought, essentially in that spirit in which the most recent congress of the people's front also took a position. Without the existence of families, other types of communities cannot come into being, nor could our socialist national community exist, either.

Socialism respects, supports, defends, and strengthens families, for the family is not only the raison d'etre of socialist society, but is the former of personality, and growing space and workshop of such characteristics of society as collectivism, democracy, freedom, and education. Our economic and cultural plans must also be worked out from the starting point that the family will continue to remain the fundamental unit of society. Referring to this latter requirement, the general secretary of the people's front, supporting the intentions of the government for juster distribution, pointed out that the people's front takes a stand in defense of the interests of low-income older people, and wishes to do all it can for young people just starting a career and establishing a family, for an intelligent start to their lives.

Several ecclesiastical leaders recommended that the movement should also think about families with several or many children, besides these two social strata in difficult circumstances. Not with a demand for social support, but much rather for consideration, the Unitarian bishop called the attention of the people's front to the peculiar situation of two youthful age-groups: young people not going from primary school to secondary school, or from secondary school to higher education. Because of their peculiar situation, society cannot effectively look after them. They must be taken care of, lest they go astray.

Due to the profession of the participants in the dialogue, the moral connections of the theme also cropped up, whether issues of the economy, socialist democracy, or culture itself were being considered. One of the prelates even felt it necessary to justify this: It would be demoralizing if they did not moralize in this group. There were no citations or quotations, yet it was not detrimental--shall we say--to what was being said when an observer thought he heard the words of one or another classic from the background. Because pure morality is the mainstay and foundation of every state.... Or as the general secretary of the OBT Catholic Committee put it, when he referred to Petofi's "table" and consequently submitted that all of us can fit there, but also warned that we must first be servers and only then consumers.

As the discussion turned to the state and the churches, the party and the people's front, it became unequivocal: The churches, leaders and followers, of our country wish to guard with all their strength that collective understanding on which the socialist unity of Hungarian society is based.

They are undertaking the defense of this and every other result against both international attacks and phenomena undermining social morale--together with their non-religious compatriots. They are undertaking the defense of the peace of humanity in international forums, as well, and the defense of the peace of society among their followers: the understanding that they have not fomented the storm in our country, but that the sea of the world is running high; the understanding of the fact that all of us are affected, but all of us both can and must contribute to the lessening of our troubles.

The general secretary of the people's front responsibly promised: What was said will not be words shouted into the wilderness. The leading bodies of the movement will weigh them, and where possible will build them into its action programs. The thoughts formulated, the readiness for action proposed and--presumably--to be realized, must have an effect on the people's front movement and through it on the advance of the nation, as well. Joint actions, too, must follow the dialogues--then we will have true understanding.

Official communiqes are generally laconic. The events about which they provide information, however, are not on that account formalities. Daily life is destined to provide information about the economy of their content, when--presumably--we no longer even remember the communiqes.

Robert Juhasz

8971  
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ECONOMIC REFORM POPULARIZED IN MOVIE HOUSE DOCUMENTARY

Budapest HETI VILAGGAZDASAG in Hungarian 3 Mar 84 pp 34-35

[Article: "We Are Not Yielding To 1968; Documentary Film 'Thoughts About Reform'"]

[Text] To learn how to know ourselves, to get the maximum profit from our mistakes and to make use of this knowledge in action--these might be the generally applicable messages to be concluded by the moviegoer who, in the coming weeks and months, decides to go to see Director Laszlo Vitezy's documentary entitled "Thoughts About Reform." In this production, first presented at this year's Hungarian Feature Film Festival, well-known Hungarian economists and experts in law, history and automation, explain their views resulting, no doubt, from much research, numerous publications and countless discussions, on the guiding economic-socio-political principles of the 15 years following 1968, thus providing simultaneously food for thought to everyone having an opinion on, or a say in, the shaping of the near future. Without any claim to completeness, the following are a few details extracted from the series of lectures delivered and filmed at the Kossuth Club in the fall of 1982--to eventually entice to moviegoing those interested in thoughts about reform.

Every year between 1973-1978 domestic consumption--use and stockpiling--has essentially exceeded the produced national revenue: The difference amounted to approximately twenty to fifty billion forints per year. This became possible only because our imports have considerably exceeded our exports. Starting just with the year of 1973, the country has suffered significant losses in the exchange ratio, a fact which some compare to such national tragedies as the disastrous defeat at Mohacs or the material losses of the Second World War. In 1975, the worsening of the non-ruble exchange ratio in international trade had been slowed down, only to start in our CEMA trade--because CEMA prices follow the trend of world market prices, even though at a slower pace. At the end of 1978 the per capita debt rate had become significant even by international standards and--especially as a result of 1977-1978--it has given rise to important conclusions.

In 1972, we came to a halt in realizing the reform started in 1968. From a political standpoint this halt was aimed to preserve the position already attained but--as so many of us have already indicated--in times of rapid advance and development halt and preservation practically equal retrogression. From 1974 on, Hungary became the loser in these series of changes in world

economy and the direction of our economy has become confused: It had not clarified in time what we should prevent and what we should adopt. There were cases when we have fought against something we should have adopted. In principle we have upheld the reform of 68, we did not retreat from our political decisions, however in practice we have rather badly curtailed them and a system has developed which deviated in substance from the principles of 1966 and 1968. This process has gone so far that in 1977-1978 the economic mechanism was on the verge of not being able to function anymore. It is well known that the dilemma of that time resulted in the decision to follow the line of 68.

Today the question arises on the one side: how can political stability be preserved, while on the other: how to achieve substantial growth in the gross national product? These two goals are closely interconnected; neither can be attained without the other. The established stability in institution and system may lend short-term security but can only ensure very slow production growth. However, on the middle or long run, lack of change would increase social risk because of the threat of unproductivity. What could the continuation of the economic reform policy bring at the same time? No doubt, from a short-term standpoint it increases economic as well as political risks, because it disturbs the standstill and the situations already established, because it redistributes advantages and disadvantages between social strata and groups, while at the same time it should not allow to change positions already attained by social classes. However, in the middle and long run it promises substantial production growth of the people's economy.

There were times when we agonized over the problem that only 98% of our national revenue comes from the social sector, and if we could only turn that 2% too into socialist, maybe we would have complete socialism here. Today's production forces require conditions of production where a man's interest lies in working more and for better wages in order to have more opportunities to spend them on what he wants--that is, we need commodity-, money- and value conditions.

I would--very arbitrarily--divide the past 15 years of the reform in three periods. The first period is the so-called golden age; I would call the second period the age of illusions and the third--the present--the age of realities. In the "golden age," between 1968-1973, all four magic numbers developed very advantageously: there was economic growth, there was no unemployment, our prices were stable and our balance of payments active. The most decisive reason was that, by means of the reform, so many tight bottlenecks within companies could be eliminated in a short time, thus producing a big upswing in the economy without new large investments. The second reason was that the foreign market situation was very favorable. Then, in 1973, the oil crisis took place and a wave of recession began in the capitalist world. The first illusion which had to dawn on us was that our prices were far from being as good as we thought them to be during the boom. The other illusion was that the rising costs of the capitalist markets and the oil crisis will not affect us.

I think that, as a result of these illusions, in the second period--between 1974-1978--we have created the well-known consequences. At that time the

political leadership had not been sure whether to continue the reform or perhaps to hold something back. Views supporting growth at any price emerged resulting in increasing indebtedness.

I called the third period the age of realities. In October and December 1978 the Central Committee brought resolutions putting the balance in first place. It is of positive value that the Soviet Union did not dump the whole price loss on us all at once, but step-by-step, based on five-year averages, thus leaving us a breathing space to adjust to the new situation. This adjustment, however, came only too late.

It is very damaging to have a bad system, but the damages are not smaller when we start correcting a system by eliminating some of its bad elements without really touching on others. In such a case contradictions are built into the functions of every system which may result in serious negative effects, despite the intended corrective reforms. For example, at present we have reached in the economy a certain level of company independence, yet we cannot talk of changes in political or social institutions which could reinforce company independence from that side. In my opinion, to think through and to bring into being the uniform system of the Hungarian model of socialism is a big task. The now evolving economic model has not yet found its socio-political model which is taking form now. From many points of view we are still at the beginning of this process; the tasks of building a consistent, logical, interconnected system are still incredibly large and require that many social and economic reform steps be assembled and constructed. Every element cannot be changed from one year to the other, as was proven by the economic reform experiences of the past 25 years. Consequently, there is need for special reflection on the change-overs and transitions, although naturally excessive prolongation and particularizations are in themselves more dangerous than any reform.

One of the great reformers of Hungarian history, Jozsef Eotvos, put it like this: It appears that those reforms are impracticable which are too radical. In reality, impracticable reforms are always those which want to bring change but at the same time also want to maintain the status quo. These are impossible undertakings. Radical reforms have always more possibilities for realization and naturally they are always harder to fight for.

For a long time many in Hungary had believed that the national budget is a simple machinery which takes money away from those companies which have it and gives it to those producing with deficit. Today it seems to be clear that this practice cannot be continued: a country cannot spend 34% of its budget on financing companies with deficits. The budget deficit cannot be eliminated until certain companies work with losses and vice versa: The budget is unable to take on deficits which surface in certain companies; to do so is not expedient. If a unit of the economy is unable to fulfill its function, then--maybe after a certain grace period--it should be discontinued and replaced by another type of profitable enterprise.

The ability to participate in global economic development is at present a matter of life and death for the Hungarian economy and for the Hungarian

nation--or, if you prefer, for the Hungarian system of socialism. If we cannot achieve this, we, as a nation, will relapse into the same backwardness where we have already been once before. In my opinion, those reform endeavors which we have started here are the most important social concentration in order to keep the Hungarian economy in the future on the course of normal development.

12214  
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RESULTS OF KRAKOW REPORTS-ELECTIONS CONFERENCE

Account of Proceedings

Krakow GAZETA KRAKOWSKA in Polish 30 Jan 84 pp 1,2,4

[Excerpts] On Saturday 28 January 1984, the WISLA GTS [expansion unavailable] Auditorium in Krakow filled with delegates and the guests of the 18th Krakow PZPR Reports-Elections Conference.

At 9:00 the deliberations opened with the singing of the Internationale. Then PZPR KC [Central Committee] candidate member, Krakow Committee [KK] first secretary Jozef Gajewicz took the floor and said: The purpose of our conference is to make an overall assessment of the progress and level of implementation of party resolutions--those of the Central Committee and our own--passed during the past term. The program of socialist renewal adopted at the Ninth Extra-ordinary Party Congress was implemented consistently during this period. We amassed new experiences; new methods of operation were initiated; the activation of our party ranks took place and the party was purged of those that are politically and ideologically alien. The reports-elections campaign has led to a further strengthening of the party's political and organizational unity, to the performance of statutory tasks by elements and party organizations and to their considerable activism. The influence of party organizations in employee groups and within the various communities has grown. Successive, gradual progress has been noted in the social, the political and the economic spheres. Our primary task is to strengthen the party's leading role and its leadership role. The struggle waged against political opponents and the enemies of the line of understanding has been of particular importance. The status of PRON [Patriotic Council for National Rebirth] has grown, along with the reach of its influence and its appeal to society. Likewise, the rebirth of the class union movement has been very important. As the party, we attach much importance to the development of employee self-governments, as well as rural, cooperative and housing development self-governing bodies.

This year we celebrate the 40th anniversary of the origin of our people's state--the anniversary of the PRL [Polish People's Republic]. It is an opportunity for an objective, honest assessment of our material and spiritual progress.

Jozef Gajewicz expressed especially deep respect for the veterans of the workers movements and for activists and fighters in the battle over the social and national liberation of the country, over preserving the people's authority. Expressing his regard for them, he greeted the veterans of these struggles present in the auditorium.

Next he greeted the guests of the conference, including: Politburo member, PZPR KC secretary Kazimierz Barcikowski, Politburo member Hieronim Kubiak, chairman of the Central Review Commission [CKR] Kazimierz Morawski, deputy chairman of the CKKP [Central Party Control Commission] Grazyna Kotnowska, chairman of the ZSMP [Union of Socialist Polish Youth] ZG [Main Board] Jerzy Jaskiernia, director of the KC Ideological Department Wladyslaw Loranc and deputy director of that department Andrzej Czyz, Maj Gen Leon Sulima-- chief of the KOK [National Defense Committee] Secretariat, Krzysztof Kuczynski-- deputy minister of metallurgy and the engineering industry, members of the KC, the CKKP and the CKR, as well as delegates to the Ninth Extraordinary Party Congress, representatives of the leadership of political parties along with ZSL KK [Krakow Committee] chairman Stanislaw Mazur and SD KK chairman, deputy Jan Janowski, representatives of PRON with chairman of the PRON KR [Krakow Council] Ryszard Zielinski, chairman of the ZBoWiD [Union of Fighters for Freedom and Democracy] ZK [Krakow Board] Piotr Grajek, Krakow area deputies to the PRL Sejm, a group of union activists led by Alfred Miodowicz--chairman of the Federation of Metallurgists' Trade Unions and invited representatives of science, culture and economic life.

This was followed by the confirmation of the members of the conference presidium. Apolinary Kozub was named chairman of the deliberations. The agenda and the rules of the deliberations were approved. By open ballot, the mandates, motions and electoral commissions were elected by unanimous approval.

Jozef Gajewicz, PZPR Krakow Committee first secretary, gave the Executive Board address (the report is published on pp 3 and 5 [Polish text]).

The first person to take the floor during the discussion was Stanislaw Baranik, PRL Sejm deputy, employee of the Lenin Works.

The Metallurgy Plant of the Lenin Works is the largest production plant in People's Poland. This year it celebrates the 30th anniversary of its naming for the leader of the October Revolution. Likewise, it was 30 years ago that the first pig iron poured out of the metallurgical furnaces that had been built on the fields of the village of Mogila near Krakow. Today's mill is urgently in need of modernization. Such a program has already been prepared; half of the outlays earmarked for modernization will be used for environmental protection. The appreciable growth in the requirement for metallurgical products at this time is a symptom of development and a manifestation of the economy's emergence from the crisis. This is fine, but the preparation of the ultimate requirement for metallurgical products for the entire economy is needed. We still do not have such a plan...

The modernization of Krakow's entire industry is contingent upon the modernization of this plant; this truth is particularly evident here in Krakow.

A break in the discussion followed. The Mandates Commission reported that of the 336 elected delegates, 333 were in attendance at the conference.

Next to take the floor in the discussion was Slawomir J. Tabkowski, editor-in-chief of GAZETA KRAKOWSKA.

The most difficult period in the life of the journalistic community, divided and set at loggerheads by the events that took place at the end of 1980/beginning of 1981, is behind us, although it is still too early to speak of total integration and harmony. We criticize the irregularities and deformities that continue in our social and economic life, since the struggle against them emanates from the party's leadership role and service function with regard to working people. But often we also encounter various forms of the suppression of criticism. The most zealous defenders explain their actions in terms of higher, superior ends. Too often, one wishes to hear others criticized, but not us. The most absorbing question is: who wrote that? It is not whether he was right, whether he told the truth, but how did he find it out? In such situations, we have the support of the Krakow Party Committee. Especially in these still difficult times for Poland, we try to remember what is meant by socialist morality. Ethical standards are the same for all, regardless of the community in which one works, and regardless of the merits and position one has.

Zbigniew Starzak, chairman of the PZPR District Review Commission at Nowa Huta, was next to take the floor. He emphasized that the last, difficult term elapsed under the banner of the struggle for socialism, for the party and its external aspect, that the party emerged from it smaller in numbers, but stronger. Today the party needs to take initiatives and to be on the offensive. It must counter all manifestations of evil openly; otherwise this will be spoken of by our political opponent. Improvements must be made in the translation of party resolutions and documents into legal documents and into more effective executory regulations. We must expand the scope of consultations with society; workers wish to participate and must have a share in the creation of the drafts of such documents. Zbigniew Starzak also condemned such negative phenomena in society as parasitism, speculation and the excessive accumulation of wealth by private companies at the expense of society.

On behalf of the PZPR KC Politburo, Kazimierz Barcikowski solidly recommended Jozef Gazewicz as first secretary of the PZPR KK.

In the next part of the discussion, the Krowodersk educational community delegate, also member of the KKKP Presidium Dorota Filipkowska, alluding to the opinion of the KKKP and the PZPR KK Educational Commission, stated that most teachers exhibit the proper ideological attitude and that a process of integration is taking place among teachers. However, such less positive phenomena as passivity and the failure to accept ideological principles also exist. The gulf that exists between the school and the family, consisting of the mutual shifting of duties and of the responsibility to educate the younger generation, does not help to improve the situation. Political, social and youth organizations must aid here; the role of the mass media is also important. The Polish school is a socialist school, stressed Danuta [as pub.] Filipkowska, and this truth must be accepted by every teacher and educator of the young generation of Poles.

Mayor of Krakow Tadeusz Salwa devoted his extensive address to the most crucial problems of the Krakow City Voivodship and also assessed what had been implemented successfully during the period between conferences. "The goal of the work of administrative and political authorities is the awareness of responsibility for the future of Krakow and the voivodship, as well as the ambition to preserve always the important position of Krakow in the life of the nation and the state." In order to guarantee supplies of food, water and heat, we are forced to act as in a near-disaster situation.

T. Salwa devoted the next part of his address to the future and the prospects of Krakow through 1985. The speaker recognized the most urgent tasks to be protecting the environment against the negative consequences of production and stepping up repair and investment efforts. The key to our emergence from current economic difficulties is more efficient production in those economic sectors that generate national income. Industrial plants must be evaluated not only in terms of production results, but also for using their economic potential to bring benefits and not harm to the city. The modernization of plants and production processes, the building and installation of more electrical precipitators, the building of new municipal refuse dumps and the protection of river basins against pollutants and of farmlands against degradation--these are fundamental tasks in the environmental protection area. The implementation of these ventures depends largely upon plants and their workforces, said the mayor. He mentioned the role of the Krakow Environmental Protection Council whose work has been instrumental in creating a more universal understanding of complex ecological problems.

What else may we expect? While we cannot anticipate that Krakow area agriculture will be able to guarantee food self-sufficiency for the city, the structure of agriculture should be changed to adapt it to the needs of our region.

The mayor devoted a large part of his address to the question of ensuring water for Krakow. Construction on Raba II is progressing smoothly. It is possible that in 1986, Raba II will provide an additional cubic meter of water per second. Temporarily, however, emergency measures are being taken to moderate the effects of the water crisis.

T. Salwa also spoke of the problems of the Krakow heating system and the potential for the speedy elimination of still existing shortages in this area. He likewise addressed the problems of Krakow transportation. A substantial portion of his speech concerned construction and obstacles standing in the way of its development.

"In 1984-1985 we will build about 10,000 housing units. In order for construction results to increase, however, other enterprises and plants must join in with their means and potential."

#### Additional Information on Proceedings

Krakow DZIENNIK POLSKI in Polish 30 Jan 84 pp 1,5

[Text] It is Saturday, 28 January 1984. The festively decorated WISLA auditorium, the traditional location of the deliberations of the Krakow party organization conferences, fills with delegates. The meeting to assess the 2-and-1/2-year term of the Krakow Committee has opened and will last many hours. Jozef Gajewicz takes the floor. He states that the delegates have gathered together to make an overall assessment of the implementation of the resolutions of the PZPR Central Committee [KC] and the Krakow Committee [KK]. The party is implementing consistently the program of socialist renewal adopted by the Ninth Congress and has purged itself of those that are ideologically alien. The Krakow organization has experienced a great deal since the last conference. Despite its reduced numbers, it has become seasoned, united and aware of its goals.

Next Jozef Gajewicz welcomed all delegates taking part in the conference and invited guests: Politburo member, PZPR KC secretary Kazimierz Barcikowski, PZPR KC Politburo member Hieronim Kubiak, chairman of the PZPR Central Review Commission [CKR] Kazimierz Morawski, deputy chairperson of the PZPR Central Party Control Commission [CKKP] Grazyna Kotnowska, chairman of the ZSMP [Union of Socialist Polish Youth] Main Board [ZG] Jerzy Jaskiernia, director of the PZPR KC Ideological Department Wladyslaw Loranc, head of the National Defense Committee [KOK] secretariat, Maj Gen Leon Sulima, deputy minister of metallurgy and engineering industry Krzysztof Kuczynski, a group of PZPR KC employees together with deputy director of the Ideological Department Andrzej Czyz. A warm welcome was also extended to ZSL KK chairman Stanislaw Mazur, to SD KK chairman Jan Janowski, to chairman of the PRON [Patriotic Council for National Rebirth] Voivodship Council Ryszard Zielinski, to chairman of the ZBoWiD [Union of Fighters for Freedom and Democracy] Voivodship Board Piotr Gajek, to a group of party deputies and worthy activists of the workers movement, as well as to chairman of the Federation of Metallurgists' Trade Unions Alfred Miodowicz and people of science and culture and journalists.

Next Jozef Gajewicz presented a list of proposed members for the conference presidium. Following confirmation of this list by delegates, these comrades, the guests in attendance at the conference and the veterans of the workers movement were invited to be seated at the presidium table.

Apolinary Kozub was selected chairman of the deliberations. Following the establishing of the agenda, delegates approved the rules of order and elected mandates, motions and electoral commissions.

Next Jozef Gajewicz took the floor and gave the report on behalf of the PZPR KK Executive Board. (A discussion of this report is published on p 4 [Polish text]).

Next Apolinary Kozub informed delegates that the conference presidium had received telegrams wishing fruitful deliberations from the Kiev City Committee of the Ukrainian Communist Party, from the German Unity Party District Committee from Leipzig and from the Voivodship Committee of the Bulgarian Communist Party from Veliko Tyrnovo.

ZSL KK chairman Stanislaw Mazur and SD KK chairman Jan Janowski extended wishes for successful deliberations to the delegates of the 18th Krakow PZPR Elections-Reports Conference.

The discussion was opened. Its first speaker was Stanislaw Baranik, PRL [Polish People's Republic] Sejm deputy and foreman at HiL [Lenin Works] Automatics Plant.

In the discussion break, the Mandates Commission gave its report to delegates. Of the 336 delegates elected to the conference, 334 were in attendance. Therefore, the commission ascertained, the conference was legally valid and was empowered to pass resolutions and elect officials.

On behalf of the Electoral Commission, chairman Kazimierz Miniur nominated Jozef Gajewicz as PZPR KK first secretary. Kazimierz Barcikowski gave the Politburo's recommendation of Jozef Gajewicz. Since there were no other candidates, the election of the Returns Commission followed.

The discussion continued until it was time to vote for the PZPR KK first secretary.

Following a break, Jadwiga Nowakowska took over chairmanship of the deliberations. On behalf of the Returns Commission, its chairman Wladyslaw Kasperekzyk reported the results of the elections for PZPR KK first secretary. All 334 delegates' votes were valid. /Jozef Gajewicz received 325 votes and thus became PZPR KK first secretary./ [in boldface]

#### List of Members of PZPR Krakow Committee Secretariat and Executive Board

Secretariat: Jozef Gajewicz--PZPR KK first secretary; Kazimierz Augustynek, Jan Czepiel, Jozef Gregorczyk, Wladyslaw Kaczmarek, Jozef Szczurowski--secretaries.

Executive Board: Kazimierz Augustynek, Kazimierz Chrzanowski, Jan Czepiel, Ryszard Dmochowski, Zygmunt Drzymala, Jozef Gajewicz, Jozef Gregorczyk, Wladyslaw Kaczmarek, Wiktor Kosmala, Stanislaw Korzen, Apolinary Kozub, Jerzy Kurdziel, Julian Martyka, Jadwiga Nowakowska, Tadeusz Salwa, Julian Stefaniak, Jozef Szczurowski, Slawomir J. Tabkowski, Tadeusz Wronski.

## First Secretary's Speech

Krakow GAZETA KRAKOWSKA in Polish 30 Jan 84 pp 3, 5

[Speech by PZPR KK first secretary Jozef Gajewicz on behalf of KK Executive Board at 18th PZPR Krakow Reports-Elections Conference on 28 January 1984 in Krakow WISLA Auditorium]

[Text] Honored Comrade Delegates! Honored Guests!

Our task at today's 18th Krakow Reports-Elections Conference is to assess honestly our party activities. The past 2-and-1/2-year term has brought us a wealth of experience. We are finally able to say that although our numbers have declined, the party now emphasizes more strongly its leading and inspirational role in society. Proof of this is found in the daily results and the concrete implementation of political-economic tasks. We have laid these out in detail in the KK reports materials. Our fundamental task today is to answer the question: to what degree have we succeeded in obtaining society's support of our program? I believe that we will discuss this at today's conference, for it is a question concerning our objective, our method, our rationale and our political victory.

We have behind us a difficult stage of the struggle over socialism, over the country's safety. We no longer have any doubts that the changes for the better won during the past year have grown into a permanent sociopolitical tendency. We are making up our losses in the economy and, although the situation in the voivodship proves that the most difficult period is behind us, we know that the future will be no less difficult. The best proof that the path we have chosen is the right one is society's acceptance of the important Ninth Extraordinary Party Congress resolutions and the program passed at this congress. We measure this approval through the purging of party ranks and thorough the several million PRON activists and union and self-government activists that have joined in the processes of the transformations in Poland. This has happened in Krakow as well.

The commitment of youth and social organizations is growing consistently according to new principles. The activism of artistic and cultural circles, of special significance in Krakow, is being rebuilt. Our daily experience confirms that we cannot build any types of programs based on universal negation and tendencies to distort the facts. The initially clever demagogic tricks of our political opponents have not withstood the test of time. Obviously, it would be a serious blunder and politically immature for us to suggest that the opposition has given up, or to fail to notice that it continually looks for new ways to destroy the party.

Our party, however, must be motivated by ironclad consistency in its Marxist-Leninist assessment of such phenomena, treating them within the category of sociological patterns and not social perversions. This sets before us a special task in the ideological sphere, mainly in the activity of all party elements.

From the outset, the newly elected officials of our organizations ought to adopt a style of "open work." This means that locally, within every plant, rurally and in the schools, the party must explain the intentions of its work, present and document its arguments and react without fail to society's criticism.

Honored Comrades!

We began this term in an extremely complex and difficult situation. It was a time of intense crisis attended by longlasting tensions and social conflicts. There was an increase in the aggressiveness of antisocialist forces that attacked more and more boldly the structures of the apparatus of state authority--forces that gained control of the leadership groups of the newly created Solidarity union. At the time, their real political goals were concealed behind slogans of political and moral renewal, the democratization of life and the struggle for social justice. These slogans, reflecting the vital expectations of the working class that joined the union in great numbers, were also alive in the renewal movement that was taking place in the party. Using these slogans, Solidarity more and more often attacked those in power and the party aktiv, sparing no methods--including gossip, libel and common lies.

Strikes and strike threats were the defense for every occasion. The more and more numerous antisocialist publications were to erode the consciousness and mold antisocialist views. These were addressed primarily to the young.

The party, although in a much weakened state, mobilized its forces. After extensive, thorough preparations, it called the Ninth Extraordinary Congress. A program was developed for overcoming the crisis. In pre-congress preparations, the Krakow party organization also mobilized its forces. As a result of the work of many party teams and organizations and the 17th Reports-Elections Conference, we made many analyses, assessments and recommendations that elaborated in full in the Ninth Congress resolution. This frank party program for overcoming the crisis, that created a real possibility for gaining social support for the objectives therein outlined at the congress, led to a sharp attack by antisocialist forces. The next waves of strikes attacked the economic foundations of the state. At the same time, attempts were made to destroy the party's internal unity and ideological oneness. While we were successful in warding off such tendencies in Krakow, it is also true that the activism of the party declined considerably at that time and the effectiveness of its influence declined as well. Despite the efforts made by substantial groups of the aktiv and their commitment as well, it became difficult to halt the development of the events controlled by antisocialist forces that led inevitably to fratricidal internal struggles.

The imposition of martial law put a stop to these most serious dangers. It did not call a complete halt, however, to the work of the political opposition. Sit-down strikes were organized at many plants, including the HiL Metallurgical Plant and several Krakow institutions of higher learning. Most of these were de-fused through political means. The party aktiv at such large industrial plants and municipal enterprises as HiL, MPK [Municipal Transportation Enterprise],

the KABEL Plant and others took tremendous tasks upon themselves. This stopped workforces from yielding to strike agitation.

During martial law and after its suspension, Krakow has been one of the strategic points on the Polish political map selected by the opponents of socialism. This was determined mainly by the plan to gain influence and political ends in two large, respected communities in the country: the Lenin Works and the academic community. The idea was to preserve the impression that society did not back normalization activities and to stir up internal divisiveness among people, conflicts and social unrest. Frequently, these activities were organized according to the plan provided by Western diversionary centers. Another motive was to provoke clashes with law-and-order forces. Possible victims would yield the most spectacular results, rousing public opinion. The working class of the plant, however, demonstrated tremendous maturity and political discretion. It did not submit to provocateurs. The influence of the political opposition declined and its sphere of influence at HiL dropped to a minimum. Finally, despite the vociferous propaganda preceding 13 December 1983, the call for demonstrations on the anniversary of the imposition of martial law went unheard.

Unfortunately, in 1982-1983, several street riots were provoked at Nowa Huta, drawing in young people for the most part, and often children.

There is still some unrest within the academic community. This is not only the consequence of the situation at academic institutions. The molding of the views of young people takes place over many years. Often the candidate for the secondary school certificate leaves the school without the elementary foundations of political realism. This confronts us with one of the most important problems of strengthening the upbringing functions of schools and increasing the responsibility of academic authorities and the teaching cadre for upbringing work. It is an issue over which party organizations are struggling in self-governing academic institutions, thus far with negligible results.

Honored Assemblage!

Party membership has declined considerably in recent years. A sharp decline has occurred in the Krakow Voivodship as well. We are the most troubled by the departure of many workers from the party. We realize, however, that some of these were lacking in confidence, that only the Leninist party is able to state its errors openly, overcome them and lead the country out of the crisis.

Today the situation is slowly changing. Young people are beginning to join the party. While they still do not represent a significant number, most of the present candidate-members have asked to join during the past year. These facts define one of the major directions of work for the coming term: the rebuilding of the party in the workers community. This represents the position of a majority of delegates. One of the paths leading to this goal is the continued improvement of party work with socialist youth unions. This should be looked upon as a long-range task.

The period that we are assessing today has required the special concern and efforts of the echelon to continue and maintain the organizational, ideological and political unity of the Krakow party organization. Party control commissions supported them in these activities. Performing their duties dictated by law and in regulations, the party control commissions conducted difficult proceedings clarifying the cases of party members that had violated statutory principles and they handed down the relative rulings. A significant number of party members and the aktiv that had been condemned unjustly were exonerated and their honor and good name were defended.

Despite this, we do not say that the process of restoring order to intraparty work and of purging the ranks and consolidating the party ideologically-politically and organizationally is complete. This is a continuous process in the practice of the Marxist-Leninist party's work, from which emanate long-term tasks. Today this is likewise one of the vital elements by which particular organizations and the entire party can regain their authority. We attach the greatest importance to this. The institution of complaints and grievances is an especially sensitive gauge of confidence in our policy. In this last period, we have noted a considerably greater number of citizens that turn to us not only regarding specific issues, but with recommendations as well. Every instance of involvement in human affairs, even those that cannot be resolved immediately for objective reasons, builds our authority.

The current reports-elections campaign has confirmed the visible increase in the activism of party organizations in our voivodship. Some small rural, cooperative and school organizations, however, cannot yet be given a totally positive evaluation. This points to specific tasks for their superior echelons.

A result of the current reports-elections campaign is the strengthening of the representation of workers and peasants in the authorities of primary elements.

During the coming term, we must also make better use of the knowledge and the experience of the party members that legally are not part of the make-up of the new authorities. We must always remember and pay heed to those that did not play us false during the most difficult times, but committed their entire authority and abilities to defense of the party line and to actions on behalf of the socialist renewal and the restoration of the Leninist standards of life.

In place of the rigorously binding "nomenklatura" procedure used to fill leadership positions in the past, a procedure that requires the confirmation of particular party echelons, broader and broader use should be made of "harder" methods of appointing cadres, including competitions, consultations and coordination within the framework of commissions cooperating with the ZSL and SD and consultations with the self-government in all of its forms.

Now as in the past, part of the party echelons and organizations is not prepared properly for the more complex methods of selecting cadres. The efforts of echelons are still flimsy in the area of preparing PZPR members to take part in competitions; we have still not managed to work effectively and consistently with party groups in people's councils at the primary level

and party groups in supervisory and social organizations, in all those structures through which the party's leadership role is implemented.

Checks likewise have uncovered the existence of many negative phenomena in cadre policy that must be eliminated consistently from the practice of party work. These include the not always objective system of assessing the work of the leadership, for example, restricting the selection of cadres to narrow groups of the aktiv centered around echelons.

Dear Comrades!

We add to our weaknesses the fact that a part of our primary organizations functions only during meetings. We subjected this phenomenon to a thorough analysis during the past term. This was particularly in evidence during the plenum that discussed the role of the party in the Krakow rural area. We had no doubts then, nor do we now that our party-mindedness confirms itself above all in everyday work, in initiatives undertaken in the interest of the community, in our opposition to wrongs committed against people, in the implementation of economic reform and in our participation in PRON.

It is difficult to understand why only 50 percent of party members belong to trade unions. After all, this is--as workers say--our political test in the implementation of our own resolutions. Never again do we want anyone to accuse us of taking a passive attitude to our own programs. We will no longer tolerate the presence of those in our ranks that wish to treat party membership as the place to wait out a cushy position. We have no need of those that will expect others to perform their party duties for them.

We must be aware of the necessary unity of ideological, political and economic actions. Ideology cannot be limited to theory alone. It cannot be only a scientific diagnosis, but must become social practice that is accepted by working people, in this way influencing the realities of social life.

Both the ideological effort of the Krakow organization in the past 2 years and the preparation of the position for the 13th PZPR KC Plenum have been significant. The dissemination and the development of the ideological and political achievements of that plenum is now the duty of all party members. The Krakow voivodship echelon possesses a developed program for implementing its resolutions within our area. This is one of the major tasks for our term.

We hold that the input of the Krakow element into ideological and propaganda work could be greater. The intellectual and cadre potential of the party in the sociopolitical sciences institutions and centers of Krakow schools, the creators of standards, qualifies us for a considerably more extensive involvement in the ideological work of the entire party.

The mass media have a special task in this regard. The policy of promoting and sometimes of even initiating the valid criticism of the pathological degradation of social life has led to an increased interest in the party press. This refers both to GAZETA KRAKOWSKA and TRYBUNA LUDU.

We have the right to expect the Krakow community of journalists, however, to engage in newspaper polemics more often with regard to opposing positions, as well as in the unclouded explanation of Polish political arguments. Certainly, this is worthy of the pens of the journalists in the community that holds the second place in Poland.

We should also expect the party aktiv in institutions of higher learning and communities to take a more active part in spreading Marxism-Leninism in the cultural and intellectual life of our city.

Anniversary commemorations were an important form of the struggle over molding public awareness, in particular historical awareness and patriotic attitudes, during the past term. We attach special importance to the celebration of the 100th anniversary of the organized workers movement on Polish soil and to its role in the history of our nation.

This year we are focusing our attention on celebrations of the 40th anniversary of the birth of the PRL. This will be an opportunity to make a straight-forward presentation of the achievements of People's Poland, to deny historical inaccuracies and to show what socialism has given the people of Poland and what it has to give. We must make this truth widespread. We must convince people that we can overcome the present crisis only thanks to the tremendous heritage of People's Poland, in spite of all past mistakes. We must assure them that the only road to the rebirth of the socialist homeland leads through group effort, greater public work productivity, initiative and internal order.

The 40th anniversary of People's Poland coincides in Krakow with the 35th anniversary of the birth of the largest socialist plant--the Nowa Huta Metallurgical Plant--and the Nowa Huta district. It also coincides with the 30th anniversary of the naming of this plant for Lenin. For all Poles, the history of today's metalworks as well is the most concrete proof of the aid and the friendship of the Soviet Union, the history of the advancement of hundreds of thousands of peasant and worker families and an example of socialist industrialization and the development of Polish technological know-how.

An ever current problem in the party's ideological work is explaining our attitude to religion and the church. This is topical, given the recurring charges of the Western bourgeois press and all diversionary Polish-language broadcasts that our party has embarked upon a struggle against the church and religion. Meanwhile, our position has not changed. The party treats questions of belief as an issue of the personal choice of people, clearly without abandoning its propagation of the scientific world-view. The party opposes resolutely the making of places of worship into seats of political struggle with the state. Unfortunately, such things have been attempted in Poland. We have the right to demand the observance of the constitutional principle of the separation of church and state, as well as the secularity of public institutions. On the other hand, differences in world-view and in religious belief cannot represent an obstacle to work for the good of the socialist homeland.

Honored Comrades!

What is the past and present situation of the voivodship economy, given the political and social determinants that have been presented? How often during the past term workforces reacted to unwarranted strike stoppages with wage increase demands. They did not give consideration to any economic logic. Meanwhile, the party and state were blamed for the production decline.

Today, from the perspective of stabilizing economic mechanisms, not everyone wishes to perceive that the party has taken on the most difficult duty of halting the collapse of the economy. But we will remember this. Polish families can live today without fearing for their existence.

Party echelons and party organizations were the major inspiration behind new economic tasks that were part of the economic reform. In Krakow, the party organizations of industry and construction and their worker communities very quickly laid the foundations for the difficult process of implementing the reform. The reform in the voivodship economy has begun to function and has become an essential element in the improvement of the rhythm of production that is significant, but continues to overpay low work productivity.

For the first time in several years, Krakow industry has gained a reduction in the share of material costs in production value. How has this happened? It has happened because plant party organizations have embarked upon and piloted anti-inflation and costs-cutting programs, rejecting methods used "because that is how it is supposed to be done." For example, in the first version, only five Nowa Huta enterprises submitted programs approved by the city quarter echelon. The efforts of engineering-technical cadres in surmounting raw and other materials problems emanating from import restrictions also deserve high praise. Most enterprises of the Krakow electrical engineering, chemical and light industries have not experienced a severe production decline for this reason.

Negative phenomena have also occurred that were not noted early enough by party echelons and organizations to be guarded against effectively. In some cases, even after they were recognized, they were not countered effectively. I have in mind here the tendencies that occurred especially during the first half of 1982 with regard to sure guarantees of good financial results through prices--tendencies that were socially and economically harmful. Progress in improving organization and management continues to be weak. We did not know how to counteract effectively the phenomenon of excessive fluctuation. Despite the significant achievements of some plants in making scientific-technical progress, we still cannot be satisfied with the level of usage of this special Krakow potential. These possibilities emanate from the combination of a strongly developed industry and construction and a rich scientific-research base.

We ask ourselves the question: what is to be the role of the party in this? More than once it has been discussed whether the party ought to become involved in such matters. Let us answer honestly what will happen if we leave this sphere of questions to their own fate. This is not difficult to predict.

It will simply mean an increase in parochialist interests, at the expense of us all. Then no one will warn against unfounded price escalations. Private interests will become muddled with the interests of society. Of course, we lack full control over these mechanisms even now. That is because these and similar weaknesses emanate from the weak mastery of echelons, party organizations and the economic cadre of the skill to coordinate in practice short-term and long-term interests, the immediate interests of workforces and enterprises with their long-range needs and group interests with the interests of society as a whole.

The stabilization of social life and the improvement of economic indicators have led to an increase in working class involvement in managing their own plants. The dependable implementation of the economic tasks outlined by the 10th and 14th PZPR KC Plenums and detailed in our voivodship operating schedule of tasks prepared by the PZPR Krakow Committee has led to the activation of enterprise self-governments and employee councils. Their activism is in evidence in the vast majority of enterprises.

Over a year's experience with the newly created trade unions has now brought more than 660 union organizations to Krakow enterprises. They have 95,200 members, representing nearly 30 percent of all those employed. It is this aktiv that demonstrates a special commitment to the work of their enterprise employee self-governments. We must underscore the active part taken by party unionists at the Lenin Works, and MPK and at the ENERGOPRZEM Plant.

We will support trade union activists, for their intentions are a guarantee of the economic interests of socialist Poland. On behalf of its political leadership, the party will defend the autonomy and self-governing powers of the union movement.

Honored Comrades!

Over the years, the growing disproportion between the quantitative and qualitative development of Krakow under severe crisis conditions and, consequently, the serious lack of means as well has been expressed in a very dramatic way, through the danger that residences will not be heated, the water shortage, a poorly operating transporation system, a lack of places in hospitals, nurseries, preschools and schools, new housing developments without services and trade facilities and the longer and longer wait for new housing--now lasting over a dozen years.

This situation requires bold decision-making, both on the political and administrative platforms. We ought to have chosen and backed alternative solutions for the problems of greatest importance for residents and the city. We believe that these kinds of decisions finally were the result of nearly a year of public discussion rightly followed by the KK plenary meeting and the decision-making of the People's Council of Krakow city in December 1982.

We also abandoned many areas of some importance. We cut back on the construction of new housing--but what good is housing without water and heat, without transportation and stores?

We wish to improve living conditions in Krakow's old buildings. At the same time, we are making every effort to increase housing construction. This requires land reclamation above all.

Thanks to the expansion of the Leg Thermo-electric Power Plant, we have made improvements in residential heating. Municipal and PKP [State Railway] transportation is functioning better. Work is progressing on bringing in increased supplies of water from the Raba Plant. The planned schedule for eliminating the very serious water shortages in many regions of the city in 1986 looks more and more feasible. New hospital beds are on the increase. Finally, in just the past year, the process of making up delays in the development of the network of schools, nurseries, preschools and trade and services facilities in new communities began, although in this field not all assumptions of the plan have been implemented on schedule.

With only a few exceptions, yearly housing construction tasks were implemented, although, for the reasons already given, these tasks were not extensive. I am not substantiating these statements with the relevant data, figures and indexes since you will find these in the conference materials and documents.

The most serious threat to the continued implementation of the tasks outlined in our 3-year plan is the shortage of processing capacity. It is a Krakow paradox that, in spite of the fact that about 8 percent of the processing capacity of Krakow construction is local, we cannot cover the implementation of even quite modest planned investment and repair tasks. We understand that large, highly specialized enterprises, regardless of their location, must implement priority tasks of nationwide range. We believe it to be their duty, however, to take part in the resolution of the problems of the city in which they have their base, in which the majority of the workforce lives.

We have before us tasks of importance to Krakow related to environmental protection and the preservation and renovation of monuments. The full accounting of the level of implementation of the programs included--for the first time, very comprehensively--in the decisions of the KK and the Krakow RN, for the past 2-year period, is contained in the mayor's report with which you have been supplied. The report shows that, despite the many achievements realized under crisis conditions, outlays planned for 1983 in the field of environmental protection were only 58 percent utilized, and in the field of revalorization, only 90 percent of planned outlays were used. At the same time, more funds could have been directed toward this end, were there not a shortage of production capacity.

Intense work is now being conducted on improving this situation. In 1984, we will increase outlays to renovate monuments; these must be utilized in full. A comprehensive program for the renewal and management of Kazimierz will be finalized.

Of vital importance for environmental protection is the agreement signed about 2 weeks ago between the minister of the chemical and light industry, the RN Presidium of Krakow and the mayor establishing the procedure and the final schedule for eliminating the toxic waste produced by the SODA and BONARKA

Plants. Soon talks will also be held at the central level regarding the Lenin Works, whose indispensable modernization is likewise a determinant of a substantial reduction of its noxiousness to the environment.

I am pleased to emphasize that these plans are being prepared in consultation with all interested parties, that no one is pushing production at any price and that the ultimate form of decisions must reconcile the interests of plants and the priority issue of environmental protection.

Honored Comrades!

Farming and its results are a question of priority importance for the entire society. Rural issues likewise are vital to the Krakow City Voivodship. This issue crops up in our daily work with the farming aktiv of our area, and we noted the importance of rural issues at a PZPR KK Plenum specially called for this purpose.

New farm policy emanating from the resolutions of the 9th Party Congress and the 11th joint Plenum of the PZPR KC and the ZSL NK [Supreme Committee], defined in the legal regulations of the laws that were passed, obliges party organizations, in cooperation with the ZSL, to work especially actively in this community.

In spite of the fact that our voivodship has good farmland, it does not possess a very favorable area structure of farmland. Fifty-five percent is broken up into parcels of less than 2 hectares. The average area of arable land per private farm is 2.1 hectares versus 4.8 hectares nationally. With regard to this, it is indispensable that we develop highly specialized, productive farms. This is not the reality, however. The number of specialized farms continues to be small, and the rural community is not yet persuaded of the great benefits accruing from the high productivity of such farms. The premises for such changes do exist, however. The technological base for Krakow farm work is relatively high, and recently the deliveries of machinery and equipment have been satisfactory as a whole.

The disturbing phenomenon of the decline of the number of head of slaughter hogs in the past 2 years must be emphasized. This phenomenon is occurring in both the socialized and private sectors. This situation obliges primary organizations in rural areas and units that serve agriculture to make an efficient and immediate analysis of this phenomenon. Like the rest of the country, the Krakow market expects immediate changes in this area.

We are presenting some aspects of Krakow agriculture that are far from satisfactory. Today the most important thing for us is to find answers to the question, "what is to be done and how are we to do it?" How can we best implement the programs and plans on the level of the gmina, the village and the farm? The question of "how?" likewise must be applied to social life and the political activism of rural areas. The Krakow party organization must seek its answers in constant dialogue with peasants, workers serving farming and people engaged in farm work. Such tasks likewise fall upon the party workers of the local administration and the educational cadre. Only in this way can we attain an increase in economic activity in rural areas.

Honored Delegates!

The rebuilding of socialist upbringing systems is our priority task in the scientific and educational community. After 1980, many complex issues arose here. We incurred many political losses. Does this mean only that we were not strong enough, or prophetic enough, or that we did not see all of these problems? This is one side of the question. There is, however, another, sadder side. The political opposition has found it too easy to reach hearts and minds. We must become painfully aware of this.

This happened because we thought that political realities and attempts to secure needs in the acquisition of knowledge are a sufficient recommendation of our intentions. We were believers in the realism of the teachers and the taught. Perhaps that is why we paid less attention to the work of party organizations in this community.

We are rectifying these errors. We are rebuilding party organizations that work together with the directors of schools and the educational administration. We have made a thorough analysis of leadership cadres in the schools and in the school administration, and as a result of this, we have made the indispensable cadre changes. Under the inspiration of the voivodship echelon, a unified system for updating the professional and ideological-political training of teachers, primarily of humanistic and social subjects, and class upbringers has been prepared and is being implemented. It is being implemented through the close cooperation of the Education and Upbringing Department, the Department for Teacher Improvement and the Krakow Center for Ideological Training. Work with groups of school directors is being implemented through similar cooperation. While the work of school youth organizations is improving gradually, it is still a weak link of the upbringing process.

We wish to return to the old tradition of the strong ties between the Polish Scout Union and educational institutions and facilities. Here we envisage a special role for young upbringer-teachers. They, not long ago scout leaders and organizers themselves, ought to continue their pedagogical work among their junior colleagues. These are ties that should be appreciated fully from the viewpoint of educational influence.

We must expand the work of the ZSMP with post-grammar-school youth, according to programs emanating from concrete needs. To implement these programs, we should make use of the leaders of schools and school party organizations for whom this should clearly be a party duty. The parental obligations of a member of our party to bring up his own children is also a party duty.

The behavioral examples that a young person takes from his closest surroundings cannot be replaced by any formally made plans. The parent that is a party member performs his ideological duty at the party meeting, at home, at the parent-teacher meeting and at the plant.

The Teacher's Charter and the code of labor regulations of pedagogical councils have given schools much autonomy. This imposes upon party organizations and the leadership cadre the duty to work intensively with teachers' groups.

It is most important here that unity of action be maintained by teachers' groups in the implementation of the major objectives of the socialist school.

Comrade Delegates!

The increase of the party's influence in Krakow higher schools is progressing too slowly. The political opposition has wreaked great havoc in this community. The representatives of the political extreme active there have proclaimed ideological, and often even organizational support for the youth from NZS [Independent Association of Students] that succumb to their influence.

At the close of 1981, Krakow higher schools were in a state of total internal disorganization and were unable to perform their basic functions. Even after the imposition of martial law, normalization activities met with an entire arsenal of methods of illegal opposition including threats and blackmail.

Party organizations, their numbers reduced by nearly one-half at the largest schools, entered into a struggle over becoming stronger internally and gradually regaining political influence. As a result of the elections of the academic authorities held in the spring of 1981, they lost entirely their representatives among the rectors of Krakow institutions.

It must be made clear that the work of the Krakow echelon and school committees with nonparty school rectors--both consistent in the preservation of all political constraints and open--yielded positive results for the community.

Unfortunately, the assessment of academic teachers was not so positive. The use of criteria for assessment here was uneven, and civic-social criteria were ignored. In the future, such situations cannot be tolerated in the schools.

In the Krakow higher schools, 22 percent of the academic teachers employed are PZPR members. The full utilization of these forces throughout school life enables us to gain a great deal of political influence. But we must improve the method of party work and overcome our own passivity and impotence. We must work consistently with party groups in all academic bodies, being attentive to the need for winning over more and more political allies.

In several schools, party organizations waged a difficult, but victorious battle over the party's role in the management structure through their confirmation in the statutes passed by self-governing bodies. There where it was not achieved in full, it was determined by a legal entry dated 22 July 1983. We must stress, however, that no legal entry can replace living political action that decides the place and the real role of the party in the school.

Today, after the brief and incomplete experiences of the functioning of schools under the conditions created by the law on higher schools, we cannot make a comprehensive analysis as yet. In practice, reference is made readily to the creative and research freedoms it guarantees, while those provisions that state that the Polish higher school is socialist, that in research and the teaching-upbringing process it is guided by the good of the state and that it is based on the principles contained in the PRL Constitution are ignored totally.

Party organizations and the voivodship echelon will be consistent in demanding that this principle be respected.

The upbringing functions of the higher schools must be strengthened resolutely. We have not yet obtained a firmer commitment from academic teachers to upbringing work. Not all party members have yet joined the offensive in work with young people as they should. The ministry for academic authorities should also exercise greater responsibility in this area.

The ZSP [Polish Student Association] youth organizations require the special support of academic institutions, and the ZSMP and ZMW likewise need help. The number of students belonging to the party is also disturbingly low.

Comrades, let us look at this situation. In Krakow, a mighty academic center, of 40,000 students less than one percent belong to the party. Now all the rest are not the children of the opponents of socialist Poland. And how does the issue of party membership look among the academic teaching cadre, whose vast majority got their social and professional advancement in socialist Poland? What are the criteria for assessment?

Strengthening cooperation with the national economy of the voivodship and the region was an important direction of the work of party organizations in the schools, in the scientific-research base of industry and in the Krakow Branch of PAN [Polish Academy of Sciences]. The PZPR KK Plenum resolution concerning cooperation between science and industry laid the foundation for this. Emanating from it, ministerial institutes and academic institutes embarked upon valuable initiatives. Here may be mentioned the scientific cooperation of AGH [Mining-Metallurgy Academy] and HiL and the recently signed agreements between the Katowice Works, the UJ [Jagiellonian University] Chemistry Department and the Krakow chemical industry, or the efforts of the Krakow Technical University toward streamlining the coordination of water management in the Upper Wisla river basin. The implementation by ministerial institutes of orders from industry is proceeding more and more efficiently.

Comrade Delegates!

Alongside learning, culture plays an important role in developing awareness. The party cannot be in favor of imposing artistic programs, and it is not in favor of this. Clearly, however, it will support all those artists that have tied in their work with the socialist homeland. This is one of the fundamental elements of state patronage. However, it is not the only one, as some prefer to think.

There are major and minor works. All, however, are part of the national concept of culture. Culture does not exist in isolation from society, just as society cannot develop properly in isolation from tradition and culture.

Here in Krakow more than in any other place, we have tried and are trying to create conditions favorable for all sorts of artistic work, in accordance with the economic potential. But I do not think that we need to prove this. Most well-known and recognized artists gained their knowledge thanks to the socialist

homeland. For many, state patronage was and is a basic condition enabling the development of their capabilities and the formation of their artistic expression.

Krakow is the largest center in Poland where the works of human genius and diligence, accumulated over the centuries, have been preserved from wartime destruction. This obliges us before history and the nation to be caretakers over the existing growth of new values. It is a priority task.

We cultivate these traditions. The successes of our composers, writers, theatrical stages and museum exhibits are known nationwide and worldwide. We are also doing all we can to secure the base for this work. There is much to be done here, but that is because we must be constant in our efforts to meet cultural needs better and better. Finally, after many years, the issue of expanding the National Museum is coming out of its stalemate. These are the facts. But we ourselves cannot shoulder this burden; we need not only society's approval, but its help as well.

Dear and Honored Comrades!

Soon elections will be held for the people's councils. This time it is a political struggle to bring into the authorities the best candidates. They will have to bear the burden of current and future tasks. These people--party and nonparty individuals, union activists, self-government activists and young people, the representatives of the entire society--will assume the role of proving and preserving the rightness of our concepts of the renewal of the homeland.

Today the question that we must answer is, how are we to do this? We know the answer and we also know that it is not a simple matter. The reality is that we will not be in a position to remedy many painful matters according to people's desires. Nonetheless, our actions must be absolutely consistent in eliminating bad management and waste and in making better use of society's tremendous reserves.

We are battling and we will continue to do battle against all of the pathological phenomena occurring in our lives. Ultimately, however, these can be overcome only by means of a healthy economic situation based above all on an increase in work productivity--that pays for results.

Through the efforts of echelons and all primary organizations, we must continue our serious efforts to raise the sense of moral responsibility of all party members, self-government activists and directors of plants for the future and the results of the economic reform.

We have already spoken of this at the reports conference. Today we are happy to note that many of these issues are behind us. This means that the Krakow party organization is consistent in its implementation of the renewal program. Our goal is to rejuvenate the People's Republic, to strengthen its role in the international arena and social justice. Here in historic Krakow, celebrated in tradition and in the building of the socialist future, we wish to offer proof of this and we shall do so.

### Barcikowski's Speech

Krakow GAZETA KRAKOWSKA in Polish 30 Jan 84 pp 3,4

[Report on speech made by Kazimierz Barcikowski, Politburo member, PZPR KC secretary at 18th PZPR Krakow Reports-Elections Conference on 28 January 1984 in Krakow WISLA Auditorium]

[Text] "We have asked each other in the conference hall lobbies why this auditorium seems brighter today than it was in the past. Certainly it is due to the way it is decorated, but it must also be because we have come to this conference with clearer minds." In this way, Kazimierz Barcikowski, Politburo member and PZPR KC secretary, opened his address. "There no longer exists in the party the sort of split that we still sensed not so long ago. Nor are our thoughts clouded by our fears about the country, its calm and its security. The depressing feeling of hopelessness against the crazy naivete, the childish delusions and the raging hostility that spared nothing and no one is gone. But we can never forget what we have experienced. What's more, we must draw conclusions from these experiences for the future."

The present realities are more optimistic. The improvement in the socio-political situation in several fields, including the economy, has come about through the efforts of party members. However, K. Barcikowski said, we must aim toward greater improvement more rapidly, ever more rapidly, with the aid of ever more perfect methods. Next K. Barcikowski made reference to the addresses of several discussants, stating that it was noted right in the conference hall that the achievements and the heritage of leftist thought in our country's history were underestimated in the past and are still being undervalued. Nor are the achievements of the 40 years of the PRL sufficiently appreciated. Why is this so? "Let us admit openly that except for us and our political allies, no one else in Poland will be concerned over leftist traditions. These are our traditions and they will be no one else's traditions." How can we find a place for them in the nation's spiritual life? For this we need the party's strength. We are rebuilding our influence and we are reinforcing it through the inculcation of the party's ideology and its considerable historical knowledge. This situation, K. Barcikowski continued, also attests to the real character of the opposition movements. Rightism and hostility to all progress are the dominant features of the opposition. Party unity and the confidence of working people in the party, as well as the increased effectiveness of action are also the most important tasks at present.

The speaker said: "From this viewpoint we must assess the progress of the party reports-elections campaign. What you have observed here in Krakow characterizes the course of the campaign throughout the country. No one can doubt any longer that the party is united. We have confirmed this and we have gained strength in the course of the campaign. Progress has also continued with regard to the ties with the working class and rural areas. While it is perhaps still not the kind of progress we would like, we have achieved a great deal more than before this time. Economic results throughout the country are somewhat improved. The process of the correction of indicators in the

economic sphere is beginning. Hence the optimism and the basis for believing that, while our progress is slow and plagued with difficulties, we have entered the stage of our emergence from the crisis."

K. Barcikowski then spoke of the need to work out a new style of party work aimed at the people, of the need to "open up" on the issues that are a part of people's lives and that bring them to the party. "It is surely in this spirit that the deliberations of the National Party Conference, that will be held most likely in mid-March 1984, will be conducted. It will make an accounting of the implementation of Ninth Congress resolutions by the KC and other party echelons. Party activists ought to fare well in this accounting... We are now entering a new stage of political work... Today the elections campaign is closed in the party and we have embarked upon preparations for the general elections to people's councils. These elections are proof of the progressing normalization; they confirm the fact that the enemies of socialism have been pushed into the background... But these elections are also a great opportunity for the stabilization of power in Poland and for ending the severe political crisis. We shall elect the organs of the authorities for the new term and no one will be able to undermine their right to perform all of the ruling functions that appertain to them."

K. Barcikowski then spoke of the dilemmas that had to be resolved before the decisions on elections could be passed. Who would be elected first--the people's councils or the Sejm? Perhaps the elections should be held at the same time. The prevailing idea was that, beginning on 1 July, the new law on people's councils and the local self-government would go into effect and it was good that there would be new councilmen to enact this law. In these elections, it will also be possible to enter into debates on candidates in local centers, that are only ostensibly less important. They are very important for molding opinions on the authorities... At this time, let us consider what we can do in our own milieus to make a real change for the better in Poland.

The proper selection of candidates both from party ranks and among independents and allied party members will be an important issue. These must be absolutely the top people. They will be needed for daily work, in the course of the work of the people's councils.

The PZPR KC secretary devoted the next section of his address to economic problems. These form political attitudes, but the reverse also occurs: an improvement in political attitudes usually improves economic results. "Today the country is in vital need of an increase in the activism of working people wherever human activity impacts upon overall results. The results from 1983 show us that an economic turn is taking place. In 1983, an increase in industrial and farm production was noted. A significant increase was shown! The national income rose for the first time in 4 years. The increase was slight--2.5 percent--but it was still an increase! Labor productivity rose by about 8 percent (over 1982 figures). Real earnings also took an upward turn, contrasting with the decline shown not long ago. For the first time in several years, the housing construction plan was overfulfilled. Many other bright sides of 1983 can be recalled. Realism and honesty, however, enjoin

us to keep in mind that although 1983 was a better year than previous years, we still produced 10 percent less in industry than in 1979. Sometimes we are inclined to forget that we produced still more, nor do we remember that if we produce less today, we have less to distribute." Euphoria is not in order, however, since 1983 also had its many weak aspects. The old and familiar ailment of failure to respect the market was in evidence, said K. Barcikowski. Planned volumes of manufactured goods did not reach the market. Only for certain groups of products did we reach the "declared" level, i.e., the level projected in the plan. In agriculture, pork production declined in 1983 and investment outlays were exceeded alongside the very poor implementation of the actual program in this area. The money was spent, but the results were not there... We sank monies into what had been started earlier and... continued fooling with those projects. This was one reason for the disruptions of the market that affected everyone. We must understand that the control of inflation within the next few years is the most important task. If we keep inflation at its current level, we are threatened with a loss of influence on the direction of economic processes... "Our system suffers worse from inflation than capitalism does because the authorities in socialism are under constant pressure from working people. They demand that the authorities curb price increases and assume responsibility for every change... But inflation, the excessive increase of income, must be balanced out by price increases. While we do not like this practice, we must approach the increase in income dispassionately, sternly." These words of K. Barcikowski are worthwhile remembering.

Next the speaker alluded to other sections of the discussion. Here his address contained a regrettably sad, but realistic assessment of current aspirations, demands and possibilities. The discussants say: "There should be more of everything. It is merely a question of who is speaking and what he wants. There should be more investments, for Krakow is a historic town and has its needs... It is easy to find arguments. Wages should be higher, for there is a manpower shortage. Higher procurement prices for farm products are needed, for production is becoming unprofitable and so on, and so forth. All of this brings up inflation (...) Our faith in purchasing power is still great although our money is 'smaller and smaller.' We still believe that it is the same and that it will continue to dictate the economic order in Poland. We only have to scatter a few groszy and things will be better. Not so! Nothing will be better! Unless economic results follow in the same direction, nothing will be better. This is the hard fact and there is no escaping it." Unfortunately, we already know this from experience...

Next Kazimierz Barcikowski addressed the major issues discussed during the conference discussion. The first was construction. On the national level, it was a modest plan, slightly larger than half of what was built in 1979. But this plan was in line with current potential. It is good that it was completed. All authorities took part in its implementation: the gmina [parish], the city quarter and the voivodship authorities... The contractors had to show results--such was the situation--said K. Barcikowski. At the same time, however, the results of municipal construction and industrial investments were much worse. Why? On the one hand, we have tangible evidence that the potential still exists, while on the other hand, we are not using it...

K. Barcikowski concluded: "At present we cannot begin any new investments. This is equivalent to economic waste. If we wish to confirm our ability to think in economic terms, we should determine which investments in Krakow should be executed first and which should be delayed to enable those that are most important to be implemented on schedule. Moreover, this affects the entire economy. There will be pressure exerted on the authorities for delaying another investment, but let us realize once and for all that until now we unfortunately have been implementing 'Gierek's' program. Thus far, no one has abandoned investment in Poland! Those that have been initiated are being propped up in various ways. The country's internal situation has changed, the external situation has changed, and we continue to believe that the great program that, unfortunately, caused the economy's collapse, will still be implemented. There is no more dangerous delusion than this. We must revise this belief if we are to stand on firm ground in planning."

The problems of employment were discussed next. Here K. Barcikowski stated briefly: "During the next few years, employment in Poland will not increase over its current levels. During the next 5-year plan, demographers estimate that the increase in the work force will amount to 140,000 people! They can be wrong, but not so wrong as to forget that during the last 10-year plan we employed 3 million people in the socialized economy... Now we will add 140,000 over 5 years. We must take note of this unfortunate fact and every line of reasoning and all plans must begin from the premise that the workforce will not increase in size. Since this will be so, we must learn to increase production with a shortage of manpower. Despite appearances, this is not an insoluble task. Every year the GDR increases production, despite the fact that employment there is on the decline! It is sad, but we are demoralized by the fact that until now it was always possible to bring in several thousand people from the villages in case of need. Now this is ended. Let us not create illusions that people will come in from some unknown place and start to work..."

Our only chance lies in the organization of work, i.e., in technological solutions effected within one's own area and different, greater work discipline.

"You have addressed the question of agriculture and the profitability of farm production here. With regard to this issue, I do not agree with some views. Does a good farmer, a good producer suffer from a lack of money today? He may suffer from a shortage of goods, for we are not in a position to supply to the rural areas what the farmer would like to buy, given current production levels. But a good farmer cannot say that he does not make money on pork, milk or the like. Certainly, not every farmer has the same amount of money compared with needs, but there are poor farmers and farmers... Should the state again give several tens of billions of zlotys to increase the market price? What should it do--increase retail prices? Let us be realistic. We must be concerned over the profitability of farming, but we have the right to dispute the degree of this profitability," said Kazimierz Barcikowski.  
"He who claims that milk production is unprofitable today is simply dishonest... The decline in the number of head of hogs made people anxious, but current trends differ from trends in evidence several months ago. We must adapt the level of production to our own fodder reserves, but even under these conditions we can afford more..."

"During the years of the greatest pork production, we imported 9 million tons of fodder--one-third of our total fodder consumption. There is no possibility for such a level of import today! Logically speaking, if we are short of fodder by one-third, it is impossible for production to be maintained at the same level (...) But is this production based on our own fodder not profitable?... To summarize this issue, we are bound by realism in treating economic matters. In speaking of what should be done, let us remember that we continue to produce less than in 1979. We must rebuild at least that level in the production sphere. There was a time when we knew how to do this... Now we must repeat this result."

K. Barcikowski reminded us all that a period of frugal living awaits us, for unfortunately not all needs and ambitions have been met successfully. In the normal nation, increased funds and income mean increased taxes. The budget is not a bottomless bag of money. Whatever comes in can be spent... The speaker discussed the mechanisms of inflation. Finally he touched upon the issue of cadre policy. "The criterion of capable people must be placed in a priority position. We must possess the skill to spot those that are worthy of being called capable. This will determine the success of not only political actions, but of economic actions as well. A position cannot be a sinecure. On the other hand, it can be an opportunity for a person that receives it. It can be an opportunity for further development, for showing what he can really do... Then we will have dynamic heads and a dynamic economy."

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POLAND

ROLE OF PRESS IN SOCIALIST STATE DEBATED

Press Vehicle for Politicians

Warsaw TU I TERAZ in Polish No 5, 1 Feb 84 p 2

[Article by Kazimierz Kozniewski: "Conversation--Cutting Through the Fog"]

[Text] I have written about this on more than one occasion in the past: one of the most vital systems in operation in the link between government and citizens is a sound political formula for determining mutual quantitative and qualitative reinforcement of two elements, the openness of public political life and the confidentiality of this life. How much confidentiality, how much openness?--this is an important practical problem in the tactics of government and self-management in modern societies. Open and confidential? How much at the cost of the other? How much of each?

Several weeks ago the newspapers published a report of a meeting between the premier, General Wojciech Jaruzelski, and the editors-in-chief of daily newspapers, central periodicals, radio and television, and leading journalists of the press and mass communications media. The conversation between the columnists, reporters, and editors and the statesman lasted from the early evening hours to late at night, a fairly long time, although there have been even longer such meetings. They are arranged from time to time, but unfortunately not often enough. They are not of the nature of a press conference: no public report of what was said at the meetings is published. But it is, after all, precisely what is said at such meetings that perforce becomes public knowledge, not the information but the tone, the mood, the trend, the bias shown in various kinds of articles, columns, in all forms of expression by reporters and columnists, and in the style and content of published writings.

I am definitely an advocate of holding meetings as frequently as possible between newspapermen and leading political figures running the government, in our case, Polish Government officials.

It is a fact that a natural difference of viewpoint, mindset, manner of appraisal, and mode of action exists between the political figure, the government official, and the reporter, editor, and columnist.

The political figure is and must be primarily and even exclusively concerned about the consequences of what he says and does. The political figure knows what he is talking about. He knows how much he must say and how much he must know. I was once witness to this scene. A certain government official was asked what he had been talking about with another political figure, a colleague of his serving abroad. He answered the question. He spoke at length, for a relatively long time, with humor, interestingly. His listeners were well satisfied. It seemed to us that we were virtually participants in that conversation. But when we broke up and went home, we realized that we still did not know what the two political figures had talked about. Since the official, in reporting on the deliberations really did not want to divulge what he had discussed with his partner, he avoided divulging it by talking about it at length. I gained an enormous amount of respect for him. He knew what he was saying and know how much he wanted to tell.

In theory the journalist, who, after all, is also a player on the larger national stage, should also observe this rule. But such is definitely not the case! The reporter has the obligation of informing the readers of a newspaper or the listeners to radio, of informing them of everything that has taken place, of informing them accurately and fully and about everything. The editor's duty is to select these reports, since there is no newspaper and no mass communication medium which could and should publish all information that in the course of a day comes to a well-organized editorial office conscious of its goals. The columnist treats information only as the raw material needed for performing this basic task, which is to stimulate the gray matter of his readers. The columnist must analyze, clarify, and comment on information, must adopt a clearcut, biased attitude toward it, for a decided majority of his readers do not know what to do with the information they have received, read or heard. For the most part, unless the information is simple, they are not even able to repeat it correctly. The columnist acts as a guide to readers. The jobs of the reporter, editor, and columnist all differ somewhat (although they all are reporters), but one feature is common to all: they tell what they know. The function of reporters, editors and columnists is to transmit information to readers. The function of government officials is to govern, to obtain socially rewarding results. There is a fundamental difference between the public duty of the journalist and that of the government official. The two must be guided by different instincts.

But in modern society the government official reaches the public on a truly mass scale precisely through the reporter, editor, and columnist, even when he himself stands on a platform in front of a television camera and his every word, gesture, and smile can reach millions of television viewers. They do reach these millions, but experience has taught that they do not truly reach the viewers until the editor and columnist appear after the official has presented his information, make selections from the presentation, break it up into small segments, comment on it, and simply instruct the televiwer, radio listener, and newspaper reader how he is to understand the address and how and what he is to remember. Only after this sometimes protracted operation does the direct address by the official truly become assimilated by society and approved by it and does it have its effect. This is the mechanism whereby officials exert a political effect.

While fundamentally differing from each other, the political figure and the journalist essentially complement each other.

This is why it is so important for political figures governing countries, holding power, and leading society to meet and talk with reporters, editors, and journalists as often as possible, not to inform them of facts, events, and decisions-- this is the function of press conferences by spokesmen at various levels. The officials should meet the journalists to convey to the latter their mindsets and their sometimes highly individual ways of appraising matters and of reacting, to make an analysis of certain phenomena in their presence, an analysis by definition different, since the analysis made by the political figure, the government official, should and always does differ from the analysis made by the journalist. But the political figure of all people cannot be neutral toward the way in which the journalist makes this analysis.

If the journalist were to be only the trumpet, microphone, and megaphone of the government official, this would be socially harmful, for it would narrow the front of influence exerted on citizens, countrymen, comrades--whatever they may be called. If a political figure were to behave like a journalist, the consequences might be socially negative and harmful. The political figure and the journalist must speak (or write) differently, since their social functions differ. But if they serve a single national, state or ideological cause, they must speak and write to the same end. The journalist must have a good understanding of his government official and political figure, and the latter must be aware of his difference from the journalist. Both play on the same field and aim at the same goal, but they play different positions and in different places.

The influence of the press on readers is not a simple one. Once before World War II, after Roosevelt had been elected President of the United States, somebody remarked that Roosevelt had been elected even though the most influential daily papers were against him. Thus readers, as voting citizens, made independent choices. But would they have been able to make any choice if no newspaper at all had reached them.

Modern societies are extremely complex mechanisms. Newspapers and magazines, radio and television make up a steady psychological system without which modern man simply could not exist. While he may even reject the views of a particular journalist or of a particular editor, the citizen of a modern nation is nevertheless shaped by them.

Contact between the government official and the editor and journalist is not two-way contact but by definition three-way contact, needed to enable the chemistry of political action to penetrate more into society by way of reporters and their papers, necessary for the governmental instinct (I make deliberate use of these two words, which cause a negative allergic reaction in many people), for the governmental instinct, so characteristic of officials, to reach society through the press.

Government officials should invite members of the press often to engage in two-way talks, not merely to press conferences, but to real conversations.

## Press as Forum for Readers

Warsaw ODRODZENIE in Polish, No 7, 14 Feb 84 p 3

[Article by Zbigniew Siedlecki: "Shaping the Reader"]

[Text] The latest issue (Number 5) of TU I TERAZ published a column by Kazimierz Kozniewski entitled "Conversation", which offers his reflections on a meeting between General Jaruzelski and "editors-in-chief of daily newspapers, central periodicals, radio and television, and leading journalists of the press and mass communications media".

There are in this column comments which are unquestionably correct, such as the one to the effect that newspapermen reap a variety of benefits from meetings with political figures. It also contains bizarre statements, for instance: "...one of the most vital systems in operation in the link between government and citizens is a sound political formula for determining mutual quantitative and qualitative reinforcement of two elements, the openness of public political life and the confidentiality of this life." There is no rational way of adapting this statement to a government that wishes to work with its doors open and does so in a downright ostentatious manner. But the thing is that the general thrust of this column is in conflict with the principles of our journal. Consequently, although most likely it was not intended by Kozniewski, but is an unintentional and unconscious criticism the editorial concept of ODRODZENIE, I must accept the challenge and defend our viewpoint. I do so very reluctantly, since ODRODZENIE, as the weekly of PRON (although this fact is not announced in a subtitle), would like to live in peace and harmony with everyone except opponents of socialism and enemies of our fatherland, but I must take up cudgels for a *raison d'etre*.

In working out the editorial concept of ODRODZENIE we have adopted the concept that the journal must give expression especially to the function of the movement represented by "organized public opinion". In the first issue, in the note signed by the editorial staff, we stated forthrightly that we want ODRODZENIE not only to reach the greatest possible number of readers but to give its readers the opportunity of expressing themselves on public matters, and in this way of influencing the decisions of the government and its mode of operation. We hope that not just professional journalists will write in ODRODZENIE but all who have something important to say:

workers and farmers, teachers and doctors, engineers and artists. It will be the function of those working in the editorial office primarily to create a framework for such publication, to take up topics pointed out by readers, and to be present whenever this may prove socially useful. While we consider this to be the main function of the journal, we have by no means abandoned the intention of shaping public opinion. The editorial note referred to even specifies the direction of this action. Thus we declared, firstly, that we will serve our customers (journalism in general seems to me to be a social service), and secondly that we will treat them as partners in discussion.

Kozniewski promotes something absolutely contrary to this: "The columnist treats information only as the raw material needed for performing his basic task, which is to stimulate the gray matter of this readers. The columnist must analyze, clarify, and comment on information, must adopt a clearcut, biased attitude toward it, FOR A DECIDED MAJORITY OF HIS READERS DO NOT KNOW WHAT TO DO WITH THE INFORMATION THEY HAVE RECEIVED, READ, OR HEARD. FOR THE MOST PART, UNLESS THE INFORMATION IS SIMPLE, THEY ARE NOT EVEN ABLE TO REPEAT IT CORRECTLY." (Emphasis mine--Z. S.)

In Kozniewski's version, then, the reader is something like an underdeveloped child who cannot even always repeat something he has heard, so that it must be explained to him in words of one syllable, or someone like a goodnatured blockhead where rough edges the journalist must smooth away. Moreover, Kozniewski is no exception. There are quite a few people in our profession who have a mania for commenting on everything and who annoy their readers with continual, obtrusive moralizing. The propaganda effects appear to me to be inversely proportional to the effort applied to the moralizing and commentary.

In contrast, we see the reader of 1984 AD as a person who in fact often does not understand muddled reasoning (for he does not want to take the trouble to try to understand it) but has an excellent grasp of the significance of important information and is quite capable of providing his own commentary on it. What is more, we are a nation of individualists, where everyone has an opinion of his own. There are opinions which are ill-considered, self-willed, often even malicious, but rarely senseless. The Polish reader is neither smarter nor dumber than the German, Czech, Belorussian or Swedish reader, but on the other hand is sensitized--here I use a term in vogue among young people--to the forcefeeding of moralistic pap; his reaction to it is absolutely allergic. This is not surprising, since in 1984 the press still has to struggle for credibility in the eyes of its readers. Journalism is sensible only when it counts on the reader's intelligence. It also seems to me that whoever fails to treat the reader as a partner will fail to convince him and even more so to be credible to him. I do not at all mean to say that the proportions between the functions of mirroring public opinion and shaping it that have been adopted by the staff of ODRODZENIE are universal ones. On the contrary, I must point out that the predominance of the former characteristic of ODRODZENIE is rather atypical and that every periodical must establish these proportions in keeping with its own needs and capabilities. But the two elements, mirroring and shaping, must always be present. Nor do I mean to say that our prescription for partnership between journalist and reader is the best one. I cannot make this statement, since ODRODZENIE has not become a widely read periodical, although we hope that we will succeed in acquiring a greater number of readers, both among those who agree with us and among those whose opinions differ from ours on many points. But our staff has not lost faith that it is going in the right direction.

Let us return to the matter of shaping public opinion. Here as well Kozniewski adopts an extreme position. He says, among other things, that "if a political figure were to behave like a journalist, the consequences might be socially negative and harmful". But--at this point Kozniewski's radicalism seems to me to be malicious--surely not always. A political figure and government official as well as professional journalist writing under the name of V. I. Lenin deported himself in ISKRA and many other periodicals quite like a journalist, and the consequences were unquestionably far-reaching but were not regarded by everyone as harmful. The difference between the government official and the journalist lies in the fact that the former makes decisions while the latter only seeks to persuade. However, while it is not the function of the journalist to make decisions, skill in persuasion is a highly desirable if not indispensable characteristic of the political figure.

Kozniewski asserts, "But in modern society the government official reaches the public on a truly mass scale through the reporter, editor, and columnist, even when he himself stands on a platform in front of a television camera and his every word, gesture, and smile can reach millions of television viewers. And they do reach these millions, but experience has taught that they do not truly reach the viewers until the editor and columnist appear after the official has presented his information, make selections from the presentation, break it up into small segments, comment on it, AND SIMPLY INSTRUCT THE TELEVIEWER, RADIO LISTENER, AND NEWSPAPER READER HOW HE IS TO UNDERSTAND THE ADDRESS AND HOW AND WHAT HE IS TO REMEMBER (my emphasis--Z. S.). Only after this sometimes protracted operation does the direct address by the official truly become assimilated by society and approved by it and does it have its effect. This is the mechanism whereby officials exert a political effect."

However, I think that Kozniewski should at least accept the thought that among the media consumers there are more persons than one capable of independently understanding an address by General Jaruzelski, especially since his addresses are easier to grasp than many items published in TU I TERAZ. It also seems to me that in the paragraph quoted above Kozniewski's tongue belies his thoughts, since this theoretical conclusion is, fortunately, essential in the practical work of editing TU I TERAZ. I acknowledge that the function of the commentator as intermediary is sometimes needed. This is true especially in the case of speeches which are interminable and not internally coherent (and there are many of them). In such cases the intelligent commentator presents to the audience the essence of what has been said. But at least as often the inept commentator, by converting the thoughts of the government official into platitudes, places a barrier between him and the listener. So many times a carefully thought-out speech falls victim to a commentator's creativity, sometimes so subjective and so far-

fetched that its proportions are distorted, and as generally received its impact is different from the intended by the political figure. Recently, in a highly important forum, a plenary meeting of the Central Committee, General Jaruzelski asserted that not all the threads of his public addresses are reflected by the mass communication media.

The thoughts contained in "Conversation" regarding the molding of opinions are not original ones. This is merely a rehash of the well-known concept of the media as channels of transmission to the masses. We are, unfortunately, very familiar with its practical effects from the experience of the immediate past. They are expressed in the pretended homogenization of public opinion that masks the disappearance of the link between the masses and those who, holding themselves to be engineers of the mind, think that they are controlling the mind.

At the end of his column, Kozniewski writes that "government officials should invite members of the press often to engage in two-way talks," thus suggesting that there are other than two-way talks. Surely the conversation reported on was useful (I write "useful" because no one from ODRODZENIE has had the occasion to verify this), but I am ready to agree with this vague suggestion, for I feel that the usefulness of talks is to be judged not on the basis of their frequency, which the TU I TERAZ columnist wants increased, but on the basis of the content of these talks. After all, we remember the very regular meetings between Edward Gierek and the press, which would be difficult to say that they had a fructifying effect on journalists, although we may apply to them the words written by Kozniewski in TU I TERAZ to the effect that they "become public knowledge, not the information but the tone, the mood, the trend, the bias shown in various kinds of articles, columns, in all forms of expression by reporters and columnists."

In conclusion, I want to make it clear once again that I have very reluctantly taken up the pen to engage in polemics with Kozniewski, that in the Polish press family ODRODZENIE and TU I TERAZ are close relations. Moreover, Kazimierz Kozniewski is one of the group of persons who launched PRON. But I cannot forebear to take up cudgels on behalf of such a fundamental value as the right of reader and journalist to partnership.

6115  
CSO: 2600/775

ARCHBISHOP BAZYLI DISCUSSES ORTHODOX CHURCH

Warsaw PRZEGLAD TYGODNIOWY in Polish 4 Mar 84 pp 1, 3, 4

[Interview with Archbishop Bazyl, the Metropolitan of Warsaw and Poland's Autocephalous Orthodox Church, by Michal Boltryk]

[Question] The Orthodox Church derives from the same root as Roman Catholicism. Nevertheless, knowledge of the Orthodox Church in Poland is minimal. Can Your Eminence give us some information about the current status of this church in Poland?

[Answer] We have about 850,000 faithful, including 350,000 living in the western and northern territories. Administratively the church is divided into five dioceses. The fifth--Przemysl and Nowy Sacz--was reinstated on 8 September 1983. A diocese formerly existed there until 1692. The five dioceses include 240 parishes in which there are 350 churches. We have about 400 clergy. There are two convents, one for women in Grabarka in Bialystok Province, and one for men in Jableczno in Bialsk Podlaski Province. There are 70 students in the theological seminary and 35 in the Christian Theological Academy.

[Question] How many Poles of the Orthodox faith are there in our country?

[Answer] About 250,000 of the Orthodox faithful are Poles. Others include Belorussians, Russians, Lemkians, Greeks, and Ukrainians. Among our faithful there is a trend to maintain one's identity within the faith. This, however, does not equate nationalistic feelings. We live in Poland and we consider ourselves Poles.

[Question] How does the Orthodox Church in Poland today compare to the period before World War II?

[Answer] Before the war in Poland there were about 5 million members of the Orthodox Church. We had 18 convents, including the reknowned Lawra Poczajowska. There were two theological seminaries--in Wilno and in Krzemieniec--which in 1938 became the Theological Lyceum, and the Studium of Orthodox Theology at UW [Warsaw University].

[Question] Poland is a predominantly Catholic country. The majority of Poles associate the Orthodox Church with the Russian Orthodox Church and the resulting emotional coloration.

[Answer] Several years ago a high official of the Catholic Curia in Warsaw was very surprised when he heard me speaking Polish. "How come you know Polish? Did they teach you that in the Orthodox Church?" he asked.

[Question] How did the Orthodox Church come to the Polish lands?

[Answer] Eastern rite Christianity came to our area in two movements. In 963, at the invitation of Prince Rostislaw, the brothers Cyril and Methodius came to Moravia from Constantinople.

[Question] Yet their missionary activity did not have a decisive influence on the church in Poland?

[Answer] Who knows how the church would have been formed in our lands if it were not for the endeavours of German bishops? After all, Mieszko I somewhat later turned to Rome in order to save the country from German pressure. This was necessary for reasons of state and to save the nation from germanization.

[Question] The second impetus for the Orthodox faith in Polish lands came from Kiev?

[Answer] The beginnings of Christianity in Kievan Russia officially go back to the year 988. In time, a full hierarchical system was created there with Kiev as the capital. From there the Orthodox faith came to our lands.

[Question] As time went by, Kiev began to lose its importance as the administrative capital of the Polish-Lithuanian Orthodox Church. What were the reasons?

[Answer] In the middle of the 13th century, Russia found itself under Mongol domination. The invaders destroyed Kiev and the Kiev metropolitans no longer had their permanent seat. In the first part of the 14th century, the Metropolitan Teognast settled permanently in Moscow, an event of great significance. In 1448 the Moscow Church gained autocephalous status.

[Question] The Union of Brest in 1596, which created the so called uniates, bore portentous results for the Polish Orthodox Church.

[Answer] Before this, there was the personal, Lublin Union in 1569 between the Polish and Lithuanian nations. It was an unprecedented event in the histories of these nations. Nevertheless, the ideologues of the Roman Catholic Church, among whom Piotr Skarga and Possewin showed particular initiative, wanted to bring about a spiritual union between these two nations.

[Question] And this led to the Union of Brest in 1596?

[Answer] In 1596 bishops Pociej and Terlecki--on behalf of Metropolitan Rogoza--went to Rome and asked for the Orthodox Church to be admitted under the Pope's authority. To commemorate this event, a medal with the inscription "Rutenis receptis" was coined. Initially they kept the results of their peregrination secret, fearing a rebellion on the part of the faithful.

[Question] What were the results of the Union of Brest?

[Answer] As a result of the union, the Orthodox Church retained the eastern rite under the condition that it submit to Roman jurisdiction.

[Question] Was this a great misfortune for the faithful?

[Answer] It was not only a great tragedy, but also a great catastrophe. A few years after the signing of the Union, the eastern rite was slowly being eliminated. This affected the faithful directly, it tore the nations apart and greatly influenced the fate of the state.

[Question] In this manner, two factions of eastern Christianity were formed in the lands of Poland: the uniates and the disuniates. The former are also called Greek Catholics.

[Answer] The disuniates in Poland were outside of any law and state protection. The bishops ordained in 1620 by the patriarch of Jerusalem were not recognized by the Polish authorities. It must be said that King Wladyslaw IV held a tolerant attitude toward the Orthodox Church.

[Question] In general, the Poland of that period is considered a very tolerant state.

[Answer] Nevertheless there were concrete facts. It was only the Four-Year Sejm that brought an end to the 2 centuries of persecution of disuniates and corrected the great, harmful error. The Orthodox believers were then put under the protection of the king. The creation of a metropolis with a few bishops was also decided upon.

[Question] The creation of the metropolis was a step toward autocephalous status. Presently the Polish Orthodox Church is autocephalous. What does that mean?

[Answer] We are independent with regard to administration, cult, establishment of the order of services, preparation of the holy chrism or holy oils, and canonization of our saints. Nevertheless, there is unity with all the orthodox churches on the dogmatic, ecclesiastic and canonical grounds. Each church is an equal among equals.

[Question] The Polish Orthodox Church became autocephalous in the interwar period. How did it come about?

[Answer] After the regaining of independence, we were linked with the Pinsk congregation. In 1923, the Moscow patriarch, Tikon, granted Metropolitan Jerzy Jaroszewski the rights of a provincial metropolitan. This was another step toward autocephalous status. The patriarch's death interrupted the process aimed at the autonomy of the Polish Orthodox Church.

[Question] As we know, the Polish Orthodox Church received autocephalous status from the Constantinople patriarchate. When did that take place?

[Answer] The Constantinople patriarchate, by a decree of 1924, confirmed the autocephalous status of the Orthodox Church in Poland. After this act, the first metropolitan, Dionizy Waledynski, visited all the orthodox churches and they all accepted him as the head of the Orthodox Church in Poland. They also hoped that this would be recognized by the mother church, the Russian church, when the appropriate time came.

[Question] Something that did not happen then. Why?

[Answer] For objective reasons only after the war the Moscow patriarch, Aleksy, began to put these things in order and in 1948 the council of bishops headed by Patriarch Aleksy gave our church the blessing for autocephalous status.

[Question] The interwar period was important for the Polish Orthodox Church and at the same time there were dramatic moments.

[Answer] In the interwar period, about a thousand orthodox churches were closed down and in 1938, in the Lublin region 170 orthodox churches were demolished.

[Question] How are the relations between the Orthodox and the Roman Catholic churches in Poland today?

[Answer] They are neither hot nor cold. Our local Church belongs to the Polish Ecumenical Council. We want to retain our identity and at the same time we do not want to subject others to the loss of theirs. We believe that it is better to stay together.

[Question] Nevertheless, there are conflicts evidenced, for example, by the situation in Polany where the Orthodox faithful were deprived of a church.

[Answer] I was there five times. I conducted the service by the fence, up to my waist in snow. The faithful have been praying in these conditions for several years. This, however, is not the fault of His Eminence, Cardinal Jozef Glemp, nor my fault. It can all be resolved in the denominational field.

[Question] What obstacles stand in the way of a possible reconciliation between the Orthodox and the Roman Catholic Churches?

[Answer] Each Orthodox Church approaches other churches independently and in agreement with other equally entitled churches. No one can interfere in this respect. Each has his way to unity. Human longing for unity is palpable. Therefore, I personally see no obstacles or antagonisms.

[Question] What then speaks for reconciliation?

[Answer] We have been divided by rite, "philioques," unleavened bread and earthly--administrative--matters. In 1054 there was an exchange of ex-communications between Cardinal Humberto da Silva Candida, and Cerularius, the patriarch of Constantinople. The final fact of the breakup was the crusades against Constantinople. The last one--in 1204--committed a great desecration. Even the gilded layers from the altar of the famous Saint Sophia's Church were chopped up. Among the crusaders there were people of various descriptions. And Christianity was broken up in order to destroy the great force inherent in it.

[Question] What unites the two creeds?

[Answer] We are united by seven general councils. The Church Fathers are a common plane. The fathers of the Roman Catholic Church are authorities for the eastern church and vice versa. The Orthodox Church recognizes the provenance of the Holy Spirit from the Father, in accordance with the decision of the Second General Council in 381. The Holy Communion for the first 1000 years was also under two forms--the Body and Blood--in the West, as it is now in the Orthodox Church.

[Question] Of what importance is the council in the Orthodox Church?

[Answer] It is the highest authority in the ecumenical church. In the local churches, there are councils of bishops. The rule is: a younger bishop ought not do anything without the advice of an older one, but also the opposite--an older one ought to listen to the advice of a younger one.

[Question] Is a national Orthodox council in Poland foreseen in the nearest future?

[Answer] For the time being there is no need for one. Nevertheless, there are ideas of convening a council in the year 1988, for the millennium of the Orthodox Church. Preparations are under way.

[Question] In what language are services in the Orthodox Church in Poland conducted?

[Answer] In Old Church Slavonic. The sermons--on the other hand--according to the wishes of the faithful. In many cities--in the Polish language. Each of the faithful has the right to retain his or her national identity.

[Question] In the Orthodox religion, the icon is of great importance.

[Answer] The Seventh General Council in 787 defined the importance of the icon; we are not worshipping its color, or the material that went into its making, but the prototype which is on the icon. Idolatrous worship of an icon is forbidden. An icon is a kind of theology in colors, a window opening into the other world, and an aid in contemplation.

[Question] What icons are worshipped most by Orthodox believers?

[Answer] The Poczajewska, Wlodzimierska, and the Athos icons. Among us the cult of Our Lady is widespread, and in the register of miraculous icons there is, of course, the picture of Our Lady of Czestochowa. This picture is from the East, and we are happy that Jasna Gora together with this picture became the sanctuary of Polish Catholicism. This icon is like a sign that we are brothers.

[Question] How do baptism, confirmation, confession and communion look in the Orthodox Church?

[Answer] Baptism is the same as in the Roman Catholic Church, except that in our Church confirmation takes place right after baptism, by anointing with chrism (that is, holy oils). Confession is individual. Communion, in two forms for everybody, consists in consuming the Body and Blood in the form of bread and wine. The bread must be baked from the best wheat flour prepared with yeast. A badly baked bread burdens the priest's consciousness.

[Question] Does the Orthodox Church grant divorces?

[Answer] Yes, when the marriage has broken down. It can also remarry the victimized party.

[Question] Many members of the Roman Catholic Church find it difficult to understand the marriage of Orthodox priests.

[Answer] All the apostles except for John Theologus had wives. Prior to the year 1139, when Gregory VII introduced celibacy, the clergy in the West married. A bishop risks less by ordaining a married man, because he knows the morals of the candidate and of his wife, as well as the wife's family. A candidate for a clergyman can also choose the monastic life. The bishop's duty, however, is to warn the candidate against the hardships of this type of life. If an Orthodox clergyman's wife dies, he cannot remarry.

[Question] Is Your Eminence married?

[Answer] I am a monk. I now lead a single life.

[Question] What was Your Eminence's road to the ministry and eventually to the highest position in Polish Orthodox Church?

[Answer] I was born in Cisy, in Narew Gmina. Until 1927, I studied in the gymnasium and theological programs in the seminary in Wilno. Later I worked as a choir conductor in Swislocz and studied theology at Warsaw University. I was ordained in 1938 on Palm Sunday in Grodno. I worked as a minister in Hornostajewicze, Swislocz, and Michalow. In Grodek Bialostocki I built an orthodox church. In 1960 I became the Bishop of Bielsk. A year later I was appointed an Ordinary of the Wroclaw-Szczecin diocese. In January 1970 I was elected to the position of Metropolitan. It is not any sort of personal career, despite what it may seem. In March 1984 I shall be 70 years old, and I carry my cross, as His Eminence, Cardinal Joseph Glemp carries his. I often pray for him.

[Question] In January of 1982, during the week of prayers for the unity of Christians, the Polish primate, Joseph Glemp, paid a visit to the Orthodox church of Saint Mary Magdalene. Could you comment on this event?

[Answer] It was the first event of this kind in the Orthodox Church in all the centuries of our separation. We greeted His Eminence by ringing the bells and together we said the "Our Father." The primate said a homily, in which he spoke about the wrong which had been done to the East and the West at the Council of Trento.

[Question] Was a return visit paid?

[Answer] Yes. In January 1983 I was in the collegiate church. During the meeting with His Eminence, I gave him an icon of the Holy Trinity. There have also been get togethers, in 1982 and 1983.

[Question] Has Your Eminence met with Pope John Paul II?

[Answer] During the first visit of John Paul II to Poland there was only an anonymous greeting. During his second visit, the Holy Father met with representatives of ecumenical churches in Poland. In the Primate's Palace on Miodowa Street, I had the honorary duty of greeting the Pope. I gave him the icon of Saints Cyril and Methodius, expressing the hope that the spirits of these apostles would guard our meeting. The Pope gave me a medal, telling me that my icon was a better gift. We kissed. I considered it all an unprecedented event.

[Question] There are frequent meetings of the Orthodox hierarchy with Minister Adam Lopatka. Are there some contentious issues between the state and the Orthodox Church?

[Answer] There are no such issues. Although some issues are not fully regulated yet. For example, the church's real estate. Nevertheless, we have been assured that this will be regulated by a general decree.

[Question] Is the opinion that the Orthodox Church in every state is and has been pro-government. true?

[Answer] When the authorities act badly, I pray. The cross which the lay authorities carry is much heavier than mine. Religion, however, cannot be brought down to politics. We do not pay court to authorities. Love and integration of people are our goals. That is how we see our position. We do not regret not being in the Sejm or in other bodies. We also do not demand much from the state because we know that it is in a difficult situation. We build our churches with donations from the faithful.

[Question] What is the state of Orthodox church building in Poland?

[Answer] Since the war we have built 35 churches. Currently there are 12 under construction. We often have difficulties with the location. We receive a subsidy from the state in the amount of 23 percent for repair of historical churches.

[Question] They say that currently the Roman Catholic Church in Poland is undergoing a renaissance. There are conversions and christenings of adults. How does this situation look in the Orthodox Church?

[Answer] We are not involved in conversions. We give Holy Communion without requiring that the recipients convert to our faith.

[Question] Is there a noticeably greater interest of youth in the Orthodox Church?

[Answer] Youth is drawn to church. There exists a Circle of Orthodox Theologians. For us, a theologian is a person who believes in God and lives with Him on a daily basis. The Circle youth belong to the SYNDESMOS Universal World Movement of Orthodox Youth, whose center is in Finland.

[Question] What is the status of the Orthodox Church in the world?

[Answer] There presently are 15 autocephalous churches: Constantinopolitan, Alexandrian, Antiochian, Jerusalemian, Russian, Georgian, Serbian, Rumanian, Bulgarian, Cyprian, Helladian, Albanian, Polish, Czechoslovak, and American, and autonomous churches: Sinaian, Finnish, Japonese, and Chinese. We know very little about the latter one.

[Question] What is the importance of the particular churches?

[Answer] In my opinion, the Jerusalemian church ought to be the most important one, because it was there, where the blood of Christ was spilled and all the prophecies were fulfilled. After the fall of Constantinople, the Russian church gained considerable importance. Presently, the church of Constantinople has the position of honor. This church is much discriminated against. In Constantinople, on each Good Friday, an effigy of the patriarch is burned. Recently, a seminary there was closed. It has been suggested that the ecumenical patriarchate be transferred to Geneva or to Athos.

[Question] What role do the patriarchs of Constantinople and Moscow play in the Orthodox Church?

[Answer] Their role is honorary. We have equal rights. We pay our respects to them. We share their pain, and their troubles are ours. Saint Paul said: "Carry each other's troubles."

[Question] For many years now preparations have been under way (they are supposedly advanced now) for an Orthodox Council. All the councils (seven) which the Orthodox Church recognizes, met in the face of situations considered to be dangerous for the Church and faith. Is there such a situation now?

[Answer] No, no such thing threatens the Orthodox Church.

[Question] Would convening a new council be contradictory to the Orthodox Church's recognition of only seven councils?

[Answer] The seven general councils are the pillars of Christianity. And naturally, the dogmas accepted by those councils are outside any discussion. All other councils which took place in the East and the West were only local.

[Question] What issues would, therefore, be taken up by the Orthodox council?

[Answer] They could deal with fasts and their conception, the calendar reform, the dates of the holidays, autocephaly, the diaspora, canon law, and the like.

[Question] In 1976, the first pre-council conference took place. What were its results?

[Answer] In the course of preparations for the council, difficulties of a political-financial type emerged. Churches from capitalist states did not want to participate in a council that would take place in a socialist state. We would go to them, but we lack foreign exchange. The council could be organized in Alexandria, but during the rule of Sadat, the Orthodox Church there was very discriminated against. Mubarak has eased this situation somewhat. There is a idea of organizing the council in Switzerland; who, however, will finance the whole enterprise?

[Question] Patriarch Atenagoras was a great spokesman for ecumenism. After him, since 1972, Dymitr I has continued this work. Nevertheless, from the moment the new patriarch was elected, the Athenian daily HESTIA, for example, has been calling for abandoning the policy of his predecessor, because according the the journal, "he strived toward submitting the Orthodox Church to the Pope, which puts the Orthodox Church in danger of annihilation." How strong today are the trends contradicting ecumenism?

[Answer] It was extraordinary when Paul VI came to Jerusalem and together with the patriarch said the "Our Father." Later there was a reciprocal visit in Rome. The journal's statement is its private opinion, nevertheless there was a reason for it. The Greeks were indignant that a Greek Catholic bishop was sent to them even though the Second Vatican Council abolished this church.

[Question] Is there a dialogue between the "third Rome"--Zagorsk--and the first Rome?

[Answer] Of course. There have been meetings on various levels. Metropolitan Nikodem from Leningrad wrote a Ph.D. dissertation on John XXIII; it remains until now the best work on this pope.

[Answer] Yet, it is said that the dialogue is opposed by the Greek Catholic Cardinal Slipyj.

[Answer] Slipyj does not play any role now.

[Question] In Poland the majority of people are believers. They belong to various Churches. No church teaches doing wrong. Why, then, are people not becoming better and not acting increasingly better? What is the opinion of Your Eminence on this?

[Answer] During Lent I had a visitor from Germany. He was simply shocked that during Lent people stood in endless lines to buy meat.

We have become in many cases skeletons without a spirit. There is a lack of Christian humility in Poland. Nevertheless, let us thank God for what we have. No one will send us manna from heaven. We have to work hard for it. "Blessed be the meek, for they shall inherit the Earth" said Christ (Math. 5,5).

[Question] Thank you, Your Eminence, for the conversation.

12270  
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FRG STATEMENTS ON GERMAN MINORITY QUESTIONED

Intentional Political Provocation

Warsaw KIERUNKI in Polish No 7, 12 Feb 84 pp 1, 9

[Article by Jerzy Nowakowski: "Hupka, Mertes, Zimmermann...the Current of History"]

[Text] "We are not indifferent to the fate of the Polish people. We are especially aware of that in these hours and days. Our wish for the Polish people is for them to succeed in establishing a national understanding and overcome their present crisis. We desire the reconciliation and understanding with Poland that both of our churches have so well begun. The concluded treaties are in force. We want to use them to build up our mutual relations."

These hopeful-sounding words are a fragment of a government declaration that Chancellor Helmut Kohl read in the Bundestag on 4 May 1983. This speech followed elections in the Federal Republic of Germany that fulfilled the political aspirations of the Christian Democrats to control the West German Government when Helmut Schmidt lost his position as chancellor and the 13-year old SDP-FDP coalition fell apart.

Words and deeds, however, are not usually the same with Bonn politicians. This can be easily seen in the case of almost 12 months of Helmut Kohl's government. What has been happening is like political aerobics.

Pacta sunt servanda! Such assurances as these have often come from the ranks of the CDU and CSU with regard to the so-called Ostverträge, the treaties negotiated in 1970 with the socialist states and Poland, but the practice of these sentiments is another matter since, behind the formal approbations, there hides the power of claims expressed in whatever form the treaties are interpreted. The Christian Democrats, flirting with the revisionists and appealing to the constitution, have still not ceased dividing Germany into Mitteldeutschland [central Germany] and Ostdeutschland [eastern Germany]. Mitteldeutschland is the German Democratic Republic while the second name refers to the ancient Piast lands along the Oder and Neisse rivers and the Baltic Sea. That sounds very anachronistic but continues to be the classification used by the people presently governing the Federal Republic.

At the beginning of last year, statements by Friedrich Zimmermann, federal minister of internal affairs, a "Machiavellian who spoke his mind" (DIE ZEIT), grew in volume. On 29 January 1983 at a Munich meeting with the Bavarian Bund der Vertriebenen organization, the central association of resettled Germans, this CSU politician questioned the Polish western border. He stated that when the Deutschlandfrage ("German question") is being decided, the government will not limit itself to the GDR and FRG "but will also consider the territory to the east of the Oder and Neisse." He later said: "We cannot let there be any doubts that the expulsion of Germans and the taking of their land and property without compensation is a violation of international law."

When the Polish Government protested the minister's provocative statements at the CSCE [Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe] in Madrid and the SDP opposition in the Bundestag reacted with sharp criticism, the federal chancellor took an elusive stance. He neither reprimanded his minister nor did he remove him from the cabinet. The press spokesman, Dieter Stolze, simply declared that Zimmermann was referring to the 1972 pronouncement by the Federal Constitutional Tribune and was not making territorial claims, but referring to rights violations...

Under attack, Zimmermann was later able to say with some satisfaction: "Bringing up the matter of the territories beyond the Oder and Neisse was no slip..."

If March elections for the parliament were held and Helmut Kohl won them, Zimmermann would still remain an influential minister. The chancellor seemingly wanted to sweet-talk the Poles with his ministerial declaration in May (see quote at beginning of article), but his legal as well as political position has not changed.

When the Social Democrats administered the Bonn government, they tried to avoid becoming involved in nationalist enterprises. They regarded them as poor tactics and unnecessary irritation of public opinion in the East. The situation has changed since the Christian Democrats came to power. When at gatherings, Bundestag deputies Herbert Hupka and Herbert Czaja, veterans of the nationalist movement harangued against "the injustice perpetrated against the German people," they basked in the clear good will of the administration.

At a meeting of former residents of Gdansk held in Coblenz, Hupka rejoiced that, thanks to Lech Walesa, the world is again talking about German Danzig, which was and remains a "German city." At a gathering of former Silesians in Hannover, Heinrich Windelen, the federal minister for inter-German affairs, tolerantly listened to demands for the recovery of the Oder and Neisse lands (Hupka: "We will not agree to the partition of our land and the robbery of our fatherland"). Windelen was described in the Sueddeutsche Zeitung as the first Bonn minister since 1969 to participate in a meeting of German Silesians.

## A Million Germans in Poland?

The height of absurdity is the recent answer by Secretary of State Alois Mertes to an interpellation by Bundestag Deputy Carl Otto Lenz (CDU). This Bonn politician, the vice minister for foreign affairs, said on 14 December 1983 that Poland has within its territory 1.1 million Germans, deprived of their rights and unable to leave the Polish state.

"The Federal Republic of Germany," we read in the long text full of figures, "insists upon the rights of these people and, above all, their right to use their father tongue in their churches and schools. At the same time, greater cultural freedom is in the interests of both Poles and Germans living in Poland because it will lessen the pressure on Germans to emigrate from the lands in which they were born to the German Federal Republic. At least 120,000 Germans living in the area of the Oder and Neisse want to emigrate, and this can be proven, to the German Federal Republic."

Bonn politicians continue to be dissatisfied with the long-standing policy of reuniting families which is a humanitarian gesture on the part of the Polish Government. An economic crisis has indeed been felt beyond the Elbe for some time now, but the desire to absorb the new arrivals (of mixed German ancestry, since persons requesting political asylum are subjected to very troublesome and very often negative selection) has not abated.

Alois Mertes would like to resurrect in Poland the old pre-war problem of German minorities, using figures that we have always been given by openly anti-Polish personalities, such as Hupka and Czaja. However, the suspicion has arisen that there is method in this madness--the revival of old sentiments about Poland and Poles.

What is more, we have learned that both of the Christian Democrat parties, the CDU and CSU, want to bring the case of "the rights of German minorities in Poland" before the European Parliament, a deliberate political provocation. This is no longer the nonsense of Herbert Hupka but deliberate action to worsen relations between Poland and the FRG and an attempt to turn back the clock on history.

Minister Friedrich Zimmermann added that he wants to see publication of full documentation on crimes against Germans. This has made West German nationalist circles very happy. This is certainly the result of the minister's sense of law. It is interesting that despite the warm words of the Christian Democrats to the opposition in Poland, Zimmermann stated in November of this year that he is not for any humanitarian gestures even to "non-communists" in Poland. For example, in the case of Wieslaw Rozyk, an imprisoned member of Silesian Solidarity who tried to obtain permission to emigrate to West Germany, the minister justified his refusal on the grounds that this former Solidarity member, a participant of the dramatic strike in a Katowice mine in December 1981, had threatened to blow up the mine. Rozyk is therefore a criminal, as Zimmermann told the intervening FDP deputy, Dieter Julius Cronenberg, and there is no place for terrorists in the Federal Republic of Germany.

In Zimmermann's sense of law so profound in all matters concerning Poles? We ask this in a purely rhetorical sense.

The "Polish Nationalism" of John Paul II...

In May of this year, Chancellor Helmut Kohl called upon the services of the Catholic Church for the cause of Polish-German understanding and reconciliation. Essentially, both Protestants and Catholics in both countries have tried to work out such cooperation in the Christian spirit, in spite of national divisions. It is, however, hard to close one's eyes to the actions of groups associated with Hupka, Czaja and others.

First, a peculiar leaflet, a lunatic open letter to the pope printed in Cologne, was distributed:

"By visiting a communist country you are betraying, Your Holiness, the interests of the church, giving moral support to a communist regime and therefore compromising the Catholic community. The visit by Your Holiness to Poland has undoubtedly fostered well-known historical Polish chauvinism, nationalism and antisemitism. The pope should be aware that he is not only a Pole but above all the head of the church and that his visit to Poland may be regarded as the Vatican's recognition, contrary to laws, of violated national borders in Europe. We Germans will never give in: Silesia, Pomerania and West Prussia were, are and will always be German. We demand the re-establishment of German church diocese in Silesia, Pomerania and West Prussia!"

This open letter was written by the Notverwaltung des Deutschen Ostens, an "association of East and Sudeten German land owners and displaced persons." One could shrug off this nonsense and pity the authors for their stupidity because madness has many shades and accents, but what is sadder is that part of the mass media took a similar position. The nationalists were offended by the homilies of John Paul II in Wroclaw and on Saint Ann Mountain, his reference to the Piast history of Silesia and mention of the "sufferings of expelled Germans."

Finally, this led, in September 1983, to the exchange of letters between the Holy See and the Episcopate in the FRG. In answer to a letter from Cardinal Agostino Casarole, the Vatican secretary of state, Cardinal Joseph Hoeffner wrote: "The bishops have insistently requested that I convey to you their expressions of gratitude for your unambiguous explanation and clear statement of your concern for expulsed Germans."

Similar treatment by the West German Catholic press (KNA) of John Paul II's second visit to Poland provoked an official protest by the Polish Episcopate in a letter sent to the secretariat of the German Bishop's Conference in Fulda. The letter of protest stated that the reports on the visit by John Paul II to Poland contain political comments that are far removed from the meaning and context of the pope's homilies.

Did this mean anything to Herbert Hupka? According to a DPA bulletin on 11 September 1983, he called upon the pope to renounce any sort of "Polish

nationalism" and added: "We welcome any rectification since for us, the pope is not the pope from Poland, but the pope of all Catholics." Hupka locutus, causa finita!

Thirteen years have passed since the signing of the December 1970 agreement to normalize relations between Poland and the Federal Republic of Germany. Unfortunately, this time has not been used to finally solve many painful problems burdening relations between our two societies. Since the optimistic period in which relations, mutual political visits, and the expansion of economic and cultural cooperation were broadened, there have begun to accumulate real hindrances to better relations. Concerning the borders, citizenship and school books, the West Germans are accustomed to continually refer to their own legislation preserving various claims against Poland.

The Social Democrats handled this problem very subtly, which gave hopes for a gradual easing of conflicts. On the other hand, the Christian Democrats act more openly, hoping that Poland, torn by its own internal problems and seeking international contacts, will be more inclined to concede to Helmut Kohl's Deutschlandpolitik. The politicians in Bonn that share this view are fundamentally mistaken. They are hindering Polish-West German cooperation and acting against the interests of both societies and of peace in Europe. This sounds like a statement of principle, but the crux of the matter is that some of the shrill politicians and politicos from the Rhine are trying to avoid.

#### Legal Definition Questioned

Warsaw PRAWO I ZYCIE in Polish No 6, 12 Feb 84 pp 12, 13

[Article by Jan Barcz, employee of the Institute for Court Law Research in Warsaw: "The Minority That Does Not Exist"]

[Text] In answer to an interpellation by a Bundestag deputy on 14 December 1983, the secretary of state in the Bonn Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Alois Mertes, stated that there are 1.1 million Germans living in Poland, especially in the western and northern territories. He said that the German Federal Republic is obligated to defend these Germans and this above all means giving them the rights of a national minority. Mertes stated: "In accordance with the International Agreement on the Rights of Man, the Final Act from the Helsinki Accords and the continuing agreement between the German and Polish peoples, the German Federal Republic demands that these people be granted the legal status of a national minority and above all that they be allowed to use their native language, especially in schools and churches."

Alois Mertes' statement is nothing new. In the 1970's, activists of revisionist societies and representatives of the West German Government made repeated demands of this sort on Poland. The notion that a German minority exists in Poland is a result of the fact that Federal Republic,

in spite of the 7 December 1970 treaty, has maintained legal provisions with respect to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Poland. What this means is that talk about a "German national minority" or "Germans" concerns a German national minority in the ethnic sense of the word. This common feeling does not meet the official notion of "Germans" currently held in the Federal Republic.

The idea of "Germans" was defined in West German revisionist legal formulas that assume the continuing legal existence of the Third Reich with its 1937 borders. This definition also includes persons of other than German nationality. In order to understand this baffling formula fully, it is necessary to take a closer look at Federal German laws covering citizenship.

State citizenship is a legal bond between an individual and the state. It is above all an institution of domestic law. On the international level, citizenship refers only to the fact that a certain individual is subject to the laws of his or her state. Therefore, states have full authority to regulate their own citizenship. This authority is, however, restricted by standards of international law. These restrictions consist above all of a prohibition against violating the sovereignty and territorial integrity of other states. However, it sometimes happens that the question of citizenship becomes a tool of politics even when this goes against those standards. This is exactly what we are dealing with in the case of West Germany's laws on citizenship.

#### Two Constructions.

The Federal Republic of Germany does not recognize the institution of its own federal citizenship but uses two legal constructions having a decidedly revisionist ring to them: a German as defined by Article 116, paragraph 1 of the Federal German Constitution and "German citizenship" ("deutsche Staatsangehoerigkeit").

Article 116, paragraph 1 states: "A German is any individual of German citizenship or anyone that, along with spouse and offspring, was accepted as a refugee of German nationality in the territory of the German Reich under its 31 December 1937 borders." This requires some explanation. It must above all be kept in mind that the definition of a German covers two categories of individuals: "German nationals" and "individuals of German nationality, their spouses and offspring that are accepted as refugees in the territory of the German Reich within its 31 December 1937 borders."

Let us first examine the first category. The West German legal definition of "German nationals" (the 22 July 1913 Reich law and its subsequent changes are still in force) includes not only inhabitants of the Federal Republic possessing German citizenship. It also covers anyone who has ever held German citizenship and has not lost it according to West German law, the offspring of these individuals and, in certain cases, their spouses.

It should also be added that the Federal Republic of Germany has not recognized the fundamental illegality and invalidity of the German citizenship granted

en masse by the Nazis in 1938-1943 to individuals in territories annexed by the Third Reich. According to the 1955 and 1956 laws, persons of German nationality or any other nationality who were involuntarily placed on the so-called "Volksliste" maintain their German citizenship even if they have renounced it.

According to West German law, not only German nationals but also persons of other nationality if they have ever held German citizenship, and their offspring (and under certain conditions, their spouses), are regarded as these "Germans." Thus, despite the fact that they are Poles, the whole Polish population born in the northern and western territories would, according to the West German regulations, be German.

Likewise, the second category of persons mentioned in article 116, paragraph 1 of the West German Constitution and defined as German has nothing in common with German nationality. The truth of the matter is that the principle criterion is the German nationality of the individual meeting the conditions laid in this article; however, the spouse of such an individual is also considered German, regardless of his or her actual nationaltiy. This part of article 116, paragraph 1 clearly demonstrates the territorial revisionism of West German legal formulas claiming that the German Reich, in its legal sense, still exists within its 31 December 1937 borders.

West German regulations on citizenship that for political needs define who is German, regardless of ethnic background, serve as justification for revisionist territorial claims on Poland.

#### "Formal Germans"

The claim that a German minority exists in Poland has no basis in fact. In the definition of modern international law supported by the United Nations, a national minority is a particular ethnic group settled in one region of a state (which includes an effort for some degree of autonomy) which is characterized by a strong sense of inner unity and preserves its own specific traits such as language, culture, etc. This group is a minority in relation to the other inhabitants of the state and does not place a leading role in that state.

The Germans who are claimed by the Federal Republic of Germany to be living in Poland and who constitute a real German national minority are so-called "formal Germans", recognized as such on the basis of revisionist legal regulations, but having nothing in common with German nationality. Thus, the claims of the West Germans are deprived of their basis for argument: the existence of a cohesive German population on Polish territory. The notion of a German minority is one of the elements of the Federal Republic of Germany's continuous efforts to question Polish sovereignty over the western and northern territories and the final, legal character of Poland's borders on the Oder and Neisse.

## Typical Economic Emmigration

The overwhelming majority of persons of German descent were removed from Poland in 1945-1950 on the basis of the Potsdam Agreement of 2 September 1945 (Section XIII). With respect to the stipulations of this agreement, the Allied Council for Control of Germany on 20 November 1945 laid a plan for the resettlement of 6,650,000 Germans: 3.5 million from Poland, 500,000 from Hungary, 2.5 million from Czechoslovakia and about 150,000 so-called Reichsdeutsche that had settled there after 1938. The removal of the German population from Poland was later ratified in the Polish-British Agreement of 14 February 1946 and the Polish-Soviet Agreement of 5 May 1946.

The decision to resettle German populations was made on the basis of historical experience: the role played by German minorities before World War II. It was also quite obvious that Hitler's genocidal policies over many years had made normal relations between a German minority and the Polish population impossible. It should also be remembered that most of the Germans fled the territory east of the Oder and Neisse in the face of an offensive by the Soviet and Polish armies and suffered great losses in so doing. The cause of this was the policy of Nazi administration which put off any evacuation until the end. The civil population was thus fleeing at the last moment from the approaching offensive, often crossing territories in which military actions were already in progress.

Polish legislation on the problem of Polish citizenship and normalization of the population in the western and northern territories has been found to be in total accordance with international legal standards, above all the decrees of the Potsdam Agreement. Following the escape of Germans from the Soviet and Polish offensive as well as during the resettlement from Poland of the remaining German population on the basis of the Potsdam Agreement, one of the main problems facing the Polish authorities in the western and northern territories was regulating the Polish citizenship of the native population. This was implemented by two laws: the 28 April 1946 law on citizenship in the new Polish state and the Polish nationality of Poles residing in the recovered lands and the 22 October 1947 law on the Polish citizenship of Poles living in the former Free City of Gdansk.

According to article 1 of the 1946 law, the conditions for Polish citizenship were: permanent residence in the recovered territories before 1 January 1945, verification of Polish nationality by a special commission, and a declaration of loyalty to the Polish nation and state. The 1946 law and the 1947 decree were above all supposed to aid in determining which persons (persons of German origin) were subject to resettlement from Poland under the terms of the Potsdam Agreement. If, on the other hand, the matter is one of certifying the Polish citizenship of the native Polish population in the western and northern territories, these laws were declarations of that citizenship. Native Polish nationality granted Polish citizenship at the moment that Poland took sovereignty over the western and northern lands, in accordance with the internationally-recognized principle that the citizenship of residents is automatically changed when the territory they inhabit changes sovereignty. The determination of persons eligible for Polish citizenship was concluded by the law of 8 August 1951.

It is a fact that a certain number of persons of German nationality (estimates are from 10,000 to 200,000 persons) remained in Poland following this period. The principles allowing these people to leave Poland were established in December 1955 by the Red Cross organizations of Poland and the German Federal Republic. It is generally believed that about 400,000 persons left Poland between 1955 and 1969. This is considerably more than the number of Germans that remained in Poland after 1951.

This data confirms the fact that there is no problem of a German minority in Poland, that almost all persons of German origin did leave Poland before 1969, and that the minimal number of them still remaining cannot pretend to be a national minority. Thus, during the 7 December 1970 negotiations, Poland very appropriately rejected West Germany's proposal for a special agreement on the problems of nationality. Since this problem did not actually exist, it was simply fabricated by West German revisionist legal formulas.

It must be added that, in the 1970's, according to the 18 November 1970 information of the Polish Government and the Official Record of 9 October 1975, about 200,000 persons left Poland for the Federal Republic of Germany. According to Polish research, the principal cause of emigration of these persons was not nationality but material reasons (thus, typical economic emigration).

Alois Mertes statements about the existence of a German national minority in Poland is thus another enterprise of the West German Government which, taking advantage of the worsening international situation and Poland's weakening international position, is conducting an increasingly active revisionist policy.

#### Mertes Equated With Goebbels

Warsaw RZECZYWISTOSC in Polish No 7, 12 Feb 84 p 7

[Article by Jerzy Pardus: "Mertes in the Role of the Fox"]

[Text] The 14 December 1983 statement by the Bonn minister of state for foreign affairs, Alois Mertes, has encountered sharp reaction from Polish journalists and the Polish Government. Mr Mertes is boldly trying to reactivate the old Prussian-Nazi doctrine of creating a "German national minority" in other countries for later use as an excuse to partition those countries. In accordance with the spirit of that doctrine, Mr Mertes has come up with a figure of more than a million Germans in Poland and is demanding their cultural autonomy and the freedom to worship in German. In essence, Mr Mertes has demanded so-called minority rights for a German minority that has been fabricated on the basis of Nazi-revisionist legal regulations. The roots and purposes of this political manipulation as well as its purposes has been laid bare by Waclaw Piatkowski, the first

and long-time Polish ambassador to the German Federal Republic (in the "Niepoprawni" ["The Incorrigible"] in RZECZYWISTOSC, no 4/84). Since this article went out to the printer, we have heard two other statements that cannot be passed over in silence.

#### An attempt at a Riposte

On 19 January 1984, Alois Mertes, visibly surprised at the sharp reaction of Polish public opinion, went on the counterattack over German Radio. In an interview with Jerzy Jedrzejewicz, he tried to make it seem as though he were retracting his previous statements while, in essence, he upheld them. He said: "I did not use the words 'German national minority' at all." He then explained: "The language of the German-Polish treaty (readers please note that that was not a German-Polish treaty, but a PRL-FRG, or, if you prefer, FRG-PRL treaty!) of 7 December 1970 does speak about persons of unquestionably German nationality. These words are used in their literal sense. In our colloquial language and in the language of the West German Constitution they are simply referred to as Germans. After all, the 7 December 1970 German-Polish treaty...has not led to a change in the constitution of the Federal Republic of Germany..."

What a wealth of problems from one single subject! First, there is the question of legal structures serving Prussian interests that was inherited by the Nazis (!) and then by their successors in the Federal Republic of Germany. Mertes says: "They are Germans according to our constitution." He is referring to persons who were forced to take citizenship in the Third Reich by the Nazis. Law is law, even if it is fascist law.

Furthermore, the 1949 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Germany states that the standards of home law may not contradict those of international law. The treaty between the Polish People's Republic and West Germany and the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe are undoubtedly standards of international law. Thus, West Germany's own domestic laws should meet these standards and its legal regulations should be in accordance with them. Meanwhile, even while the 7 December 1970 treaty was being ratified, the Bundestag became a battleground in which all of the parliamentary factions passed a resolution decrying the terms of the treaty. So what if this has no validity in international law if it is good enough for the political forces of the Federal Republic of Germany? Mertes looks like a Prussian Junker when he says: "The German-Polish treaty...has not led to any change in our constitution..."

Mertes also added with a sigh: "We do not intend to remain silent about our views of the truth. According to Polish law, those Germans possess Polish citizenship. I noted that clearly in my letter. In our opinion, they also have German citizenship in many cases and are thus both Polish and German nationals. This is possible under international law and is entirely normal." He later stated: "In this case, the German Federal Government refers to current international law (sic) which is laid out in the section on human rights in the Final Act of the CSCE and was also

signed by the Polish People's Republic. Real fulfillment of human rights also depends upon whether or not religion, as an especially intimate part of man's life, can be practiced in the native language along with education and cultural activity."

There is nothing to hide: "In many cases they [German minority members] also possess German citizenship" -- that is a very smooth formulation and a very broad one. Because he is a politician and wants to present a god-like image of himself to a Polish audience, Mertes does not say that West German law considers Poles who were involuntarily added to the Volksliste as citizens of the Third Reich to be citizens of the Federal Republic of Germany, that revisionist claims on Poland include property lost (left in Poland) by West German citizens and that these claims also include farms in the Zamosc region that were turned over to German ownership by the Nazis during World War II! After all, the German colonists did receive the property in accordance with law -- fascist law.

"I confess that I was the center of an 'international scandal'," said Alois Mertes." In the beginning of 1980, I led a delegation of Polish journalists on a visit to West Germany. At that time, our hosts offered us a meeting with Mertes. Being familiar with his publicly stated revisionist views, I refused to meet with him. I also turned down an interview with WE. Mertes then made an announcement to the DPA in which he stated with "indignation" that the Polish delegation has abused our hospitality by refusing to meet a representative of such an important political force."

With the passage of time, I have become convinced that my decision was a proper one. Mertes cannot be a discussion partner even if he so brazenly talks about "further improvement of German-Polish relations" or "deepening our trust in each other to overcome the ballast of history." Can he be serious? For Mertes, the ballast is the present status quo in Europe.

Is it not strange that Alina Grabowska spoke up in defense of Mertes in a Radio Free Europe broadcast at 8:10 pm on 22 January 1984? "Every unauthorized and meaningless statement is scrupulously noted (in Poland) and held up as an example of revisionism. The mass media in the Polish People's Republic has also deliberately ignored official pro-Polish Pledges made by these same circles and by social and political groups that do in fact determine the policies of the Federal Republic of Germany." Then she simply confirmed the old Goebbels notion that a lie repeated often enough becomes the truth: "There are 1 million persons of German descent in Poland. These figures are determined by West German legal regulations that legally recognize the German citizenship of the offspring of any family that has ever been considered German and that claim the right of the West German authorities to protect the rights of such persons." I have already described the regulations that she mentions. Ms Grabowska prefers to ignore this point and says: "These regulations were not adopted for any revisionist reasons." Innocently, she adds: "It must above all be emphasized that Mertes is just one of many Christian Democratic politicians who have always had a favorable attitude toward Solidarity." Grabowska concludes: "Problems of nationality have always been a sore point for communist regimes and an extremely sensitive

subject. They are the object of party political games and are used to build up hatred among citizens of the same state as well as those of neighboring countries.

"The idea of a united Christian republic of many peoples is just as alien and unappealing to the ruling circles of Poland as the theories of Marx and Rosa Luxemburg, even though they do carry them on their standards."

Thus speaks Grabowska in the role of spokesman for the "republic of many nations" -- which nations, she does not say, but it is not hard to guess. Grabowska in the role of follower of Marx and Luxemburg. Let us leave Grabowska, who says whatever she is told by the CIA and West German intelligence. Let us return to Mertes.

It is hard to say he is a fool. Why then the statement that he made? There are two possibilities: 1) Mertes took the role of a fox in an English hunt, with the calculation that the hounds and hunters will follow his tracks and not notice other moves by the Federal Republic of Germany; 2) He is drawing fire to test our strength, to find out how far principles can be stretched and what will be the reaction of the government and society to such outrageous ideas.

It is certain that the cast of West German characters is an old one in relation to Poland. This is what the establishment there wishes. Therefore, we cannot be naive.

#### Olszowski Voices Concern

Warsaw PERSPEKTYWY in Polish No 6, 10 Feb 84 pp 4,5,7

[Interview with Stefan Olszowski, minister of foreign affairs, by Jerzy Walasek: "A Policy To Meet the National Reason of State"]

[Text] The international situation is being followed with enormous concern by Polish society. Fears are being expressed everywhere at the growing tension between the East and West and the restrictions on Poland. How does foreign policy protect the vital interests of our nation and state? What part does it play in the actions for peace undertaken by the socialist state? These questions and others were answered for PERSPEKTYWY by PZPR Central Committee Politburo member and Foreign Affairs Minister Stefan Olszowski.

[Question] The year 1983 was a hard, almost dramatic year in international politics. The deployment in Western Europe of American middle-range rockets has brought about an entirely new situation. With the greatest alarm, millions of people around the world are asking what will happen next? How do you view this problem?

[Answer] It really was a difficult year. The imperialist forces and especially the United States have begun to implement plans aimed at changing the existing balance of forces both in Europe and on a global scale. This has been made especially clear in the deployment of the new American middle-range rockets in Western Europe. An aggressive NATO policy has become the direct cause of hinderance to an East-West dialogue and especially the disarmament talks that are so important to international peace. The numerous and constructive proposals made by the socialist states, and especially the Soviet Union, outlining the conditions necessary for a return to arms negotiations and their successful conclusion have gone unanswered. Political and military tensions have spilled over into other areas of international relations. Europe and the world stand before a real danger of global conflict.

However, the fate of Europe and the world is not going to be decided by the United States and its NATO allies alone. International security is being guaranteed by the peaceful policy of the states of the socialist community, the defense strength of the USSR and the Warsaw Pact nations, and the activity of all progressive, antiwar forces in the world which is being expressed in the movement protesting American rockets that is being joined by millions in Western Europe and the United States.

The consistent and constructive position being taken by the Warsaw Pact states has prevented the International dialogue from failing. The Madrid CSCE has been successful, though not without difficulty, in making it possible to continue the process started in Helsinki and at the Stockholm Conference, aimed at finding means to build trust and security in Europe and implement disarmament.

Thus, without underestimating the threat facing the world, we are finding justifications for careful optimism. We do not believe that war is inevitable. This conviction will be expressed by all of our actions in international contacts.

[Question] Poland and other states are following the CSCE with great interest. What are your conclusions and reflections on the conclusion of its beginning phase?

[Answer] The very fact that 34 foreign ministers have taken part in the conference shows the great importance that the participating nations attach to it. Likewise, the great interest shown by the public throughout the world at the opening of the conference shows the hope felt by people around the world for a successful outcome to the Stockholm Conference.

The majority of speeches made during the ministerial session were dominated by a feeling of deep alarm at the current state of international affairs, and a readiness to search for ways of reducing tension and building trust was declared. The adoption of very conciliatory rhetoric by the spokesmen of NATO states is not the result of any real changes in their policy. They want to soothe public opinion in their own countries and to persuade

the socialist states to accept the new military situation caused by NATO's intensive arms program and especially the deployment of new American middle-range rockets in Europe.

The USSR, Poland and other socialist states have opposed the NATO position by demanding that the situation which existed before the rocket deployment be restored and by proposing political and military enterprises of great importance to building trust in Europe.

I would like to emphasize that the diplomats and participants at the conference, the numerous representatives of the mass media present in Stockholm and the Swedish public well know and highly value the efforts of Poland to strengthen peace in Europe and achieve disarmament. On our part, we have repeatedly stressed that, as one of the initiators of the conference, we will try to make it a constructive and successful conference. We await a similar position from the NATO member states.

Following the so-called ministerial session, the conference in Stockholm is now entering a less speculative and more practical phase. The official positions presented at plenary sessions as well as those that have been spoken of at bilateral meetings and so-called lobby discussions now need careful examination. There is no doubt that the negotiations will be hard and long but their outcome will depend upon both the process of negotiations in Stockholm and the development of the general political situation in Europe.

[Question] The inaugural session of the Stockholm Conference was an occasion for numerous bilateral meetings. You, too, held discussions with the foreign affairs ministers of Western states. Can we expect to see these states change their position on the question of the restrictions on Poland?

[Answer] While we were in Stockholm, we held a series of talks with the foreign ministers of Denmark, Finland, France, Yugoslavia, Canada, the Federal Republic of Germany, Sweden, the Vatican and Italy. I feel that these talks served to present and explain positions on the international situation and bilateral relations. We also discussed affairs connected with the course and work of the conference.

The bilateral talks showed that many states are ready to improve their relations with Poland. The confirmation of this was the change in tone of official statements and the fact that this was the first such important international meeting in many years at which Polish affairs have not been publicly raised by other states. In this context, one must see that a series of settlements will be made on political contacts and some agreement reached on setting talks for economic, cultural and scientific cooperation. Nonetheless, we still see cases in which some of the Western European governments are pressured by Washington to slow down the pace of normalization. But, generally speaking, the West's approach to Poland's problems is becoming more realistic. The Stockholm talks have contributed to this.

[Question] We have touched to the greatest degree by the confrontational policy of the Americans. As a result of this, Polish and American relations have reached their lowest level ever. In connection with the fact that this policy has not achieved the desired results, can we expect any essential changes in Washington's policy?

[Answer] As we know, the present state of relations between Poland and the United States is the result of the policy of restrictions and other illegal and unfriendly moves that have been made by Poland against the United States since December 1981.

These attempts by the United States to interfere in the internal affairs of Poland, the initiation and conduct of an international propaganda campaign against our country, efforts to use Polish affairs as grounds for confrontation by the present American administration to undermine the Yalta and Potsdam agreements have led to the present crisis in relations between Poland and the United States.

The unilateral violation of contracts on air travel and fishing rights, the suspension of the most-favored trade status with the United States, the removal of credit guarantees, suspension of scientific and technical cooperation, blocking Poland's admission to the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank and other such moves break bilateral agreements and are obvious violations of international law.

Political restrictions were and still are calculated to pressure our government to change the sovereign course of Polish policy.

The destructive and anti-Polish policy of the United States has been assessed in many speeches by Gen Wojciech Jaruzelski and in a note sent by our government to the government of the United States on 3 November 1983 in which we pointed out that this course is a glaring contradiction of international law and the Helsinki principles of the Final Act of the CSCE.

It is an obvious fact for Washington as well that the restrictions have turned out to be a fiasco. This has brought about efforts to change the policy, such as President Reagan's recent decision to lift the ban on fishing in American waters and charter flights to the United States. These cosmetic measures cannot hide the fact that all of the key restrictions are still in force. Thus, the American policy on Poland has not undergone any real change. The announced measures are very narrow and fractional in nature. They cannot in any sense be regarded as important steps in the normalization of our relations.

Both the range and nature of these moves and the official announcements that accompanied them show that the American Government has not abandoned setting political conditions for Poland and that efforts to interfere in our affairs are being continued. The aggressive propaganda against Poland is continuing.

The position taken by our government in the 3 November 1983 note on the illegal and hostile acts against Poland and the principles of normalizing relations is still valid. We are demanding the suspension of all restrictions and the abandonment of other illegal actions in all areas of our relations. We are waiting for the American Government to take the necessary steps to remove the obstacles that Poland has suffered as a result of the American trade restrictions.

[Question] The USSR and other socialist states have unceasingly spoken out for a peaceful future. The entire history of the postwar period proves that the struggle to bring this vision to life will succeed only with our joined efforts. What actions will be taken by our alliance in the present situation?

[Answer] The fact that the peoples of Europe have been living in peace for 40 years and that they have managed to avoid the outbreak of a new world war is undoubtedly the result of a collective effort by the nations of the socialist community. The effectiveness of our policy depends upon us uniting in a solid front to defend the interests of our own people and of mankind in general.

The socialist states have not only spoken out for peace. They also possess a concrete program for bringing this about. This program was included in the January 1983 Prague Declaration of the Political Advisory Committee of the Warsaw Pact States, the announcement of a meeting of seven heads of European socialist states held in Moscow in June of last year and in a communique from the Sofia session of the Committee of Foreign Affairs Ministers of the Warsaw Pact States.

The socialist states are calling on the United States and NATO to give up their course of confrontation aimed at disturbing the balance of military forces for their own advantage. We completely support the Soviet Union's position, as expressed by Yuri Andropov in his 25 January 1983 interview with PRAVDA. The Soviet Union's position expresses not only the interests of the socialist states but of all European nations that feel that the preservation of peace is most important.

The socialist countries take the position that the threat of war must be turned back by the implementation of a set of Soviet proposals to limit and eventually liquidate nuclear arms. If all of the nuclear powers were to take the responsibility of denouncing first use of nuclear weapons, it would be an enormous positive achievement.

Propositions to freeze military expenditures and to ban the use of chemical weapons from Europe are a major part of the Wardaw Pact package of peace initiatives. A proposal to conclude a Warsaw Pact-NATO agreement to avoid the use of arms and preserve peaceful relations has received special attention. A constructive NATO attitude toward this initiative would do much to heal existing international tensions.

In advancing their broad program for defending peace, the states of the socialist community are aware that it cannot be realized if the present equilibrium of forces is disrupted. We have always believed that this equilibrium must be kept on the lowest possible level. However, in the face of the arms race that the United States has forced upon the world, the nations united within the political and defensive Warsaw Pact are being forced to take real measures to protect themselves.

[Question] It is an obvious fact that we cannot look at our European problems as something separate from the problems in other parts of the world. The U. S. Marine intervention in Grenada, the threat to Nicaragua and Cuba and Israeli-American aggression in Lebanon cannot but have an effect upon the general world atmosphere. What view does the Polish Government take of these events?

[Answer] American aggression in various parts of the world, and especially in Central America and the Near East, are an integral part of their policy of confrontation and the arms race. Along with other global confrontational actions of the United States, this has led to a dangerous sharpening of the international situation and threatens world peace. Recent statements by representatives of the U. S. administration show that the American policy of confrontation will be maintained in all spheres and regions. This means that local conflicts may continue or even intensify.

Like the rest of the United States' continual and ever stronger policy of confrontation, the American invasion of Grenada, calculated to destabilize the Nicaraguan government, and the constant U.S. threat to Cuba are nothing more than the fulfillment of a plan to remove progressive governments from the political panorama of the American continent and also a warning against any attempts to change reactionary and obsolete social and political structures.

Poland has unanimously condemned the brutal act of aggression against Grenada and is in full solidarity with fraternal socialist Cuba and Nicaragua in their struggle to establish lasting peace and stability in Central America and guarantee in this region the right of peoples to choose their own road to development and defense of their territorial integrity and sovereignty.

In the Near East, the United States is openly giving Israel political and military support for its aggressive and expansionist policy against Arab nations. The coordination between Washington and Tel-Aviv has been especially clearly illustrated in the development of events in Lebanon, especially the forcing of a Lebanese-Israeli agreement contrary to the interests of the Lebanese people and the Arab world. Through its direct military involvement in this country, the United States has ended up taking a side in the conflict rather than mediating a solution. The same applies to the whole Near Eastern conflict. The development of events there has confirmed the 1983 Warsaw Pact Prague Declaration's assessment of ways to control the conflict, such as the convening of an international conference of all interested parties, including the Palestine Liberation Organization.

[Question] I would like to bring up Polish-West German relations at this point. There are many elements in our mutual relations lately that have alarmed Polish public opinion. In light of the many statements and utterances that have been made, could one say that the present Bonn government does not feel bound to the 7 December 1970 treaty?

[Answer] Indeed, Polish public opinion has cause for alarm at the increasing number of many such phenomena in Bonn politics that do not bode well for our country. For understandable reasons, relations with the Federal Republic of Germany have an important place in our foreign policy. These relations can only be developed on the basis of the 7 December 1970 treaty in which the FRG finally recognized our western borders on the Oder and Neisse and pledged itself to "unconditionally respect the territorial integrity" of Poland. The treaty also contains the stipulation that no territorial claims of any sort are to be raised "now or in the future."

For some time now we have observed an increase in the FRG of revisionist tendencies, territorial claims, fabrication of artificial problems and anti-Polish sentiments. Some representatives of the Bonn government have joined the choir of professional nationalists who openly question the final character of our western borders. They are also trying to claim authority for the welfare of a German minority in Poland that they have themselves fabricated.

Phenomena and tendencies of this sort, harmful to the climate and substance of our relations, are a hindrance to normalization, make it difficult to return to a dialogue and destabilize the situation in Europe. I cannot help but point out that, as a consequence of the deployment of the new generation of American rockets on West German soil, the risk of war and nuclear devastation has been increased. This is not a matter of indifference to us and will have an influence upon our mutual relations and the European situation. During my last meeting with Vice Chancellor and Foreign Affairs Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher, I pointed out these facts.

I would like to express my hope that the political leadership of the Federal Republic of Germany will take action to return the process of normalizing its relations with Poland on the basis of the 7 December 1970 treaty. I say this in reference to repeated declarations that have been made by the highest politicians of the FRG, including H.D. Genscher, who told me in Stockholm that the West German Government continues to be guided in its policies on Poland by the 7 December 1970 treaty and wants to continue the normalization of our relations.

We accept this statement and also await concrete moves to improve Polish-German relations.

[Question] How are the basic interests of our state and people being protected by our foreign policy? How is foreign policy established?

[Answer] Congresses of the PZPR and its allied parties are most important in setting a foreign policy. The main directions and trends in the realm of

foreign policy are annually reviewed by the Sejm, the leadership of the political parties and the Council of Ministers. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs frequently provides information on various aspects of foreign policy to the Sejm Foreign Affairs Commission.

I would like to emphasize that foreign policy, next to the state's defense policy, has not suffered crises nor has it been twisted or turned. We have kept complete faith with our alliance's policies. In the entire 40-year history of the Polish People's Republic, our foreign policy has had the support of the people because it has always met the nation's reasons of state.

Recent years that have given our government so much experience have confirmed the profound appropriateness and permanence of the foreign policy principles of the Polish People's Republic. Next to continuing normalization of life in our country, consistent realization of these principles is especially important now in view of the threat presented us by the aggressive policies of imperialist circles, especially the United States, and has enabled us effectively to resist the efforts that I have already described to isolate Poland from the international community. This constancy is a source of satisfaction and, even more importantly, has made it possible to determine precisely the missions of Polish foreign policy that will promote further growth and strengthen Poland's position in the world. The PZPR Central Committee Politburo and the presidiums of the United Peasant Party Supreme Committee and Democratic Party Central Committee stressed this point at a recent joint session.

We are continually developing our fraternal ties to the Soviet Union and the entire community of socialist states. As experience has taught us, this is what guarantees Poland her proper position in the world.

As General Wojciech Jaruzelski said: "The national interests of our country, the socialist character of our state as well as our alliance with the Soviet Union and the other states of our community forms a solid, organic whole. It is the basis of bases for our reasons of state. Poland's security, the inviolability of her borders, can only be protected within the Warsaw Pact. We are safely allied with friends."

We will consistently make our contributions to the cause of fulfilling the Warsaw Pact's comprehensive program of constructive, peaceful initiatives and in this way act against current dangers. With these as our guidelines, we support the peaceful undertakings of the Soviet Union.

As I have already said, we cannot but perceive that, as the NATO arms race increases its tempo, more attacks are made by official representatives of its member nations on the territorial and political status quo in Europe that was established at Yalta and Potsdam, by treaty and the Final Act of the Conference on European Security.

Another important principle of Polish foreign policy is to create favorable conditions for overcoming the economic crisis and its negative consequences.

What I have said obviously does not exhaust the full catalog of foreign policy, rather, these are matters of special importance. Thus, to an important degree, good realization of the tasks before our state and people is subject to the effectiveness of our activity in the international arena.

[Question] At the end of the 1970's, we were neglecting our relations with developing countries. Cooperation with them turned out to be little influenced by business cycles. Looking at the course of your visits to nations of Africa, Asia and South America, this cooperation has become a permanent element of our policy.

[Answer] Relations with developing countries have acquired a new dimension in the past 2 years. These countries did not break off the political dialogue with us or put restrictions on economic cooperation after the introduction of martial law. They are promising partners for mutually beneficial political and economic cooperation called for in plans such as the program outlining the development of economic cooperation with developing countries until 1990 that the Presidium of the Government adopted in June of last year. We share many common interests and points of view with these countries. I became convinced of this during the previously-mentioned visits. The support given to Polish initiatives for building up trust in international economic relations proves this point. The developing countries are our natural allies in the struggle for peace and security and are opposed with us to the imperialistic understanding of the world and international relations. This feeling of solidarity was confirmed at a New York meeting of heads of state called by Indira Gandhi, the chairman of the Nonaligned Nations Movement. The chairman of the Council of State of the Polish Peoples' Republic, Henryk Jablonski, also participated in this conference.

Smooth growth of cooperation with the developing nations has become a permanent element of our foreign policy.

[Question] We have heard about different plans to increase international contacts.

[Answer] Our international contacts will serve to realize the goals of Polish foreign policy that I have already discussed.

We will be placing special value on contacts with our fraternal socialist states, especially the Soviet Union. We feel that the terms of these contacts are an important prerequisite to the fulfillment of the domestic tasks we face and also one of the foundations for maintaining peace and safety in the world. For this reason, our active participation in the Warsaw Pact and CEMA has received high priority.

I have already spoken about our relations with developing nations. The further enrichment of these relations requires more intense activity on the part of our foreign service and the development and strengthening of contacts on various levels of state and social activity, especially with nations that are realizing a socialist conception of development.

We are, as always, believers in maintaining a broad dialogue and cooperation with all nations, especially the developing nations and socialist states. This does, however, demand that, in our international relations, we observe such elementary principles as sovereignty, the preservation of national borders, noninterference in the internal affairs of other nations and honoring our obligations. It would be hard to avoid mentioning again that the danger posed by the confrontational policies of the NATO states has made the development of normal contacts very difficult.

The year 1984 will be richer in contacts, but this will require great effort and a feeling of responsibility on the part of everyone who must bring these contacts into being.

12261  
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POLAND

BAKA SPEAKS FOR REFORM, DISMISSES 'NOT' CHARGES AS 'DEMAGOGUERY'

Arena of 'Political Struggle'

Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 8 Mar 84 supplement REFORMA GOSPODARCZA p 1

[Editorial commentary by Wladyslaw Baka, government commissioner for economic reform: "The Social Test of the Reform"]

[Text] Working out the assumptions of economic reform was not an easy task. Transforming the assumptions into a system of legal regulations, laws, orders and instructions regulating the functioning of the economy required a great intellectual and organizational effort. But the most difficult task is that of putting reform into effect, ensuring that all of its principles are understood and supported, and that above all they influence the way that people, groups of people, organizations and institutions think. On the one hand, taking into account the stereotypes of thinking, habits and practice, as well as the interests, and on the other hand the deep transformations which reform brings into the socioeconomic system, it is not difficult to see that its application into the realities of everyday life will create the greatest resistance, and even counteraction. And this should not be surprising to anyone. Nor should this be discouraging to participation in reform. The price that society would have to pay in the future for not instituting reform would be far greater than the concerns connected with a change in "society's way of life".

Today we are confronted with a kind of social test of the reform. It is being said tersely that its principles "encroach on the payroll", that more and more they exert an influence on the situations of individual people and entire social groups. This direct contact with reform is not always pleasant, taking into account the tragic aspects of the economic situation that we inherited after the 1970's and the period of great revindications. Let us add also that a large part of the society was disillusioned with reform because it expected that immediately after it was applied the economic difficulties in our country would be eliminated. Of course, nothing like that could have happened and the government never promised anything like that. But this is a social fact which must be considered, especially since the real test is still ahead of us.

The social testing of reform is being made difficult not only by the drastically unfavorable economic conditions. The task is also not being made easy by the political struggle which is taking place in our country. It is a peculiar

paradox, often encountered in history, that both kinds of people met on the common front against reform: the sworn enemies of socialism, and the people who left and right bandy slogans in defense of socialism and who dream of a return to the old, "proven" methods of managing the economy. They count on the fact that the public will forget, that economic information and knowledge will be lacking in society, and they importunately attempt to promote the mendacious thesis that the reconstruction of the system of the functioning of the economy is the cause of the difficulties that are occurring. And these circumstances, too, should be taken into account in the social process of the implementation of reform.

Baka Press Conference

Warsaw TRYBUNA LUDU in Polish 13 Mar 84 pp 1, 4

[Article by Andrzej Leszczynski: "The Government Commissioner's Seven Theses; the Social Test of the Reform"]

[Text] Never before have economic problems been presented as broadly, comprehensively and precisely as in the "Directions of Economic Reform", a document which is an integral part of the party's Ninth Extraordinary Congress' resolutions. Following is the first of the seven theses which Prof Wladyslaw Baka, the government commissioner for economic reform, presented at a press conference held 12 March 1984 in the government press office.

The "Directions of Economic Reform", Professor Baka said, contain 130 points, but the number which have not yet been dealt with, or were not dealt with in their entirety, can be counted on the fingers of one hand. Hence the second thesis: We have lost no time in the field of economic reform since the Ninth Congress.

The third thesis is as follows: It is easier to create a law than to enforce its principles in practice. This pertains to economic reform which received legislative sanction, but which in no way indicates that this reform was put into effect.

There is no doubt that a real influence of reform on economic life is becoming more and more evident. This successive thesis is documented by the indicators of economic growth in 1982, and especially in 1983.

As management improved, and also as a result of experience obtained, it was necessary to make systems-type corrections. That was the fifth thesis. Last years corrections were aimed at:

--increasing effectiveness, weakening inflation, strengthening the incentive factors for work by the enterprises and every worker, and stimulating scientific and technical progress.

The sixth thesis reads as follows: The modifications that are made open up a new stage in the implementation of economic reform, a stage in which systems solutions are identical, or more approximate, than in past years, to the ultimate solutions.

And finally, what determines the further, correct process of the implementation of reform? First, Professor Baka replied, it is essential that economic equilibrium be attained, because without this, in time, the mechanisms of reform can break down. Second, reform must pass the social test which has just begun. This means that we must be able to endure the negative reactions to the principles of the so-called "hard money" policy now being introduced, and sometimes to the new wage principles. Economic reform is now undergoing a social test, the minister said.

Many of the questions asked by the journalists reflected an anxiety about the inadequate development of production, foreign trade, small deliveries of consumer goods to the market, and an incorrect investment structure.

More attention should be given to the question as to whether the letter by W. Jurewicz from NOT [Chief Technical Organization], published recently in TRYBUNA LUDU, strikes at the government's policies and as such should receive an official government reply. Prof Baka said that there is no need for the government to react to every publication, however much against reform it may be. If this were done, the commissioner said, it could create something of a protective shield around reform.

And, after all, reform cannot live under a shield, the professor said. The government presented its position on the proposals coming from the NOT activists during the middle of last year, when they were discussed at a meeting of the Commission for Economic Reform and were deemed to be incompatible with the directions of reform. The government's position on this matter was then fully documented in the press.

I see no need for the government to speak out on this subject again. But there is no doubt that all kinds of demagogic, tendentious attacks on reform, unsupported by proof, should be opposed in the press.

Prof Baka said that a report on the application and functioning of economic reform in 1983 is now being prepared. It will be discussed in April at a forum of the Commission on Reform and at a government meeting and will then be sent to the Sejm where it will be the object of broad public discussion.

#### Erratum to Press Conference Story

Warsaw TRYBUNA LUDU in Polish 14 Mar 84 p 5

[Continuation by Andrzej Leszczynski]

[Text] There were some questions on my report of the press conference with Prof W. Baka, government commissioner on economic reform, published in TRYBUNA LUDU on 13 March 184. I was asked to be more specific about that portion in which last year's proposals by NOT activists on the issue of economic reform were mentioned. Therefore, I will return to this matter.

Minister W. Baka said at the aforementioned conference that the proposals presented by the NOT activists were discussed at a meeting of the Commission for

Economic Reform, which deemed them to be incompatible with the directions of reform. A report of the commission's meeting and a list of the differences between the NOT proposals and the directions of reform were published in the July issue of the supplement to RZECZPOSPOLITA, REFORMA GOSPODARCZA. Thus it was not the government, but the Commission for Economic Reform which criticized the proposals of the NOT activists.

Let us recall that both last year, as well as recently through St. Albinowski's writing, we polemicized with the ideas of the NOT activists. This position does not mean that we will not publish various opinions on a subject as important as economic reform.

#### Additional Details on Press Conference

Warsaw ZYCIE GOSPODARCZE in Polish No 13, 25 Mar 84 p 2

[Article by Tomasz Jeziorski: "An Attempt at an Accounting"]

[Text] It is rare for the central figure in a press conference to enter a Government Press Office hall, filled with journalists, alone. As a rule, he is followed by a retinue of advisers, experts and other co-workers. Minister Wladyslaw Baka entered the hall on 12 March 1984 solo, although common sense would have dictated that he in particular should be accompanied by a large group which would ensure him the appropriate resistant firepower. It is not news that the issue of the degree and methods of applying reform is a subject on which journalists have a good many critical comments. And it was this conference which was to be devoted to an attempt to make an accounting of 2 years of economic reform.

However, the commissioner proposed something other than the expected plane of discussion. "Let us not assess individual mechanisms and their results; there will be time for this when the next report on reform is prepared. However, let us give some thought to the implementation of reform in the context of 'Directions' and the resolutions of the Ninth PZPR Congress."

Seven theses, formulated by the commissioner, were to serve as the starting point for the discussion:

1. Several attempts have been made to reform the economy in People's Poland, but the present attempt has, for the first time, been so widely, deeply and at the same time accurately reflected in the resolutions of the party Congress. This fact is not only significant politically, but also practically. The concreteness of the entries contained in "Directions", which is the official document of the Ninth Congress, and in the resolution itself, makes it possible to control the course of the application of reform.
2. The "Directions" contain 130 points, and those areas which reform has not touched at all, or where solutions other than those planned have been applied, can be counted on the fingers of one hand.

3. The past 2 years confirm the old experience that it is easier to define courses of action, to create a new law, than to implement, and especially to enforce them in practice. Decrees in and of themselves settle nothing, since they come up against fixed habits and collide with solidly entrenched interest groups. If we say, therefore, that reform is a social process, then it may be acknowledged that this process ends successfully when reform, and strictly speaking, its rules of actions, become a way of life for society.

4. The statistical depiction of the last 2 years, and particularly of last year, confirms the positive influence of reform on the economy. The favorable indicators reflect the obvious growth of the adaptiveness of independent enterprise to very difficult management conditions, especially in the area of imports (see the Commission for Economic Reform report, pp 1-7). The growth of production over and above the plan, at a lower-than-planned import, refutes the thesis that our economy cannot function without import.

An increased adaptiveness is also seen in the area of market equilibrium. During times of relative equilibrium, i.e., in the 1970's, the ratio of increase of deliveries of goods and services to the market, to the increase of the population's incomes was 0.95, and fell to 0.75 in 1981. But already in the following year this ratio improved (0.85), and last year it was 0.90, i.e., close to normal.

5. Many modifications to the mechanisms of reform were made in the first 2 years of reform, which, of course, was justified by the very difficult conditions, but this also destabilized the economy of the enterprises. The period of systems-stabilization began with this year. The enterprises are able to make longer-range plans, which is something they have been demanding for 2 years.

6. The recent modifications bring reform closer to its ultimate form. Reform was to have brought an increase in efficiency and because of this the recent systems changes were made, making it more difficult for unearned money to flow to the enterprises. These changes are significant also because they deprived the opponents of reform of the argument that reform mechanisms are crisis-producing and inflationary.

7. If we accept the thesis that the econo-financial system is almost optimal under present conditions, then it is obvious that reform will be successful to the degree that economic policy, or the selection of instruments and methods of using them, will also have as its main goal the restoration of equilibrium. Without wide-scale economic equilibrium, reform will break down. Therefore, this is the first condition for its success.

The second condition lies in the social character of reform. Through the law on wage experiments, reform encroaches on the payroll, and thus faces the most difficult social test. We must expect that the result of this test will be favorable, but we must also be aware that the test will be difficult, that there will be counteraction to the enforcement of the rigors of efficiency. Consistency and firmness of resistance to such counteraction was never our strong point.

Our approach to bankruptcies and incentive systems will be a kind of litmus test. Either we will show determination and readiness to withstand local dissatisfaction in the name of efficiency and striving for equilibrium, or we will yield the next time and continue to finance extreme inefficient and uneconomical management and allow wages to grow without commensurate efficiency.

From the questions, rejoinders and unspoken reactions to questions, we can conclude that the journalists do not see the course of the application of reform as being as favorable, and the assessment of the future as optimistic, as presented by the commissioner. In reporting the discussion, we are concentrating, in accordance with the plane of the discussion, on questions of a fundamental nature.

First, the criterion contained in the second thesis was questioned. The fact is that it is not the number of laws that were passed that is important, but to what degree the functioning of the economy was democratized, for that is the essence of reform. From this viewpoint it must be stated that the process of reform has progressed very weakly. The fear that equilibrium will be reached through democratization of decisionmaking and economic processes is stronger than the will to reform, and the principle of "something for something" is not functioning properly, since self-dependence and self-management are limited (as an illustration, the story of the 1,800 directors appointed without competition, was cited).

The commissioner did not agree with this assessment. It may be said, he announced, that three premises are necessary for reform: an economic situation, social pressure, and political will. During the attempt at reform after 1956, the economic situation was relatively good, social pressure was quite strong, and there was no political will. There was no reform. In 1973 the economic situation was unusually favorable, there was no social pressure, and the political will was weak. Reform was begun, it is true, but it was quickly abandoned. At the beginning of the 1980's the economic situation is clearly unfavorable, social pressure is enormous, and the political will is strong. And it is no accident that especially now, in the area of reform we have made the greatest progress.

We may ask, Minister Baka continued, whether these two factors, which appear to be decisive, i.e., political will and social pressure, will always appear. A positive answer would conflict with the laws of dialectics. Both of these factors are strongly interrelated. In particular, the influence of social pressure on the political will should not be treated lightly, nor should it be forgotten that the economic situation has a definite influence on the strength of social pressure. In this light, the pessimist may complain that the ranks of the advocates of reform have shrunk, but the realist will be happy that the quality of those who stay with reform has improved. The naive, who believed in miracles, have left, Minister Baka noted, in my opinion, not too happily, because this opinion, as few others, can be looked at in many different ways.

The example of the directors, Baka added, is true, but this belongs to the past. In 1983, of 78 directors appointed by the workers' councils, 78 came through competition, and out of 165 appointed by founding organs, 133 were brought in through competition (80 percent).

Other journalists called attention to the fact that the prospects of reform appear to be dismal and arguments are increasingly brought up about the natural conflict between a planned economy and market mechanisms and between the planned nature of a socialist economy and the independence of the enterprises. We see also the dangerous aspect of the instrumental treatment of reform as one of many equiponderant priorities, although this should be the chief priority, for economic and political reasons.

On the first point, the commissioner reminded that "Directions" very clearly define the scope of the "marketiveness" of reform and from the theoretical standpoint, the elements of the market are harmoniously linked to the planning principle. All of this was recorded in the Congress resolution after a long discussion and there is no sense now in returning to the question as to whether and to what degree a socialist economy can afford market elements. However, we already have practical proof from the past on the efficiency of directive-type planning, and we know that this system does not ensure economic efficiency but only the availability of people and a scourge of objective impossibilities. And so there is no other way than to socialize planning, and conformance of the central plan with the enterprises' plans must be achieved through talks and negotiations between equal partners, and not through orders.

Minister Baka agreed with the comment that reform is being treated instrumentally. Our reform cannot be treated like this. After all, it is not based only on defining the instruments by which goals are achieved, but also, if not primarily, on a totally new method of reaching these goals and defining them. It is this especially which allows us to talk about a reform of the system for the functioning of the economy and the state. Unfortunately, reform is not seen in this light often enough, which threatens that its deepest meaning is being obliterated.

It would be surprising if at a meeting organized at precisely this moment the matter of the successive attack by some of the NOT leadership on reform were not brought up, and in a manner which suggests an attack on the political line delineated for the government by the Ninth Congress and the Sejm. Thus the "Open Letter", written by Dr (engineer) W. Jurewicz (together with the referral letter of the NOT president, A. Kopec) published by TRYBUNA LUDU on 28 February 1984, produced a question as to the government leadership's political position on this.

Replying to the question, the commissioner, member of the Council of Ministers presidium, said that neither the presidium nor the Council of Ministers has concerned itself with this issue. Last summer the Commission for Economic Reform, of which the premier, as we know, is the chairman, took a clear and definite position on the NOT ideas, defining the leadership themes of this organization as being in glaring conflict with the documents of the party's Ninth Congress. "There is no sense, therefore, in coming out officially against such viewpoints and raising their standing by the very fact of having high echelons concern themselves with them."

Particularly because I personally, Prof Baka added, am not an advocate of repressing discussion about reform. Reform can defend itself with facts, without

establishing a protective zone around it. But the social influence of certain opinions is something else, he continued. It is hard to deny that those about whom we are talking not only are not close to the subject but they are also carrying a large load of cheap demagoguery. This demagoguery relies on the difficulties which our economy is experiencing for known reasons, but also on a certain kind of social amnesia. We know, of course, that people rarely compare conditions today with conditions of the past, but more often with those which in their opinion should be. Such thinking is an impetus for development, but when cleverly, and actually demagogically employed, breeds frustration.

There was another group of questions and doubts expressed as to progress in the reform of the economy based on structural stagnation, highly negative trends in investment, anti-market disintegration, the raised coefficient of correction for FAZ (Vocational Activization Fund), etc.

After all, it is no accident, it was said, that of 111 products covered by government orders only 29 of them are market products, that 85 percent of investment outlays last year went for preservation of structures from the 1970's, that in the marine economy, for example, many sectors producing means of production received an FAZ coefficient of 0.65, while, for example, the canned fish industry had to be satisfied with a basic coefficient of 0.5. And so on. How, in this context, can we be satisfied with reform, it was asked.

Well, it appears that it is possible to be satisfied, on condition that a distinction is made between the instrumental part of reform and economic policy. "I maintain that not much wrong can be found with the present set of instruments, but if they are not being used correctly the blame lies elsewhere," the commissioner said. The instruments do not show who is supposed to get reductions, who is supposed to get the higher coefficients of correction, or the higher minimum scales, or who is supposed to get the higher or lower amortization allowances, etc. Those are questions of economic policy. Economic policy determines goals and priorities and has a full range of instruments for their implementation. To blame reform for lack of progress in the restructurization of the economy and production is entirely without foundation.

The culmination of this otherwise-correct explanation was the comment by one of the journalists on the great resistance on the part of the organs of state administration--the implementers of government policy--to reform, of which the best proof is the unlawful decision by the Minister of the Machine Engineering Industry in the case of the "Hydromat" director in Warsaw.

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POLAND

MILITIA OFFICIAL DISCUSSES WARSAW CRIME

AU030745 Warsaw ZYCIE WARSZAWY in Polish 30 Mar 84 pp 1, 2

[Interview with Colonel Edward Klosowski, head of the Warsaw Office of Internal Affairs by Teresa Gawerska: "About Thefts, Burglaries, and Robberies"--date and place not given]

[Excerpts] [Gawerska] Colonel, let us talk about thefts, burglaries, and robberies. Society feels that the crime rate involving the above types of crime in Warsaw is high and rising. Do you agree?

[Klosowski] The rise has been halted this year, but the number of crimes is very high, twice the national average.

[Gawerska] Are you talking about all the abovementioned crimes?

[Klosowski] Of course. I would point out, however, that crimes motivated by gain--breaking into public and private premises, theft of private property, and robberies--constitute over 70 percent of all crimes.

[Gawerska] Can you illustrate this with figures?

[Klosowski] Over 58,000 crimes were noted last year, in other words, almost 14 percent more than in the preceding year. Burglaries of private apartments and other premises went up by as much as 20 percent, in other words, by 15,000. The number of thefts also rose, most frequently involving cars and their contents. The number of robberies went up from 696 to 822, especially the number of assaults inside apartments, whose victims are usually elderly people, people who live alone, and people who are regarded as affluent. However, there were less burglaries in state buildings (a drop from 5,786 to 5,026).

[Gawerska] And what is the effectiveness of investigation?

[Klosowski] About 89-92 percent of crimes involving a threat to life and health, in other words assault and battery, are solved. Some 31 to 55 percent of thefts and robberies are solved, and 90 percent of economic crimes. Last year, officials of the Warsaw Office of Internal Affairs apprehended perpetrators of 11,000 burglaries, thefts, and robberies, in other words, over 900 more than in 1982. The value of property recovered and seized by the militia was 411 million zlotys.

[Gawerska] Has the "law concerning conduct toward people avoiding work" reduced the number of persons who are hopeful of dishonest gains?

[Klosowski] I feel that the law is not a very effective instrument, at least so far. I will give an example. Five hundred and sixty people have been assigned work for a social cause, but only 56 of them have started working.

[Gawerska] I believe the cause of crime deserves a separate interview. Therefore, I have avoided this subject, as well as the problem of social pathology, both of which are on the increase and which give birth to crime.

[Klosowski] Fine. So, what characterizes our activity? Daily systematic harassment of criminal elements. That is the first thing. The second is that additional Citizens' Militia posts have been set up in order to try and improve security. Militiamen have been on 24-hour duty in 46 posts throughout the city as of 2 March. Therefore, one knows that there is always a militiaman in a given place at any time of day or night who will come rushing to help if necessary.

[Gawerska] Are these posts in the open air?

[Klosowski] For the time being, yes. But in time we will set up small shelters to offer protection against changes in the weather.

[Gawerska] Where are these posts located?

[Klosowski] The district offices of internal affairs have the addresses. If necessary, and if our personnel capabilities permit, the number of posts will be increased. A motorized patrol unit will commence work in the second quarter of the year, which will certainly make quicker intervention possible. We have also increased the number of night street patrols as of March.

[Gawerska] You mentioned the systematic harassment of criminals. The first results of this are already visible this year. Please give examples.

[Klosowski] During 2 months of this year, the number of crimes was 500 less than a year ago. During one operation alone, carried out in late February and early March, our functionaries seized goods worth over 20 million zlotys, found 29 stolen cars, detained 53 persons who were on the wanted list, and referred 560 cases to penal-administrative commissions. I will say nothing about regular checks at drinking joints and visits by our employees to markets, fairs, and automobile sales.

[Gawerska] So on what note can we end the interview?

[Klosowski] I will repeat what I have already indicated. We will systematically harass criminals and speculators. The work of the people in the office of which I am head and of everyone who helps us is meant to make an honest citizen feel safe.

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POLAND

PZPR CONFERENCE RECORD RATED IN ECONOMIC AFFAIRS WEEKLY

Warsaw ZYCIE GOSPODARCZE in Polish No 13, 25 Mar 84 pp 1, 3

[Article by SC: "After the National Conference of PZPR Delegates: What Is Behind Us, What Is Before Us"]

[Text] The highest party forum during the period between congresses concluded a 3-day conference. An analysis was made of the changes and evaluations of party work during the 1000 days that passed since the Ninth Extraordinary PZPR Congress. Documents adopted by the conference are an expression of this analysis and evaluation. In the resolution, delegates recognized "that the Central Committee is working according to the resolutions of the Ninth Congress, and is acting in the spirit of socialistic renewal, a spirit of strengthening socialism in Poland. The party is successfully realizing the great tasks connected with the process of overcoming the crisis and creating bases for further socialistic development of our country." In the declaration, "What We Are Fighting For, What Our Goals Are," in "Materials for Discussion of the PZPR Program," and in other documents, an outline was presented of the immediate and more distant tasks of the party, the prospects of resolving serious difficulties that continue, and visions of necessary social and economic changes.

The general approval of what we have achieved thus far did not mean at all that the delegates do not see numerous weaknesses, that they are not taking a sharp, critical look at the work of many centers in the party, the administration, and the economy. Conference discussions fully confirmed the statement contained in the paper of the Politburo: "The most dramatic is behind us, the most difficult before us."

This most difficult pertains also, and perhaps most of all, to the economy. Overcoming the trend toward a drop in production and national income is only the beginning of the road. Not by accident did Wojciech Jaruzelski, first secretary of the Central Committee, put in first place in a list of tasks confronting us the final victory over the economic crisis and overcoming shortages, worries of everyday life. The main trump in achieving this task is economic reform. There is nothing strange, therefore, in its assuming a dominant role in the plenary discussion and in discussions of the third conference assembly on problems.

The resolutions of the Ninth Congress include the following: "The Congress recognizes that it is an obligation of the party, its responsibility with respect to all of society, to inculcate economic reforms in the shortest possible time. Carrying out reforms is the basic condition for success of the program to overcome the crisis and to create foundations for the social-economic development of Poland. The reform must be compatible with the basic precepts of the socialistic social-economic system.

"The fundamental goal of reform is to ensure a high social effectiveness of management. Realizing this goal requires that planning be socialized, that is, that the participation of all social centers in forming the development program be broadened, and conditions be created for self-dependence and self-government of enterprises operating on the principles of self-financing."

The party assumed the responsibility of inculcating reforms not only "in the shortest possible time," but also under exceptionally difficult conditions. As far as the economy is concerned, these conditions have been adequately described on more than one occasion, and there is no need describe them again. At the same time, contrary to what is frequently said, social conditions were not at all uniformly favorable. We sometimes forget that the first year of the reform was also the year when the results of the crisis became fully apparent; it was the year of a serious decline in living conditions and in consumption. Despite these difficulties, the process of change in the functioning of the economic system was initiated immediately after the development of and obtaining social acceptance for the basic principles of the reform and adopting the necessary resolutions. This does not mean, however, that we may have skipped over (or that we are at present skipping over) or taken lightly the existing, unfavorable conditions. Economic conditions have the attributes that they exist in the real sphere, that they have concrete dimensions, and that they cannot be by-passed. Social conditions have a different character: they require different methods of study and different methods for dealing with them. They arise from various interests of groups, levels and classes. The arbiter of these interests, the guarantor that the interests of the working class will be considered first, is the party.

The goal of the reform is an increase in the efficiency of management. We have no other road for achieving an increase in production and improvement in living conditions of society. Many factors contribute to high efficiency, but under our present conditions, the decisive and practically only factor is better work on the part of the enterprises. The task of the reform is the creation in the sphere of regulations of conditions for more efficient operation of enterprises by creating a field and incentives for initiative, increasing effort, better organization and technological progress. But we cannot limit ourselves to this. We must also be concerned with creating economic pressure that will materially affect everyone who does not know how to exploit the opportunities for improving efficiency, who does not know how to change the habits and methods of work. The reform cannot, therefore, be "good" for everyone, because then it will not be good for the economy or for society as a whole.

This problem, in various forms, was considered during the conference discussions. There were those who criticized specific solutions in the economic-financial system because they were too difficult or severe for their plant or branch. Sometimes those very people who complained about the high rate of inflation at the same time demanded additional money for wages or investment, relief and preferential treatment. There were other voices also, and they finally added a tone to the debate on the subject of reform; they stated that we will not make progress without effective close adherence to the hard regulations of management, the principles of hard money, and, therefore, regulations favoring efficiency. This does not mean that there was no well-founded criticism, for example, of the somewhat late introduction of changes in specific mechanisms, the frequency of these changes, and the lack sometimes of adequate coordination between certain financial solutions and economic policy.

The party expressed a decided will for further effective inculcation of the reform. In the paper of the Politburo this was formulated as follows: "The reform is and will remain our greatest reserve and opportunity. But we are far from exploiting its potential fully. We must stop arguing for and against the reform and we must learn it and apply it effectively."

In the resolution of the Ninth Congress there was an entry stating that strengthening socialist democracy requires "the creation of self-government of the workers in enterprises, self-government equipped with legislative authority and answering the aspirations and needs of work centers, particularly workers in key industrial plants, as well as initiating the enforcement of the new principle of self-dependent and competent organs of agricultural and cooperative self-government and self-government of city residents. Under conditions of communal ownership of means of production, self-government should ensure that the workers have the right to participate in decisions on communal matters. The congress is responsible for rebuilding self-government of the workers on the basis of communal ownership of means of production."

No economic mechanism operates of itself -- it is either well or badly managed by people. The reform creates a field for initiative, for more effective actions, but these actions must be undertaken by the work force, the workers, engineers, economists. At the same time, on this basis, the reform assigns additional new tasks to party organizations which, by acting on the behavior and attitudes of people, should direct the process of changes in the economy, in the plants. Workers' self-government is an exceptionally important element in this process, it becomes a constructive force that supports the reform. Examples of such action occurred in the paper of the Politburo and in the discussion.

Undoubtedly there is a need to develop forms of action and cooperation of the party organization and workers' self-government. Self-government in its present form, with present authority, has not been in existence very long. We must, therefore, gather experience, and generalize that which practice proves. Many motions were made on this matter. Much depends on the attitudes and authority of party members in the plant, on whether the party organization is creating conditions for partnership and for constructive cooperation between self-government, the administration and the trade unions.

In information on the subject of the state of the economy presented by Vice Premier Zbigniew Messner, member of the Politburo, much attention was given to the matter of balance, inflation, and providing consumer goods. The Ninth Congress also stressed concrete tasks in this matter. Carrying out these tasks is exceptionally difficult, but it has enormous economic and social significance. As one of the delegates said, the worker evaluates the reform and actions of the government in economic matters by what he has in his pocket and by what is in the store. While what he has in his pocket depends to an ever greater degree on his own work, the relationship between that work and supplying the store is not always as direct and obvious. And even if the market is provided with certain articles so that supply and demand approach a balance, there is still a great deal to be done to make this progress meet social expectations.

Of the large number of matters and problems discussed and debated at the conference, I have selected only a few since the wealth of elements does not permit a comprehensive discussion of the entire achievement in a single commentary, not even of all the economic matters, let alone the problems that are strictly political or international.

I must, however, emphasize that the conference evaluated critically the achievements of the period that passed since the Ninth Congress, but it concentrated mainly on what lies before us, on the tasks that must be accomplished in the immediate future and later. The past months, so full of difficult, pressing political and economic matters, did not encourage thinking of the future, or making real plans for the longer term. At the conference, the thinking about prospects, about programs that go beyond the nearest months, or even years, was already clear. On the one hand, this is a symptom of changes that have already taken place, and, on the other, an expression of the vitality of the party, its sense of responsibility for the country, its ties to the fate of the people. This idea was expressed by Wojciech Jaruzelski in his presentation: "Socialism persists, grows, and is becoming stronger in the world and in Poland. It knows how to defend itself, to overcome mistakes, to find the true course on the march. It is also the only future for our country."

2950  
CSO: 2600/834

ROMANIA

DECREE ON MINISTRY OF EDUCATION, INSTRUCTION AMENDED

Bucharest BULETINUL OFICIAL in Romanian Part I No 22, 19 Mar 84 p 2

[Council of State Decree Amending Some Provisions of Decree No 469/1971 on the Organization and Operation of the Ministry of Education and Instruction]

[Text] The Council of State of Socialist Republic of Romania decrees:

Article I--Decree No 469/1971 on the organization and operation of the Ministry of Education and Instruction, which became Law No 17/1972, with subsequent modifications, is amended as follows:

1. Article 18 will read as follows:

"Article 18--The Ministry of Education and Instruction is headed by a minister, two deputy ministers and two state secretaries.

The deputy ministers and state secretaries are appointed by presidential decree and their functions are stipulated by the steering committee of the Higher Council for Education and Instruction."

2. Article 28 will read as follows:

"Article 28--The Ministry of Education and Instruction has the following organizational structure:

- a) Directorate for Pre-school, Elementary and Gymnasium Education;
- b) Directorate for Lycee, Vocational and Master Worker Education;
- c) Directorate for Higher Education, Scientific Research, Foreign Students and Foreign Relations;
- d) Directorate for Social Sciences, Educational and Sports Activities;
- e) Directorate for Personnel, Training, Organization and Control;
- f) Directorate for Planning and Finance and the Ensuring the Management of the Material Base;

- g) The Secretariat-Administrative Service;
- h) The Department for Instruction in Languages of the National Minorities.

The organizational structure, according to work departments, the maximum number of positions and the list of functions in the apparatus of the ministry have been specified in annexes 1-3\*), which are an integral part of the present decree."

Article II--The provisions of Decree No 367/1980 on measures for the rational utilization of personnel in the socialist units, whose application has been extended by Decree No 476/1983, does to apply to positions in the apparatus of the ministry, to positions from which working personnel in other units will be transferred for the purpose of supplementing the number of personnel in the ministry apparatus, and to positions in other units to which working personnel, reassigned as a result of reorganization, will be transferred.

Working personnel who are transferred from the ministry apparatus to other units or from other units to the ministry apparatus, in accordance with the provisions of the present decree, are considered to be transferred in the interest of the job.

Personnel transferred in the interest of the job or assigned to duties with lower levels of remuneration, as well as persons who have no job as a result of the application of the present decree, benefit from the rights stipulated in Article 21 of Decree No 162/1973 on the establishment of unitary structural norms for economic units.

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\* The annexes are being transmitted to the institutions concerned.

Nicolae Ceausescu  
President of the Socialist Republic of Romania

Bucharest, 16 March 1983

No 96

CSO: 2700/172

ROMANIA

DECREE ON MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS AMENDED

Bucharest BULETINUL OFICIAL in Romanian Part I No 22, 19 Mar 84 pp 1, 2

[Decree of the Council of State Amending Some Provisions of Decree No 589/1969 on the Organization and Operation of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs]

[Text] The Council of State of the Socialist Republic of Romania decrees:

Article I--Decree No 589/1969 on the organization and operation of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which became Law No 38/1969, with subsequent modifications, is amended as follows:

1. Article 11<sup>1</sup> will read as follows:

"Article 11<sup>1</sup>--The Ministry of Foreign Affairs is headed by a minister, a minister state secretary, three deputy ministers and a state secretary."

2. Article 16 will read as follows:

"Article 16--The central administration of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has the following organizational structure:

- a) Directorate I;
- b) Directorate II;
- c) Directorate III;
- d) Directorate IV;
- e) Directorate V;
- f) Directorate for Foreign Economic Relations, Treaties and International Organizations;
- g) Directorate for Culture and the Press;
- h) Consular Directorate;
- i) Directorate for Organization, Personnel-Training, Protocol and the Secretariat;
- j) Directorate for Finance and Accounting, Supply and Administration;
- k) Diplomatic Courier and Cable Service.

The organizational structure, according to work departments, the maximum number of positions and the list of functions in the central administration of the ministry have been specified in annexes 1-3\*), which are an integral part of the present decree."

3. Article 17 is abrogated.

Article II--The provisions of Decree No 367/1980 on measures for the rational utilization of personnel in the socialist units, the validity of which has been extended by Decree No 476/1983, does not apply, for a period of 90 days from the date of the present decree, to positions in the central administration of the ministry and to positions in units to which and from which personnel are transferred as a result of the application of the present decree.

Article III--Personnel who are transferred from the central administration of the ministry to other units, as well as those who are transferred from other units to the central administration of the ministry are considered to be transferred in the interest of the job.

Article IV--Personnel transferred in the interest of the job or assigned, within the ministry, to duties with lower levels of remuneration, as well as personnel who have no job as a result of the application of the provisions of the present decree, benefit from the rights stipulated in Article 21 of Decree No 162/1973 on the establishment of unitary structural norms for economic units.

\* The annexes are being transmitted to the institutions concerned.

Nicolae Ceausescu  
President of the Socialist Republic of  
Romania

Bucharest, 16 March 1984

No 94

CSO: 2700/172

ROMANIA

BRIEFS

NEW DEPUTY CHAIRMEN--On the basis of Article 97 of Law No 57/1968 on the organization and operation of the peoples councils, the President of the Socialist Republic of Romania decrees that comrades Gheorghe Daogaru and Nicolae Simion are delegated to fill the position of deputy chairman of the executive committee of the Giurgiu County People's Council. [Excerpts] [Bucharest BULETINUL OFICIAL in Romanian Part I No 19, 14 Mar 84 p 2]

PEOPLES COUNCILS APPOINTMENTS--On the basis of Article 97 of Law No 57/1968 on the organization and operation of the peoples councils, the President of the Socialist Republic of Romania decrees that Comrade Nicolae Mihalache is delegated to fill the position of chairman of the executive committee of the Constanta County People's Council and Comrade Tudor Constantin is delegated to fill the position of chairman of the executive committee of the Dolj County Peoples Council. [Excerpts] [Bucharest BULETINUL OFICIAL in Romanian Part I No 23, 23 Mar 84 p 4]

CSO: 2700/172

YUGOSLAVIA

SCHEDULE OF ELECTORAL CHANGES IN FEDERAL-LEVEL FUNCTIONS

Belgrade BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 14 Mar 84 p 4

[Excerpt] When, toward the end of last year, we talked about 1984 as a crucial year for the realization of the Stabilization Program, we forgot to some degree that this would be an election year.

We have in mind the end of the terms of office of almost all leading officials in the assemblies, assembly councils and other working groups of sociopolitical entities--from communes to the federation. To some officials their 1 -year, to others a 2-year term is expiring and they have to yield their positions to others. In sociopolitical communities only, thousands of new officials have to be elected this spring. The calculation is simple; if there are 520 communes in the country, and each one has to elect at least 4 to 5 new leading persons, it is clear what a job this is. Altogether, it is estimated that about 10,000 officials will be elected on all the levels this spring.

Start of the New Team

Without counting the members of the SFRY Presidency, in the federation alone about 40 officials have to be elected--from the chairman and vice-chairman of the SFRY Assembly, through assembly councils, to many working bodies of the "Federal parliament." It is the turn of the second change, since they have a 1-year term except for the SIV and management organs, whose term lasts 4 years.

Naturally, the public is presently most interested in the election of new members of the SFRY Presidency, which by the Constitution is the collective chief of state. It has already been announced, and expressions of support are arriving from communes and other milieus that the SFRY Presidency should from 15 May of this year have a completely new personnel set-up. Except for Radovan Vlajkovic, who is a member of the present Presidency and has been nominated by Voivodina to be a member again, the following officials will be in the Presidency for the first time: Veselin Djuranovic (Montenegro), Sinan Hasani (Kosovo), Lazar Mojsov (Macedonia), Branko Mikulic (Bosnia-Hercegovina), Stane Dolanc (Slovenia), Nikola Ljubicic (Serbia) and Josip Vrhovec (Croatia).

The ninth member of the collective chief of state is ex officio the chairman of the Presidency of the Central Committee of the SKJ.

#### Changes in the SIV Also

Members of the SFRY Presidency are elected, according to the Constitution, by republican and province assemblies by secret ballot with a 2/3 majority, and it is known that this election must be completed by 15 April.

According to the already well-known order, the present chairman of the SFRY Presidency, Mika Spiljak, should be replaced by the representative of Montenegro, Veselin Djuranovic, followed by representatives from Voivodina, Kosovo, Macedonia, Slovenia, Serbia, and Croatia. The vice-chairman of the Presidency is elected in the same order. Let us also mention that the term of the members of the Presidency is 5 years and that they can be elected twice at most, and that the chairman and vice-chairman of the SFRY Presidency are replaced every year.

As for the Federal Executive Council [SIV], for the time being the only (almost) certain thing is that it will see two changes. As two present federal secretaries--for foreign affairs (Lazar Mojsov) and for internal affairs (Stane Dolanc)--are candidates for membership in the SFRY Presidency, it is clear that other people will take over their positions in the SIV after the elections for the SFRY Presidency cannot perform any self-management public or other social function (except in sociopolitical organizations, or any other professional activity).

It is still not known who will come to these two significant ministerial posts.

According to the Constitution, this is a matter for the incumbent, the chief of government, Milka Planinc, who has broad authority in the selection of officials. The incumbent freely chooses personalities, obviously taking into account and respecting the rules about representation and criteria for the election of federal officials. Members of the SIV, federal secretaries and chairman of federal committees are otherwise elected, appointed and dismissed by the SFRY Assembly at the joint session of both Councils, at the suggestion of the chairman of the SIV.

Will these be the only two changes in the cabinet set-up, in addition to the earlier one when Janez Florjancic ceded the position of federal secretary for finances to Vlado Klemencic, is difficult to tell now.

The chairman of the SFRY Assembly is also giving up his office this year (the next chairman will be chosen among the Voivodina delegates) and so do chairmen of all the sociopolitical organizations in the federation: Kosovo will give up the chairmanship of the Presidency of CK SKJ, and Macedonia the secretariat (with a 2-year mandate). The new

**ORDER OF OFFICES IN THE FEDERATION**

Year	Assembly	Presidency	Presidency	Conference for the Social Activity of Women	Confederation of Trade Unions of Yugoslavia	Federal Council of SUBNORJ	Presidency of SK SSOJ
	Chairman	Chairman	Secretary	Chairman	Chairman	Chairman	Chairman
1984/85	Vojvodina	Kosovo	Macedonia	Slovenia	Bosnia- Herzegovina	Serbia	Vojvodina
1985/86	Kosovo	Montenegro	Macedonia	Macedonia	Bosnia- Herzegovina	Bosnia- Herzegovina	Kosovo
1986/87	Croatia	Bosnia- Herzegovina	Serbia	Montenegro	Macedonia	Macedonia	To be agreed upon by republics and provinces
1987/88	Slovenia	Vojvodina	Serbia	Bosnia- Herzegovina	Macedonia	Croatia	"
1988/89	Macedonia	Macedonia	Kosovo	Serbia	Croatia	Slovenia	Croatia
1989/90	Serbia	Croatia	Kosovo	Kosovo	Croatia	Montenegro	"

1-year chairman of the CK SSRNJ must be from Slovenia, and the secretary from Bosnia-Hercegovina. According to the order, a representative of Voivodina will be the chairman of the Confederation of Trade Unions of Yugoslavia, and a representative of Serbia will be chairman of the Conference for Social Activity of Women. It is Kosovo's turn for the chairman of federal Committee of SUBNOR of Yugoslavia (Ilija Djukic, present chairman of the Assembly of Kosovo, has been proposed as the candidate), and Voivodina Assembly chairman has been proposed for the chairman of SK SSOJ.

[Insert: "Elections in the SK [League of Communists]"]

The new chairman and secretary of the SK Presidency will be elected at the level of the CK SKJ. In Bosnia-Hercegovina also, new party officials will be elected.

In Macedonia everybody has to be elected too, but it is possible to renew the terms of the secretaries of the presidency in commune committees and republic CK's. Milan Panchevski, present secretary of the Presidency of Macedonian CK SK has been renominated for that post. New officials will be elected in Montenegro too, and in Slovenia all party officials have the possibility to be elected to one more 2-year term. This is valid for Serbia too, except in the case of the chairman of the presidency of republic CK SK, Dusan Ckrebic. His second 1-year term is expiring, and Ivan Stambolic, chairman of the city committee of Belgrade SK, has been proposed as the new chairman.

Voivodina, Kosovo and Croatia are also getting new party officials--from the communes to the republics and provinces. Presidency chairmen are being replaced for the second time.

12455  
CSO: 2800/250

JOZE SMOLE DISCUSSES DEGREE OF LIBERALISM IN LJUBLJANA

Belgrade BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 22 Feb 84 p 5

[Interview with Joze Smole, president of the city committee, League of Communists of Ljubljana, by Jovan Pjevic]

[Text] Smole: We are not persistent enough in developing comprehensive, continuous cooperation with other capital cities, although we have proclaimed an open city policy. The basis for Ljubljana's development has been the concept of a unified Yugoslav market, and we are struggling against the monopoly of individual local associated labor organizations. Sometimes, the question is asked about some "local" occurrence receiving publicity in other republics. Communists must take a bolder stand in such debates, for contradictory or unacceptable theses can and dare no longer be decided by administrative bans.

The discussion printed here was with Joze Smole, president of the Ljubljana City Committee of the League of Communists, who in performing this responsible sociopolitical function makes wide use of the experience of his many years in journalism and the diplomatic service. He is not at all "tormented" by the dilemma as to whether he is a professional politician, journalist or diplomat, for in public social activities, he intertwines all of these functions. We began by asking whether the commonly-held opinion was true that in resolving Ljubljana's current and developmental problems and questions, not enough attention is paid to the relatively great scientific research, cultural and general intellectual potential available in the city, which has 30,000 of the some 80,000 employees in Slovenia with higher and advanced education. All of the more important republic scientific, cultural and educational institutions and organizations are located in the city.

[Smole] All of those institutions and all that creative potential take active parts in the city's economic and social life, and in planning and guiding its development. For example, last year at the level of the City Committee alone, more than 160 scientific, cultural and educational workers took part in various social actions. Naturally, that does not mean that in this regard, everything is in the best possible condition, and that we can give in to self-satisfaction.

[Question] Ljubljana has a large so-called technological intelligentsia, but it seems that to some degree it is neglected, that its activity is limited to its place of work and organization.

[Answer] It is an accurate assessment that the intelligentsia is insufficiently included in resolving problems of development at the opstina and city level, but it is very involved in the labor organizations. Many faculties and scientific institutes, such as for example the Jozef Stefan Institute, are included directly in deciding problems of development of economic and other organizations, and they base their joint cooperation on profit relationships. We must support and stimulate this type of cooperation more, for without the direct involvement of science and specialists as a whole, we will be unable to reconstruct our industry and other economic and social activities and prepare them for equal competition in world markets, for attainment of higher quality in products and operations, for reducing production costs per unit and liberation from the lethal logic of increasing income by price structure and the like. Without engaging that creative potential, it is impossible to plan correctly to determine which industrial and other economic activities are most suitable for Ljubljana, or to implement an orientation toward new technology, and especially toward the development of microelectronics. In a mood of self-criticism we must admit that in this regard we have not activated all available creative forces, and therefore that is now one of the priority objectives of the League of Communists, as well as of all other sociopolitical organizations, self-management agencies and assemblies.

[Question] Is that one of the reasons that you frequently warn that it is wrong and harmful to carry out stabilization in social activities primarily through restrictive measures?

[Answer] There we need a selective approach. The situation in which we find ourselves and the tasks before our economy require greater investments in scientific research work, particularly that which is directly involved in resolving development problems of the economy, as well as in education, health care and culture.

[Question] Some believe that these activities have not yet begun to behave in a stabilized manner and that such a position contributes to the continuation of their previous extensive developmental pattern.

[Answer] In a linear fashion, cutting off resources supports that kind of development, for on the one hand, it contributes to the survival of those who are not worthy of it, while on the other hand it prevents the development of activities that contribute directly to the growth of labor productivity in the economy and to its technical and technological advancement. Therefore, we need selective measures in order to bring those activities into direct dependence on the economy, to eliminate irrational decisions, pettiness, lack of ties and other weaknesses, and force them to a more rational division of labor and to functional integration. For example, the treatment of certain major developmental questions requires a division of labor among scientific research organizations at a Yugoslav level, and not just in Ljubljana or Slovenia.

[Question] We often hear the criticism that so-called opposition forces from the capitals or the larger cities are interconnected, while there is insufficient cooperation between the city leadership of the League of Communists and of sociopolitical organizations.

[Answer] And we should not look at such ideological and political questions in the framework of a single city. Rather, we must keep the whole country in mind and seek greater cooperation in that regard. That joint cooperation must include all our reviews and organs of public information as a whole. In considering crucial cultural, artistic, ideological, political and similar questions, creative people throughout Yugoslavia should take part.

[Question] In that case, would there be less suspicion regarding certain "debatable" questions and negative occurrences?

[Answer] Certainly. Now some people ask why this or that article about some "local" matter is published in another republic. If there were more direct cooperation, such prejudices and reproaches would disappear. Thus it is essential that communist intellectuals become involved more boldly in those debates, that they enter the ideological battle, but with arguments, for contradictory or unacceptable theses and strivings can and dare not be resolved by administrative bans, arbitration and the like. In this regard, it is precisely the communist intellectuals in the capitals that have the greatest obligations. Incidentally, in this we cannot simply proclaim all criticism to be opposition activity. We must show the necessary tolerance and by democratic and reasoned dialogue, build a unified ideological front throughout the country.

[Question] One hears criticism that the League of Communists city organizations (primarily the city and five opstina committees) have not been included sufficiently in current debates. These reproaches appear in Ljubljana magazines and are heard among journalists. They indicate that you are leaving the entire issue up to the founders. Is that perhaps because the founders are important figures in the republic, or are these comments exaggerated?

[Answer] There you need to differentiate between two things. Founders have their obligations, which in large part they fulfill. To be specific, the University Conference of the League of Socialist Youth, as founder of the student journal TRIBUNA, has been very responsible in seeking to resolve problems at the editorial offices, and it has advocated a new conception of the paper. It has acted in the same manner regarding the "Student" radio station. Sociopolitical organizations must first work actively, and within that framework members of the League of Communists must work. There can be no division into forums that place certain things under the sole control of republic agencies, while others are controlled only by city or opstina agencies. It is particularly important that those debates and initial differentiations reflect the basic LC organizations in separate editorial offices and journalists' collectives, as they do, although we cannot say that such activity is everywhere sufficiently intensive and effective.

[Question] The current ferment in the Ljubljana press presently is getting much more attention in other republic capitals than in Ljubljana.

[Answer] For us that is a natural, normal thing, just as similar occurrences are seen practically every day in economic organizations, in connection with developmental programs, etc., and no one makes a special issue out of it. It is harmful when much is made of such things in a sensational manner, so that an impression is created throughout Yugoslavia of some sort of crisis in the Slovenian press. A false dilemma has also been created around the question as to whether or not we support a satirical humor newspaper. No such dilemma exists. We know what satire and humor are, and what the publication of unverified information, libel and the like is. Normal check-ups are being made of the editorial policies of those newspapers and magazines, and the public at large should be included in this process, for practice has shown it to be not good when such questions are discussed only by various forums and editorial councils. In that manner we will not be able to achieve the desired socialization of informational activity. We must also struggle for greater expertise and responsibility in considering particular problems and topics. We say that there should be no taboo topics in our society, and that means at the same time that we must write with more expertise and responsibility about individual questions. In short: fewer taboo topics, more expertise and responsibility.

In Ljubljana there are favorable circumstances and "climate" for creative actions, not only by intellectuals, but by all other working people and citizens. There is the desire and the need for developing comprehensive and systematic cooperation with other capitals in the country, but concrete results still lag markedly behind the real possibilities and needs because of accumulated formalism in political work and in self-management and operational decisionmaking. The city leadership is aware of these facts, and that is a guarantee that in the future Ljubljana will develop more successfully as a truly open self-management community in every regard, and that together with the other capitals, it will make a greater contribution to better mutual acquaintance, understanding and reconciliation of the Yugoslav peoples and nationalities.

#### Not Enough Cooperation

[Question] It seems that there is not enough cooperation between Ljubljana and other capitals of Yugoslavia.

[Answer] We perceive that on the level of city sociopolitical organizations, we are not active enough in developing comprehensive, continuous cooperation with other republic capitals, although we have proclaimed a policy of an open city and are striving to implement it, even if our efforts are not resolute enough. On the other hand, recently more guest performances by artistic and cultural ensembles have been seen in Ljubljana, largely thanks to Cankar House. Individual artists have also performed from throughout the country. Contacts and cooperation between scientific institutions are also expanding. We have gone farthest in pooling resources with basic labor organizations from other parts of the country for investments in producing agricultural and food processing products for the needs of Ljubljana's people.

This cooperation is very well developed and has already provided good results. The development of Ljubljana is based on the concept of a unified Yugoslav

market, and we are struggling against the monopolies by individual "local" associated labor organizations, and for healthy competition in the city itself. For now, when many products are in short supply, it is difficult to speak of competition, but we must think ahead. Thus we will strive even more resolutely for the presence of increasing numbers of associated labor organizations from throughout Yugoslavia, in Ljubljana. We have already discovered that that is an important factor for quality, successful development of the city's economy and the consumers' welfare.

[Question] The representatives of LCY organizations of the capitals used to meet occasionally to exchange opinions, but then that practice was dropped. It appears that someone did not like having direct communications between the capitals, outside the framework of republic and province leadership.

[Answer] Working agreements between leaders of not only the LCY but all other sociopolitical and social organizations and opstinas can only be useful, and therefore, they should be organized from time to time. The capitals have many common or similar problems, so that exchanges of experiences are essential and useful. Exchanges of opinions and experiences in the first place should contribute to the creation of a favorable climate for more comprehensive and continuous collaboration between labor organizations from all regions. We do not advocate manifest, forumlike cooperation, but cooperation between labor cooperatives, for better mutual acquaintance between working people and citizens.

#### Healthy Polemics Should be Nurtured

[Question] Ignorance of the true situation in some republics, and in Ljubljana itself, has led some people to say that the magazine NOVA REVJJA is the "paid opposition" of the League of Communists of Slovenia.

[Answer] We have not had any special debate about that magazine in the LC city organization, and so I can only give you my personal opinion. It is senseless to say that it is "paid opposition." To me the basic question is whether we communists are ready to carry on debate with theses and standpoints presented by some who write for that review. It is a mistake that we have no polemics about the topics they initiate there. If the editorial board were to take the position of a monopoly, then naturally that would be unacceptable. We could not tolerate such tendencies. I am speaking in principle. Otherwise, we must nurture healthy polemics in magazines and work for democratic clarification of disputable questions. Currently there are enough such polemics between the reviews, but they should also appear within individual reviews, which so far has not occurred, and which is a major weakness. Naturally, democratic debate and polemics cannot be conducted with certain authors who slander the League of Communists or its individual members, or other citizens. If such writers are members of the League of Communists, then they should be expelled.

12131  
CSO: 2800/242

YUGOSLAVIA

SLOVENE UNIONS OPPOSE FURTHER DECLINE IN LIVING STANDARD

Ljubljana DELO in Slovene 6 Apr 84 p 2

[Article by Helena Kos]

[Text] Maneuvering room for the growth of prices has already been exhausted, unless we assent to triple-digit inflation and a corresponding reduction in the standard of living. The unions cannot permit one or the other. The way out lies in stimulating the broadest working classes to overcome the opposition of those who are obviously not satisfied with the principle of remuneration according to work, to resist the all-too-present policy of averaging and to impose just measures themselves for a new method of behavior based on the stabilization measures.

In that way they would be able to epitomize the essence of the ideas expressed in the first part of the conference of presidents of opstina, interopstina and city councils of the Trade Union Confederation of Slovenia on basic characteristics of the temporary sociopolitical conditions among workers in organizations of associated labor and work communities.

The president of the Republican Council of the Trade Union Confederation of Slovenia, Marjan Orozen, acquainted conference participants with the measures that the Federal Executive Council and the Federal Assembly, respectively, are preparing. He also spoke of the results achieved by the Slovene economy last year and its movements in the first quarter of this year. It is especially, worrisome, he emphasized, that real personal incomes continue to fall--already by 9 percent this year--even though in the resolution we anticipated at most a 2-percent decline in real personal income this year. The trade union must analyze above all the effect on income of management; it must become more deeply involved in financial movements; it must ask why, together with relatively high growth in social productivity, we have such a growth in expenses and an extraordinary falling behind in amortization. All liabilities must be combed out from income; it is necessary to be aware that man and his personal income come first. All else comes after.

Also taking part in the conference of trade union officials in Lipica was Martin Mlinar, president of the Chamber of Associated Labor of the Assembly of Slovenia. He informed the participants of the tasks which await the delegates in the next months and invited the presidents of opstina trade union

councils to stimulate discussion with the delegation to the republican assembly, particularly with the delegation to the Chamber of Associated Labor, which will discuss each and every measure that is being prepared to implement the first phase of the stabilization program, especially in connection with preparations for relieving the economy and for greater financial discipline. In short, measures are at stake which would contribute to returning the activity of the economy to economic principles, as well as measures which would once more give self-management greater material bases.

In another part of the conference, the trade union officials will arrange the activities of basic organizations of the trade union confederation in organizations of associated labor and communities for achieving agreed-on goals. They will arrange tasks in the sphere of division of income, with special regard to the preparation of work agreements, and acquaint themselves with the essence of modifications in the area of social policies.

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END